THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE MIND BACK OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

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THERE is a class of facts that trouble every school of philosophy seeking to explain the phenomena of mind.

They are the workings of the mind in mysterious methods and regions outside of its ordinary activity, breaking in upon consciousness in an imperial way. They are of different kinds and functions; as, the assumptions and conditions of thought which the mind has not worked out but finds furnished at hand; the inspirations that come unexpectedly into the realm of thought to enrich and ennoble it; and the intellectual processes that go on in the dark, when we not only give no conscious force to secure them, but seem to devote elsewhere all our available energy, while they spring into finished form from their unknown retreat.

Writers on psychology, in forming their systems, generally give their first and principal attention to the more obvious and commonplace phenomena, such as occur fully within the reach of consciousness or even of the senses; and then, when

their theory is completed and they feel secure in their position so far, they construct an annex for these obtrusive, neglected wanderers. But, as in the case of other annexes, the spirit, genius, and purpose of the principal establishment go over into the annex. The philosophy that rules in perception and cognition is the philosophy that colors the interpretation of the more subtle phenomena. The consequence is, these most subtle and kingly forces are often treated as if they had no substantial reality, no claims,—as if they were merely a play of color, a phosphorescent sheen, arising from the other powers and workings of the mind, and no other account need be made of them, than to point to them and state their insignificance and marvellousness. Instead of being approached reverently and docilely as material of prime importance,—to issue commands and to mould theories,—they are generally regarded as something to play with, or for conjurors to turn into any shape they please for amusement.

But why may not these phenomena be accepted as central and fundamental in psychological inquiry? Why may not they stand out in all their naked force, requiring other facts to be explained in harmony with them, and not that they should be explained under other facts? If we begin our psychological discussion with sensation, why need we work along that line exclusively, giving us only a sense-philosophy? Why may we not, when we come to facts that naturally report themselves in consciousness and the workings of the mind as of another order and issuing from another realm, recognize them as such and entitled to separate and co-ordinate authority in our systems? Why, in fact, might not a psychology be constructed that starts from this higher source and comes down to cognition and sensation, with as much propriety as one that starts from these and goes up to the higher phenomena?

It is not the object of this paper to sketch or propose

any such system, but the far more modest and humble one of enumerating some of these mysterious phenomena, and making an hypothesis for their explanation.

The hypothesis is, that the *spiritual principle in man—the mind, or the soul—is only imperfectly in possession of the organs*, and is *able to report only a small part of its own activity in consciousness;* that it has reserves of power and intelligence which it has no adequate physical means of using, or even of conveying to our knowledge; and that here, in the irruptions of this, is the source of those gleams and surprises of intelligence which come so strangely at times within the horizon of thought.

This hypothesis will be assumed, as the phenomena in question are discussed, as an easy way for their presentation, to give them perhaps an added interest, and to save a separate adjustment and application of theory to the facts. It will not be my aim to give a complete or logical analysis and presentation of the phenomena of this curious department of mind, but only such portions of them, and in such a form and order, as bear on the hypothesis. This method must be borne in mind, or our psychological study will seem unnecessarily ill-digested and crude.

Let us begin with instances in which this unknown power uses the *physical organs*. In the case of organs that are highly and exquisitely trained, we sometimes witness, back of them, the workings of an energy and an intelligence that comes from a region beyond consciousness, springing noiselessly and invisibly across it without planting a recognizable footstep, and wielding the facile organs, now a sympathetic and semi-spiritual instrument, according to its own will. The fingers of the musician may be so trained that they can be worked without separate specific volition, and, so far as that is concerned, execute automatically the bidding of the unknown power that sweeps down into them in a movement so subtle and rapid as utterly to elude observation. The

sense of touch may become so exquisite that through it the hidden observer—the mind above the conscious mind, locked up in secret chambers of the brain—will clearly receive a score of distinct impressions before consciousness has detected the elements of sensation entering into them. A trained eye may pass by a show-window filled with toys and goods, give them a single glance, and the invisible one behind the brain will take them in, and hold them fast on his camera; and it will take the conscious intellect a long time subsequently to travel over the details of this one swoop of vision and bring them separately into cognition.

There are many ways of explaining these phenomena. That is not the point here. No matter now what the explanation is. I refer to these curious facts because what is true of these experts and those with specially trained physical organs may indicate latent possibilities in all men. There is no reason to believe that there is anything radically exceptional in these men, anything in the structure of their minds. The difference between them and others is this, that in their case the latent possibility is brought out; with others it is not.

When the absorbed artist sweeps the instrument with a storm of forces which his slow intellect does not individually summon and guide, and he himself, in his conscious being, is swept by it as by a power back of himself, to which he gives himself up in a general surrender, not in conscious particulars, this hints that this reserve of power, this something, exists as a possibility within all men, and that all would have the benefit of it, were its possibilities within them brought out by having their organs trained according to its needs.

Take the case of the *orator*. He uses a high grade of organs. There are impassioned, rapt moods, when, through the quickened senses and reason, he takes in, without any conscious volitional process, a dozen different things almost at the same moment; as, the general condition of the audience, the expression of individual faces, the thought uttered,

the thought to be uttered, its suitable expression, the choice between synonyms, the pronunciation of words, the emphasis and tone, with back glances at the ground gone over, and forward glances at the ground to be traversed, and the end to be carried. At such times something in him, with ubiquitous insight and sovereign power, seems to have possession of him, rather than he of himself, and to be working through him, now a facile medium, its own lordly purpose. A prominent pulpit orator in New York once said, that in his highest moods it seemed to him "as if a little fellow in the top of his head did the work for him, and he had only to allow himself to be used, and the torrent of oratory came forth." In a sketch of the life of Henry Ward Beecher is this account, given by himself: "There are times when it is not I that is talking, when I am caught up and carried away so that I know not whether I am in the body or out of the body, when I think things in the pulpit that I never could think in the study and when I have feelings that are so different from any that belong to me in the lower or normal condition that I neither regulate them nor understand them. I see things and hear sounds, and seem, if not in the seventh heaven, yet in a condition that leads me to understand what Paul said—that he heard things which it was not possible for man to utter." It would appear that when the conditions are favorable, when the mind is thoroughly disciplined, the vocabulary mastered, the whole body in sympathy and responsive, gesticulation natural and spontaneous, the subject well thought out, the purpose noble, inviting the reserves of help, and the speaker well assured of the urgency of the interests at stake,—when, in short, all the *impedimenta* are reduced to a minimum, then a power from behind, higher than the plodding conscious personality, issues from his retreat, takes up the facile implements, and dominates the orator. Intuitution takes the place of thought. The results of various complex reasonings are borne in, to shape and direct

the rapid current of oratory, before the speaker has detected what he is about. He feels himself an instrument, not the master. Another presides at the organ, pulls out the stops, and touches the keys, while he merely hands over the overture. May not this hint what marvellous powers may be locked up behind other brains, having no opportunity to disclose themselves?

Poets, also, have had a kindred experience. It is said of some that, when the afflatus was on them, the conceptions came pouring in with such rapidity that a hundred pens could not have transcribed them; and these conceptions came not in vague, nebulous visions, but in definite verbal imagery and rhythm. Coleridge declared that the fragment "Kubla Khan" burst upon his vision in a dream, burning its impress on his memory so that he was able to write it down, on waking, word for word, till he was unfortunately interrupted by a call, when he was never able to recover the remainder.

Frances R. Havergal writes: "I have a curious vivid sense, not merely of my verse faculty in general being given me, but also of every separate poem or hymn, nay, every line, being given. . . . . I have not had a single poem come to me for some time, till last night, when one shot into my mind. All my best have come in that way, Minerva-fashion, full grown. It is so curious, one minute I have not an idea of writing anything, the next I *have* a poem; it is *mine*. I see it all, except laying out rhymes and metre, which is then easy work."[1]

Indeed, the whole process of *true creative art* is interesting in its bearing on this subject. Most creative *ideals*, in the first instance, come mysteriously, as from afar, or another world, before the vision of the artist. He thinks of them as given to him, as dawning upon him. He does not reach them by mechanical approaches, by displacing one experi-

[1] Memorials, pp. 82, 93.

ment by another till he finds something that suits him. The vision is golden, enrapturing, transcendent, from the start. Something has given it to him. A remarkable illustration of this is given by Miss Havergal: "In the train," she writes in a letter to a friend, "I had one of those curious musical visions, which only very rarely visit me. . . . I seemed to hear depths and heights of sound beyond the scale which human ears can receive, keen, far-up octaves, like vividly twinkling *starlight* of music, and mighty, slow vibrations of gigantic strings going down into grand thunders of depths, octaves below anything otherwise appreciable as musical notes. Then, all at once, it seemed as if my soul had got a new sense, and I could see this inner music as well as hear it; and then it was like gazing down into marvellous *abysses* of *sound*, and up into dazzling regions of what, to the eye, would have been light and color, but to this new sense was *sound*."[1]

After the original creative vision, comes the real artistic struggle, the test of genius, the work down on the plane of volitional effort. It is to find the means, in marble, or color, or sound, to capture the ideal, and fix it, not bind it as a chained slave, but retain it in sweet joyous liberty, for the admiration of mankind. Here all the resources of culture and art come in. The aim is to embody the ideal in the fitting material; and to this end the ideal, which came at first as a whole, must be carefully studied in the details, and settled to the artist's eye; solidified to his imagination, like the fixed outlines of a temple. Sometimes, while occupied with the minutiæ, in this way, he becomes confused, and the ideal eludes the attempts to chase it down. In that case he generally desists from work for a time; thinks of something else, in a totally different region; gives the imagination rest, and thus quickening; and waits in sympathetic, expectant state over against the object of his desire. Suddenly a light shoots through the confusion. The difficulty has been

[1] Memorials, p. 152.

cleared up. The discovery has been made for him. An intelligence he did not know of has been at work, and given him the advantage of its insight. In a similar way, when, after this travail, he comes to put the ideal in form, if he is embarrassed by the prominence and glare of the details in hand and does not know how to proceed, a similar respite and turning away to other things, for a time, not unfrequently brings the aid of the unknown artist. He sees now, without having himself thought it out, what to do to produce the desired effect. The knowledge is brought to him.

There is often a similar experience, also, in connection with *literary* composition of the common sort. Who has not carefully treated a subject, finished his paper, laid it aside, and given himself to other studies, and then, when his thought was far away in another realm, had an inward reviewer appear abruptly before him, and tell him of serious *lacunæ* in his treatment of the theme, or of wrong positions taken?

Practical *moral questions* present many illustrations. We are often placed in circumstances that give us great moral bewilderment. The motives from without that press upon us are likely, at first, to present their unmoral end to us,—appealing to convenience, interest, enjoyment, ambition, honor, pride, reputation,—and turn away from us or conceal their moral end; and, in deciding the course of duty in this medley of motives, we are perplexed. If at such times we stop, step out of this atmosphere into another, soon a right moral judgment dawns upon us, through all the sophistries, as clear as daylight. It will need no coaxing, only a knowledge of all the facts, and a state of moral equilibrium in which it can be brought to us.

Says Dr. Carpenter: "There are things which are clearly right, and things which are clearly wrong; there are things which are clearly prudent, and things which are clearly imprudent;—but a great many cases arise in which even right

and wrong may seem questionable, or opposing motives in themselves good may be so balanced that it is difficult to see where our duty lies; and again there are cases in which it is difficult to say *what* is prudent;—and I believe that in all such cases, where we are not hurried and pressed for a decision, our best plan is to let the question *settle itself* by unconscious cerebration; having first brought before our minds, as fully as possible, everything that can be fairly urged on both sides."[1] This is quoted for the fact stated, not for the explanation, which we shall see is unsatisfactory.

Intellectual processes on profound *scientific* subjects, also, sometimes go on in the dark. Dr. Carpenter relates several instances. He mentions the case of an eminent mathematician who, when a boy, had tried his skill at a difficult problem, in vain. It was put aside and almost forgotten. Many years after, in the small hours of the night, a solution occurred to him. He jumped out of bed and solved the problem. "The effect," he said in giving an account of it, "was strange. I trembled, as if in the presence of another being who had communicated the secret to me."[2]

In a way equally remarkable was the method of Quaternions discovered by Sir William Rowan Hamilton, as he himself afterward stated in a letter to a friend: "To-morrow," says he, "will be the fifteenth birthday of the Quaternions. They started into life, or light, full-grown, on the 16th of October, 1843, as I was walking with Lady Hamilton to Dublin, and came up to Brougham bridge. That is to say, I then and there felt the galvanic current of thought *close;* and the sparks which fell from it were *the fundamental equations* between i, j, k; *exactly such* as I have used them ever since. I pulled out, on the spot, a pocket-book, which still exists, and made an entry, on which, *at the very moment*, I felt that it might be worth my while to expend the labor of at least ten (or it might be fifteen) years to come. I felt a

[1] Mental Physiology, p. 532. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 536.

problem to have been at that moment *solved*—an intellectual *want relieved*—which had *haunted* me for at least *fifteen years before.*[1]

Indeed, it is one of the commonplaces in scientific discovery, that elect minds, having mastered the literature of a subject and investigated all the accessible phenomena bearing on it, often have the glad vision of the law running through and explaining all, come suddenly upon them from an unexpected quarter and in an unexplained manner. The sight of the new vision coming grandly into view thrills and awes, and they tremble in the presence of the august helper, whose presence they feel but cannot see. To give the instances would be to write the history of science.

Memory, also, presents another great psychological mystery. Familiarity with it, alone keeps it from seeming quite as wonderful as the unknown help in solving the dark problems of science. *Memory* is very different from *recollection.* Recollection is subject to the will; memory is not. In recollection we do the work; in memory it is done for us. Recollection is an open library; the contents in alcoves, accessible, free; and we go round where we please, and know where to go, and we take down of our store what we choose, and make use of it, and then put it back: memory, which we never consult till we have ransacked recollection, is a mysterious apartment; never open, inaccessible, served by a masked and muffled custodian, whom we never hear or see, and who delivers his treasures at our bidding, and only at his own uncertain pleasure. We have learned by experience that the best thing to do, when we cannot find in recollection what we want, is to go to the door of this mysterious apartment, ring the bell, slip our message into the drop-box, go quietly and unconcernedly away about our other business, and patiently bide the time and movements of the freakish custodian. Whenever it suits him, if it suit him at all, there

[1] Mental Physiology, p. 537.

is no signal, no warning, but the first we know the desired information is flashed out on the bulletin-board. It is done with such celerity and subtlety that we never catch him in the act or see the machinery.

Oliver Wendell Holmes' words are worth quoting: "We wish to remember something in conversation. No effort of the will can reach it. Presently, perhaps some minutes later, the idea we are in search of comes all at once into the mind, delivered like a prepaid bundle, laid at the door of consciousness like a foundling in a basket. How it came there we know not. The mind must have been at work, groping and feeling for it in the dark: it cannot have come of itself. Yet, all the while our consciousness, so far *as we are conscious of our consciousness*, was busy with other thoughts."[1]

Further, there are certain fundamental *philosophic* questions that bring us to another curious chapter of this subject. I refer to those general truths that are assumed as the condition and the atmosphere of thought, and are not deduced from thought. They are not so patent as the axioms of science, but quite as pervasive and influential in thinking. They are such ideas as Cause, Time, Space, Substance, even *Mind* itself.

It does not lie in the purpose of this paper to discuss these ideas, but only to refer to the way in which they are delivered to us. It may be true, as Lotze holds, that few of these universal and legislative truths, by which acquaintance with the particulars of knowledge is to be gained, are "innate in their detailed completeness." He says of them, "We only possess a single germ of higher insight which, according to the varying favor of circumstances, may be developed to a more or less orderly or a more or less tangled growth."[2] Yet the fact is, this growth is not so

[1] Mechanism in Thought and Morals, p. 38.

[2] Microcosmos, Vol. i. p. 685.

much pushed up from beneath, elaborated and constituted out of elements of experience, as mysteriously produced from above, growing downwards on the occasions of experience and according to experience; for it involves, in its higher forms, elements and reaches which the human reason, shut up to experience for its data, cannot give. If it is a growth, it is the growth of a supernatural germ from a region of pure reason. If not a growth, might it not be regarded as the whisperings, the best possible in dull human ears, which open only at the touch of experience, whisperings of the higher mind within,—the mysterious mind,—the mind back of the mind,—that can only here and there find one to whom it can utter the full, ringing, transcendent message?

So we come at length to the question of the origin of the conception of the *mind* itself as an entity. For, as Lotze says, "we cannot make *mind* equivalent to the infinitive *to think*, but feel it must be that which thinks; the essence of things cannot be either existence or activity, it must be that which exists and that which acts." "Thinking *means* nothing, if it is not the thinking of a thinker: acting and working *mean* nothing, if in endeavoring to conceive them we leave out the conception of a subject distinguishable from them from which they proceed." [1] In accordance with this, we perceive our thoughts, but the mind, the thinker, keeps out of sight. This does not even show itself as a hooded and cloaked monk. It hides behind the walls of its cell, keeping its own secrets, never betraying itself, never showing a flash of the eye or a motion of the finger: and yet we know it is there. It is a revelation from the unknown realm. There is something strange, also, in the way in which this thinker thinks for us. He gives us no idea how he does it. When we are interested or excited on any great theme and thinking on that subject, we do not consciously gather the downy fibres and wisps, the raw material of thought, and delib-

[1] Microcosmos, Vol. i. pp. 548, 549.

erately spin and weave them into the desired fabric: but out leap the thoughts from his cell in rounded periods, as a magician thr ows out of his empty hat bolts of ribbon and yards of silk, of unknown origin. This sudden appearance of thoughts on the field, like ghosts from an unknown world, with no perceptible sound or motion or gleam of the thinker, and no clinking or appearance of the machinery by which it is brought about, would be a perpetual marvel to us, were we not so familiar with it.

Thus all the higher philosophic truths involved in the substance of our thinking, and more or less also in the very background and texture of consciousness itself, are not the outcome of a drilled intellect, or an uplift of intelligence from the senses, or deduction from materialistic conceptions, but the raying down of supersensible light—light coming from afar through rifts into consciousness—from a nature veiled; not an emanation from physiological psychology—the mirage of an earthly scene cast on the sky,—but gleams of the descent of supersensuous psychology—the dip of a celestial city on the mountain-top in full view.

If we go further, to the origin of *moral* distinctions and imperatives in the human mind, we shall come again upon the borders of this secret domain. The moral world is one of the distinguishing possessions of man. None of the lower orders of being have it; and none of the powers or faculties which man has in common with the lower orders, or analogous to those of the lower orders, can eliminate it and give it to him. It comes to him as an inflow from an unknown source, but a source obstructed and thwarted, in part, in delivering it. "Human nature," writes Lotze, "everywhere carries about with it the thought of duty and obligation; but what it is that corresponds to these notions, and what kind of action they require, it has to find out by degrees in the course of development. I need not insist on the twofold character of that which we here affirm:

on the one hand, the power of experience to develop; but, on the other hand, and just as important, the original presence of the germ on which this power operates. Satisfactory results will never be reached by attempts to show that a consciousness of obligation can be produced in a soul which is wholly blank, by the mere impressions of experience." [1]

Not only is this original germ in the mind, but a marvellous power to reach down and introduce moral distinctions to conscious thought and enforce their claims. Though concealed, this power works authoritatively, with the emphasis of destiny often, making the whole being cower and tremble before its mandates. Out of sight itself, it flashes light, sometimes lurid and appalling, like lightning, out of other worlds into the soul. These effects are not produced by causes that lie in the range of consciousness. They are the scintillations and gleams from a power in the higher ranges of the soul, that can only imperfectly express itself here, and which we cannot measure or fully interpret.

Another department of this peculiar kind of facts may be found in the way in which we reach belief in *God and the supernatural.* There are many different kinds of argument to prove the existence of God; as, the argument from design, the ontological argument, the moral argument. I have no need to discuss these separately; one is more convincing to one person, another to another. But their relative value is not the point. In the case of each, there is a great distance, even with those to whom it is most satisfactory, between its real logical worth and its practical effectiveness. The irreducible difficulty, the radical vice with each, is, it is a net of *finites* to catch the infinite. Our premises have to do with the finite, and we cannot pile up finites into a conclusion that shall give us, logically, the infinite; as, the being of God and the realities of the supernatural world. Not, I say logically: but practically, morally, we can do it again and

[1] Microcosmos, Vol. i. pp. 686, 687.

again. For with all our arguments there are higher reserves and forces of mind—the unrecognized being hidden away in the depths of the soul, that tugs away at our convictions all the while to bring us up to the belief and the discernment of the reality of God. The argument may fail, tested by hard logic; but this succeeds with its flashes and revelations and sidelights. Often, long before the logical argument has been completed, when few of the evidences have been stated, merely by having God suggestively *pointed at*, the conscious mind, thus helped and led on by the unconscious mind back of it, leaps to the belief, and rests in it in joyous trust. The magic wand of this unseen charmer makes the suggested argument—the instruction given a child at the knee of its mother, or to a Sabbath-school class by its teacher, or the story of a missionary to the heathen—all that is necessary, a line of golden light up to the Supreme Object, the existence of which the heart may never after doubt. Without waiting for completed intellectual proofs, the working mind is caught up by the higher mind back of it to glad and victorious faith, and there abides. If, later, in some mistaken after-experience, it cuts itself adrift from its unseen helper, and falls down to the cold, lifeless, logical method, and attempts to deal with God and the supernatural only in an intellectual, logical way, reasoning on finite data, it plunges into doubt, cheerless and trackless; but this can be only by falling from its own higher self hood.

There is another class of phenomena which ought perhaps to be referred to. It is a class connected with abnormal operations of the mind, and does not run its roots down into the common experience of mankind. It is a class, consequently, which is regarded with suspicion, and is not of very high repute, as a basis of induction. I refer to *trances*, *inspirations*, *elevations*, *visions*, transcending the ordinary or natural activity of the mind. These witnesses cannot altogether be put out of court simply because they are not of

our speech and race. We may not feel the stirring of like powers; yet there are so many instances, that seem to be well authenticated, of persons in health and persons diseased, of persons having this state come on them mysteriously and of persons brought to it by manipulation, of persons who are honest and have no motive for deception, and persons who are simple and could not carry out deception, who assert that they have risen to these extraordinary heights, that we cannot, with any generous faith in testimony, pay no attention to them. It does not concern us now whether the genuine cases of this transcendency are many or few; but, whatever the number and whatever truth there be in them, they betray, back in the secret chambers of the soul, freer, it may be wilder, powers than any of which the individual is conscious at other times. Powers, usually bound, then slip their leashes and assert their freedom. Energies, kept in secret chambers, come upon the stage and act their strange part. Buried knowledge, stored away in the dark, is spirited from its retreat and brought forth into the light of the sun, to the marvel of astonished eyes. Reaches of insight bordering on supernatural discernment, extending over into untraversed realms of truth, betray possibilities of mind that had never been suspected, and which, in fact, could not find the means of expressing themselves in ordinary conditions. The abnormal state betrays the secret power.

Such are some of the strange phenomena we are considering, with the involved hypothesis for their explanation. The facts are the main things: the hypothesis, which I have used as a string on which to present them and make them intelligible, is of less importance.

Other explanations may be proposed. "*Unconscious cerebration*" is the hypothesis of Dr. Carpenter for the solution of a portion of the facts. But "unconscious cerebration" explains nothing. It is only another name for mys-

terious hidden activity of mind. And it does not touch the essential point, that the hidden activity we are considering, far transcends, both in quality and degree, the conscious purposed activity, and stands off in a sphere by itself. Nor does he show how *such* cerebration—cerebration of this unique, transcendent kind—is possible or even conceivable. Nor indeed is it, unless we concede that the mind has hidden reserves of power, which is our hypothesis.

Still less satisfactory is the supposition of A. L. Wiggen, in his treatise on "Duality of Mind," that "each hemisphere of the cerebrum has a separate mind," and that, on certain occasions, "the two hemispheres may be considered as carrying on a conversation with each other, or working separately in some cases."[1]

There is also the *pantheistic* hypothesis: "We float in God." No, not that, "God floats in us." No, not that, "Our floating is a part of God, and God's floating gives us being." According to this, these unusual uplifts and revelations crossing the ordinary horizon of consciousness are merely larger pulses of the All-throbbing where we perceive them, a fuller and richer determination of the self-evolving current, on its rounds of universal circulation, for the moment in our thought. But this theory is not available; as, in addition to all the other objections to pantheism itself, it conflicts with our sense of the integrity and completeness of our personality, and with the conviction that these higher moods and activities come within the range of our own selfhood, and are properly our own moods and activities, though springing from a source deeper than the ken of consciousness.

Then there is the hypothesis of a mysterious *race-connection* between the individual and the rest of mankind. In virtue of this, it has been thought that, what the race has gained, of wisdom, knowledge, skill, insight, may be transmitted by heredity and transfused by the solidarity of the

[1] Quoted by Sir B. C. Brodie, p. 21.

species and mysteriously buried in individuals, as secret latencies and potencies, ready at any unexpected moment to burst forth and surprise us; or, instead of propagating itself in this way, the higher knowledge may, by some occult influence, leap from the person endowed with it, light with muffled foot in another mind, and there proclaim itself. But this last theory in both its forms goes a great way to find an explanation of the facts. In reference to the first, the secret endowment of individuals by heredity, there is no evidence that there is any such umbilical cord between the individual and the race, or, if there were such a cord, that it is a medium for the secret transmission of intelligence; and, in reference to the latter, the mind-reading supposition,—it is admitted by its advocates that it is no part of the normal experience of mankind, is an irregular and unnatural function, and does not explain the origin of any of the grand, healthy, transcendent acts we are considering.

There remains, in addition to our own, the theory of *inspiration.* I do not deny that there may be divine inspiration in our day; that men are often directly helped up to great thoughts, discoveries, works, by the warm girdings and inspirations of God. In this way, there may be gleams of knowledge, flashes of insight, breaking in on human vision directly from him "in whom we live, and move, and have our being." But we are investigating a class of facts most of which more or less characterize all men, or have their roots in all men; facts which belong to the orderly, regular development of mankind, though on a unique and extraordinary side of that development; facts which seem to come under a law of that development,—a higher law of its own,—and do not need the supposition of immediate inspiration, as they can be rationally explained otherwise. And it is alike unscientific, unphilosophical, and unchristian, to infer direct divine action when other explanations are adequate.

We therefore fall back on our own hypothesis as a con-

venient string on which to hang the facts, *the mind is only in part in conscious possession of the body.* It has reserves and reaches of power which only under favorable conditions it can find the means, in its clumsy physical environment and organs, of hinting to us or others. At such times, the mind above the mind acts, and flashes its higher and surprising light, out of our own hidden personality, within the reach of consciousness. Lotze's words are significant. "The finite being always works with powers with which it did not endow itself, and according to laws it did not establish; i. e. it works by means of a mental organization which is realized not only in it, but also in innumerable other similar beings." This excludes the theory of inspiration for the explanation of our phenomena. "Hence in reflecting on self, it may easily seem to it as though there were in it some obscure and unknown substance, something which is in the Ego though it is not the Ego itself, and to which, as to its subject, the whole personal development is attached. And hence there arise the questions, never to be quite silenced, What are we ourselves? What is our soul? What is ourself—that obscure being, incomprehensible to ourselves, that stirs in our feelings and our passions and never rises into complete self-consciousness? The fact that these questions can arise shows how far personality is from being developed in us to the extent which its notion admits and requires."[1]

It may be interesting to note that our hypothesis is quite in the line of the scriptural doctrine, that man was made in the *image of God.* The greatness and the royalty of this image may well be supposed to be unable to express itself fully in its corporeal investment and organs. Ovid, in his "Metamorphoses," represents certain persons as turned into trees, and only with difficulty and at intervals able to make their presence known by sighings. In all souls may there not be a hidden spirit, the better part of ourselves, sighing again

[1] Microcosmos, Vol. ii. p. 686.

and again, waiting for opportunities to attract attention, and now and then uttering a tone of touching divineness? This hypothesis, also, agrees with the intimations of *immortality* which we find in our nature. The sighings and voices in that part of our pent-up personality which we are considering are, so to speak, the reverberations and echoes of immortality on the earthly side,—or rather, the advance-couriers, come to sound in our dull ears, as they can, the waiting fact of immortality. The outlying soul, the undeveloped soul, the imprisoned soul, knocking at the earthly gates, and now and then finding an opportunity to drop a ringing message down into the earthly courts where it is found, shows that there is something in us worthy of immortality.

Further, this hypothesis justifies our feelings of the *greatness of human nature.* This feeling is generally rather an unintelligent one. It rests on piling up earthly qualities and achievements, rather than on discovering in us grand spiritual insights and powers. Our man is great because he is cyclopean, encyclopedic, pyrotechnic, volcanic. But when we see that there are grand reserves of soul—powers, higher, more imperial, more divine, in us,—and that it is the unconscious play and sheen of these, around and in our conscious thought-world, that stirs this feeling and gives it its finest quality, we perceive that the estimate of the greatness of man is justified, and he rises, rationally, to colossal grandeur. And when he shall have come out of his prison, and spread his folded wings, and taken an investment and organs suited to his disenthralled power, he may really be great next to God, as it is said of him: "Thou hast made him a little lower than God."[1]

But we must give up the pursuit of this mysterious activity of mind. We have seen it does more than come out from behind the screens and cut capers, to amuse and astonish. It is the master actor. It dwells in the holy of holies of our being. It handles first, and then hands over to us, the reali-

[1] Ps. viii. 5 (Heb. and Revision).

ties of supreme interest. It is this that looks out into the eternities, and thrusts its head into the other world, and talks with God, and then comes down to us, as it is able, and gives us the echoes. It is this that, rapt and seraphic with such communings, gives us insight and impulse in the direction of things supremely pure and beautiful, ideal and divine. And it is this that, ever sitting at its enduring loom, weaves for us the web of conscious unchanging personality and conscious unchanging identity, not out of the floating disconnected gossamer flecks of our swift vanishing states of consciousness, but, using these as woof and the objects of his own eagle-eyed changeless insight as warp, it weaves the web, and hangs it where we can see it or feel it. This is the centre and head of the regnant personality, the support and bond of the transient experiences and untrustworthy powers: surviving all catastrophes, continuing through all changes, seeing the corporeal, intellectual, moral stages come and go, but itself always the imperturbable, regal, inscrutable, immortal, rational Ego.

ARTICLE II.

EGYPTIAN ETHICS.[1]

EACH of the great nations of antiquity had, so to speak, its mission in the world; the special mission of the Egyptians appears to us not the least noble in the development of the civilization which is the pride of modern times.

This history presents itself to us in three divisions.

To the Babylonians is due incontestably the merit of having created commercial law, with a marvellous knowledge of the questions of interests, of business, of the transformation and the utilization of different values; with a surprising intuition of the fundamental principles of political economy.

Among the Greeks human thought expanded to wondrous amplitude. Poetry spreads its wings, and charms by its divine songs. Eloquence is no longer the spontaneous accent of a heart that is moved: it becomes an art that is cultivated, I had almost said, a science. Philosophy giving body to abstractions, proclaims the reign of the idea, the worship of the beautiful.

But law, taking this word in its highest meaning; morality, its application to the relations of men to each other; the equitable organization of the condition of persons and its consequences; the science of the human soul and its destinies,—this was, pre-eminently, in the education of humanity, the share of this Egyptian people, who were far more ancient than the Greeks.

In the Orient as in the Occident, among the Jewish

[1] [A lecture delivered in the School of the Louvre by Professor Eugene Revillout. Translated from the Revue Internationale de l' Enseignement, Paris, May 15, 1889, by Florence Osgood.]

prophets as among the historians, the poets, and the philosophers of Greece, there existed the same almost unlimited admiration of the sages of Egypt. It is the sages of Egypt to whom Isaiah can find no opponent but the wisdom of Jehovah. It is to them that Pythagoras, Solon, Plato, the most illustrious of the Greeks for their wisdom, went to be taught as disciples, according to the stories of their times; and we have often had occasion to show that these statements of the ancients are confirmed by documents recently discovered, so that, for instance, we now know with certainty that Solon copied many of the laws of Athens after those of Egypt.

Of all that has lasted until our time, ethics, as we understand it, is pre-eminently of Egyptian origin. Strangely enough, we can even say that, while among other ancient peoples ethics was the result of religion, one is led to think at the first glance that in Egypt it was in some way independent.

There were in Egypt a large number of learned men who were, properly speaking, only moralists, as were, at a relatively recent period in our western world, Isocrates, Epictetus, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, etc. Is not the oldest book in the world the Egyptian book of the "Maxims of Ptah-hotep," going back as far as the fourth dynasty, that is, to an epoch so remote that everywhere else it is lost in the night of time? And later, under the Ramessides, have we not the "Maxims of the Scribe Ani," another book of pure ethics of the same kind? To the same class belong also the numerous analogous treatises written in demotic, as well as curious Coptic treatises that have been published.

Wisdom [a book of the Apocrypha], whose Egyptian origin St. Jerome saw clearly, and several centuries afterward, the *Decrees of the Council of Nice*, written by the great Athanasius, are the legitimate results of this peculiar literature, whose productions were counted by thousands in the valley of the Nile.

I have no doubt, for my own part, that this movement

started exclusively from Egypt, to propagate itself throughout the ancient world, as the weakened echo of a sound. Outside of Egypt all seems to us curtailed. How small does Isocrates himself, so celebrated as a moralist, seem beside the old scribes of ancient Egypt! For Isocrates certainly did no more than put in circulation the translation of ancient works from another country than his own. We have proof of this at each step. How otherwise in his treatise addressed to Demonicus could this Athenian have recommended this citizen of the republic of Athens to reverence the king, to obey his orders as sacred laws? All of this savours of Egypt and comes from Egypt. The ancients then were perfectly right when they traced everything to these old masters who said to Herodotus: "You Greeks, you are only children."

I have previously used the expression, the independent ethics of the Egyptians. We must not give this expression too much of a modern dress. If ethics was independent of religion, it was because this ethics was to the Egyptians religion itself. In fact, whatever idea one may form of Egyptian mythology, which has been so much discussed and about which there will be discussions for a long time; whether the Egyptians were or were not monotheists at heart and polytheists in form; whether they worshipped their sacred animals as gods, or as symbols, or as fetiches: one thing is certain and incontestable, that the essential element of the true Egyptian religion was man and his destiny.

Let us not think, however, that this religion was merely an atheistic philosophy, like Buddhism; and that a final Nirvana, nothingness, or absorption in the universal Being, was considered the supreme result to which the highest virtue could attain. No; the Egyptian believed in God, and he believed also, on the same ground, in the immortality of the human soul. The guilty alone would be beheaded in the other world. It was by virtue that the soul should be puri-

fied and elevated, as later among the Buddhists. But this was in order to become another god, another Osiris, though remaining always absolutely distinct from the "Osiris of heaven," to use a demotic expression, that is to say, the "good being," the martyr for the right, who represented the divinity in its highest acceptation. Consequently it was of little importance whether one worshipped Amon at Thebes, Ptah at Memphis, or elsewhere a crocodile, a cat, a jackal. The important matter, the one thing necessary, was to imitate Osiris and to become another Osiris, the great prototype of virtue, as well as of virtue persecuted.

In the books of morals, then, one may eliminate all other worship but that of virtue, the beautiful, the good, and the true: the truth by which one must live and which must be shown in all one's works, according to the Egyptian expressions. Undoubtedly the Egyptian sages, preoccupied with the beautiful and the good, did not always contemn the useful in their counsels. It is such an axiom as a Jew could copy without ceasing to be a Jew, but without copying the others.

To be a new Osiris, like him impeccable, like him deified: this was the ever present thought of the Egyptian during his life, and his ideal after his death. This we find from the time of the earliest dynasties, with Anubis and the other elements of funeral worship, with the desire for revivification, for a resurrection, for happiness beyond the tomb; sometimes a little materialized, but sometimes also illumined by grand views. As the sun disappears below the horizon, soon to reappear as brilliant as before; as nature darkened by the signs of autumnal decay, resumes, soon afterward, all the glory of its springtime youth: so, the Egyptians believed, man himself, having vanished from the world of the living, should one day reappear in it more glorious than ever. Hence the care they took to preserve to man his first body. Hence the funereal invocation of the sun in whose boat the

dead journeyed. Hence the libations poured out upon the tomb and destined to water the eternal germ. Hence also the numerous prayers, designed to avert from the soul, during its voyage across the lower hemisphere, the terrors and dangers of this nocturnal journey. But, at the same time and above all, to this belief was due the extreme care which the moralists took to show men their duty; for it was the complete accomplishment of this duty, and, I repeat it, an almost absolute sinlessness, with which were intimately connected, for the Egyptian, the legitimate hope of becoming another Osiris, enjoying eternal happiness. Of the penitential side, so highly developed in the ancient Babylonians and in the Hebrews, which gave rise, in the one as in the other, to many admirable psalms having for foundation the repentance of sins past, we find only a trace among the Egyptians. In all our monuments in the Louvre, we have only found one or two, a little pyramid No. 43, for example, where one sees Osiris besought to remove all evil, all sin from the person of the dead, that he might find favor. It is only during the last epoch, and in consequence of foreign influences, that the idea of repentance, of intercession, and of pardon gains importance. We see it clearly in the Papyrus of Pamont, dating from the time of Nero, as well as later, among the Egyptians of the Christian epoch, after the Council of Alexandria, held by St. Athanasius in A. D. 362. But in the most ancient monuments, as in the first Coptic documents, sinlessness is the rule. The deceased vaunts himself as having been the pre-eminently honest man, a hero of virtue, in accordance with the statements in the one hundred and twenty-fifth chapter of the "Book of the Dead," to which we shall soon return. Upon this condition alone he became another Osiris, and could be adored as truly as the celestial Osiris.

You have no doubt often traversed the lower halls of our Egyptian galleries. In the multitude of inscribed stones, of

bas-reliefs, which they contain, you will, perhaps, not find ten on which this fundamental idea is not distinctly expressed, together with facts whose remembrance they wished to insure. With greater reason no contrary doctrine can be found. If some strong mind, epicurean in reputation, like the great priest Pserenptah, father of a prophet of Augustus, wishes to insinuate into the minds of his readers a doubt concerning immortality, he takes great care to surround it with pious formulas and to multiply as much as possible the funeral rites. It was so at all times in Egypt: for the general opinion was opposed to incredulity. Let me add that this dogma of the deification of the dead elevated the living also, as we have already shown, and as we shall continually show in our course on Egyptian law. In Egypt all men could become Osiris: and this supreme deification effaced in great part the inequalities of condition in terrestrial life. Especially charged with the funeral services for his father, the son is pictured in them accompanied by all the rest of the family, the upper servants and the slaves included. In fact, they will find the dead again in the other world and become, like him, other Osirises. In default of the son, in default of all other members of the family, it is upon the slaves that the worship of the dead devolves. And, by a reciprocity which in no way recalls the religion of ancestors, as the Chinese understand it, or the subordination of the family in the Roman world, when the son dies before his father and mother, it is they who adore him, in the first rank, in his character of Osiris. You will see pictures of this kind on the monuments in the Louvre numbered c 178, c 176, c 52, c 184, and on many others. When all three are dead, the son takes his place between his father and mother, as in c 72, where, in default of relatives, the slaves render them the funeral worship. Sometimes the son foresees this final reunion while he still lives, and appears as the maker of the funeral tablet. He then joins beforehand with his deceased

parents, in adoring the celestial Osiris; and when he has himself rendered them the funeral duties, he seats himself opposite them on his eternal seat (see No. c 82). Or else (c 211) he prays for himself, for his wife, as well as for his father and mother.

We have already said that, in the family, the sons were, in the first place, charged with the funeral duties. But a very large number of funeral tablets show either a brother, a sister, or a beloved wife performing or causing the same funeral rights to be performed (see Nos. c 22, c 40, etc.). All classes of society are mingled, so to speak, near the new Osiris, in a common homage: the steward, the servant, the nurse, defile before his eyes, and sometimes the latter is represented as suckling the child, who is pictured as a man in the same record, and who is adored as God. Dates and chronology are of small consequence, since the dead now shares in the divine eternity. Certain funeral tablets, No. c 34 for instance, represent at the same time Osiris young and Osiris old facing one another; while the legend recounts the good works of the dead and recommends him to the prayers of the priests whom he has loaded with benefits.

The resurrection, the eternal happiness of him who has done right, are the sanction of Egyptian ethics. In respect to these the latest rituals bear a strange resemblance to the most ancient monuments. All the complicated mythology which filled, during the classic epoch, the Book of the Dead, is obliterated again. They now only speak of the deceased, of Osiris himself, who is surrounded and escorted by the divinities beyond the tomb, the judges of the sacred tribunal: that is, by Osiris of heaven, Hathor of Amenti, Horus the avenger of his father Osiris, Anubis the conductor of souls, the divine mourners, Isis and Nephthys, Thot the recorder of the judgment. They declare the dead justified, deified. They describe the joy that awaits him. They speak of the virtues which have deserved this eternal joy, and that is all.

I shall analyse for you in a few lines the demotic ritual of Pamont, of the time of Nero, which we shall study in coming lectures; at present let me enter into some details. This ritual is composed of several chapters: The first has nothing corresponding or analogous, as far as we know, in the hieroglyphic or hieratic specimens of the Book of the Dead. It is devoted to a brief summary of the whole doctrine of the deification of the dead. Here is the literal translation: "Writings of pir em hou:[1] "O Osiris Pamont, whom Tsepsemont bore! Thy name is known. God is satisfied with the inspiration of thy heart. Osiris is joyful. Thou receivest incense, libations, every day of eternity, from the hands of Isis and Nephthys. Horus is peaceful beside his king. He takes his repose. Near thee is truth. Hathor exalts thee. Anubis, he who shrouds the body, makes thy bands. He makes thy flesh like that of Osiris-Khent-Ament.[2] He rejoices in thy eternal duration. He receives thee into the place of truth. He makes thine eyes to see, thine ears to hear, thy foot to walk in and out. He takes away all the impurities which are in thy soul. In this state of stability, thy hand is pure, of perfect purity. Thy heart is in the truth, far from all falsehood. Thou dost eat, thou dost drink by thy throat. A pure oil is on thy flesh. Thy limbs purified, without perspiration, are animated [3] by the hand of Su.[4] Men mourn for thee. The women lament over thee.

[1] "Book of *Pir em hou*" is the general title of the great funeral ritual. This word means "to go out in the day" or "before the day." The preposition *em* has the double sense of "in" and "of."

[2] *Khentament* means "dwelling in Amenti," that is, in the abode of the dead. It refers therefore to the funereal Osiris, who is represented mummified and enclosed in bandages.

[3] It is curious to see that among most of the ancient nations the same root expresses the ideas of breath, soul, and vital animation.

[4] The solar God.

The mourners cry out to fulfil the prayers of Sensen.[1] It is Thot who is thy protector, who has written them himself with his divine hand. He makes thy words good before Osiris. Thou lookest into the hall of truth. Thine embalming remains there: thy bones are there."

Here there is a gap of one line. Undoubtedly they here contrasted the hope of a good resurrection with the funeral lamentations; for the text continues thus: "[How great are] thy beauties! Thou approachest the earth without a fault. Thine are the resplendent spirits! Thine are those who love Osiris! He shall call thee to enter the divine abode. Thou sailest towards the sky. Thou unitest thyself with Osiris: no one putting any obstacle in the way of thy rejoicing. Thou walkest upon the earth. Thou goest to Amenti: thou sittest there without opposition from any one. Thou goest to Tiaou: thou dost join the spirits; thou dost praise Osiris. He says to thee: Fear not! come! He causes thy burial to remain in Amenti. Thy name lives in the world. Thy house remains for thy children and thy people. Great is thy name for all eternity!"

Such is the first chapter, serving as an introduction.

The second, equally unknown until now, is a spoken picture, if I may so express myself. It is the description of the judgment-hall, almost the same as represented either by paintings or drawings in a great number of funeral papyri, in the vignettes relative to this chapter about the appearance of the soul before Osiris. Notice, however, that one person, the goddess Hathor of Amenti, who is also called in the texts the goddess Amenti, plays an important part in this spoken picture and does not appear at all in the vignettes. According to the latter, the scales rest upon the ground; while in our

[1] The word *Sensen* is found again in the title of one of the funeral books. The root means "to breathe" and consequently "to animate." "The prayers of *Sensen*" may then be understood to mean the prayers having as their object the resurrection.

papyrus, this goddess Amenti holds the scales on her arm. Must we believe that the author of the Pamont ritual was inspired by the representations on some sarcophagi, where the goddess Ament, facing the goddess Nout, personifies the lower world and supports the dead, while Nout personifies the upper world and covers the dead? Must we believe that, consequently, the ground of Amenti is to be understood by these words: "The arm of the goddess Hathor of Amenti holding the scales"? At all events, Amenti would be perfectly personified. She who holds the scales is a great goddess, the supreme queen. She weighs man and consequently plays the principal role. Isis and Nephthys, who are sometimes represented in the great judgment, behind the seat of the judge, that is, the celestial Osiris, but whose funeral role is to watch over Osiris when he lies upon his funeral couch, here accompany Pamont, whilst he himself becomes another Osiris. They hold the place usually occupied by truth, or the two truths, behind the dead person who is being judged. The result of this judgment is foreseen. Isis, in fact, carries a lily,[1] which she presents to him, and in a *neb*, vase, a pure offering. He also holds a lily with the stalk, which Anubis has placed in his band, as in the vignette of a papyrus in Leyden. Here, translated word for word, is the description forming this second chapter:—

"The gods of the hall of truth: the forty-two gods who administer justice, as attendants upon Horus,[2] in the upper part of the hall of truth.

"A princess Hathor of Amenti, the supreme queen. She weighs the soul, and it is her arm that holds the scales. The left hand of Thot is at the right of this one.

[1] The word *sensen* means "the lotus" in the hieroglyphic representations; but it translates "lily" in the Coptic biblical books, and in the Pamont ritual a symbolism, analogous to that of the lily with us in these days, seems to be attributed to it.

[2] Sesu hor. See what is said, later on, concerning this expression, so celebrated in the hieroglyphic texts.

"Horus, the avenger of his father, verifies her weight, and Anubis grasps it upon the part where truth is. He puts it in equipoise with that part of the scales wherein he himself [Pamont] is. Thot reads from the writing in a book. His hand is upon the platform where the goddess of destruction sits, having in her hand a knife, having a sword and a sceptre, *hek*, before her. [There is] the man whose hand Anubis has filled with a lily and its stalk: on the flowering stalk are the four gods Mesu Hor.[1] A divine power, which is Isis, is behind him. She places near them [the divine judges] a *neb*, vase, wherein are pure offerings, and she holds a lily out before her. Behind her, on one side is Isis, and on the other side Nephthys."

I have already said that the vignette here described is so placed in the funeral papyrus as to form part of the one hundred and twenty-fifth chapter. It is the same with this spoken picture in the Pamont papyrus. The scenery being thus arranged, the curtain rises upon the judgment of the soul.

Listen first to the declaration of the man who is soon to appear:—

"Writings which penetrate into the hall of the gods who judge, to make man good, to make him see the face of the gods: 'I present myself before you, O lords of truth! I present myself before thee, great god, lord of justice! I come toward thee, my lord, to see thy beauties. I know thy name. I know the names of the forty-two gods who are with thee in the judgment-hall. Thy name is lord of justice. I have accomplished it, justice. I have made known your name, lords of truth. I have also brought the truth to you. I have kept harm far from you.

'I have not lied to any man.

[1] The four *Mesuhor* are the four funeral spirits, Hapi, Kebhsennuf, etc. They are called *Mesuhor* by the demotic and hieratic rituals of burial. In the Leyden papyrus mentioned above, the dead hold the four funeral spirits upon the flowering lotus stalk.

'I have not done violence to the widow.

'I have not spoken the false word in the place of justice.

'I have done no wrong.

'I have not obliged a man to work each day more than was meet for him. I have not kept in prison[1] the men who depended upon me.

'I have made none infirm. I have made none poor. I have not done that which is the abomination of the gods.

'I have done no wrong to the slave before his master.

'I have not caused hunger. I have not caused thirst.

'I have not caused mourning.

'I have not commanded treacherous murder.

'I have not eaten the sacred bread (or the revenue) of the temple. I have not offended the master of the gods. I have not taken away the sacred loaves. I have not sold the wrappings of the dead.

'I have not defrauded in weighing upon the scales.

'I have not taken away milk from the little child.

'I have not removed grass from before the cattle.

'I have not stolen the fish belonging to God.

'I have not turned aside the water (of the fertilizing irrigation) at the moment of its issuing.

'I have not made a dam before the water to turn it aside.

'I have not extinguished the flame at its legitimate hour. I have not troubled the sacrifices of the gods. I have not troubled the cattle of the divine domain.

'I have not offered violence to a god in his manifestation.

'I am pure in every way. My purity is that of the god

[1] Throughout the ancient world, private persons had prisons for their slaves and often for their debtors. We know from a series of demotic contracts that it was only under Darius, and not under Bocchoris, as Diodorus of Sicily pretended, that it became impossible in Egypt for people to give their persons as surety for their debts. In Rome the celebrated Appius Claudius, who loaned a great deal of money, had immense prisons constructed, where he incarcerated his debtors and which he complacently called "the domicile of the Roman people."

who is in Heracleopolis. There is nothing false in me in this land of judgment. As I know the names of the gods who are with thee in the hall of judgments, save me from them.'"

Here ends the first part of the negative confession, which contains an affirmation of innocence from almost every kind of fault which could have been imputed to the deceased. It is clear that what we call charity plays here an important part; and duty towards man is placed on precisely the same line with duties to the gods. Take, for instance, the paragraph where the deceased cries: "I have made none infirm. I have made none poor. I have not committed the abomination of the gods. I have done no harm to the slave before his master. I have not caused hunger. I have not caused thirst. I have not caused mourning." On account of the place here occupied by "that which is the abomination of the gods," may we not think that this "abomination" must be, above all, a lack of charity? This charity is carried to a great extent: for one must not take away milk from the little child, one must not even take away grass from before the cattle who are eating it. With still greater reason all injury to the general well-being, to the production of the soil and the fertilizing irrigation, becomes an unpardonable crime. This was preserved even so late as the Roman period, in the special legislation for Egypt, where all injury to the management of the waters was punishable with death.

After this first general confession, in the hieroglyphic rituals, comes a whole series of particular confessions, if I may thus express myself. Each one of the forty-two assessors of Osiris is supposed to ask a question, or at least the dead replied to each one after having saluted by his name the god whom he addressed. Here the judges are called Sesu Hor, that is the followers of Horus, the avenger of his father Osiris. Osiris, "the good being" (Ounnofre), had

been the victim of the evil being. His son Horus, to avenge him, to bring about the triumph of right, had surrounded himself with companions, each one of whom was intrusted with the pursuit of evil under one of its forms. Whoever wished to become another Osiris must submit successfully to examination by all the companions of Horus. The author of the demotic ritual of Pamont understood the matter in this way. But it seemed to him quite as simple first to group a certain number of these Sesu Hor by invoking them by their title, then to address collectively to all this group the series of affirmations of purity and innocence which he had to make to each one of them. In this part, wholly mystical, the negative confession of the rituals, whether hieroglyphic or hieratic, often became almost incomprehensible; while it is perfectly clear in our ritual of Pamont.

It is not worth while to give the list of these judicial gods, which commences thus: "Listen, O he who enlarges his walk and who comes out from Heliopolis! Listen, O he whose mouth is open and who comes out from the glorious abode of the gods," etc. But that which interests us above all is the ethical portion:—

"I have not been unjust. I have not defrauded.

"There is no fraud in my heart.

"I have not stolen.

"I have killed no man by treason.

"I have not eaten the bread (or the revenue) of the gods.

"I have not done evil. *I have not prevented the doing of good.*

"*I have not urged others in the way of evil.*

"I have not taken possession of any beast of burden belonging to the gods.

"I have not acted a lie . . . . I have said no evil word. I have not raised my voice (in pride or in anger).

"I have not committed adultery or any impure act. I

have not prevented my ears from hearing the truth. I have done no wrong by the strength of my hands."

Here Pamont returns to the usual order of the one hundred and twenty-fifth chapter, and addresses himself separately to each of the latter gods:—

"Listen, Nofre tum, coming forth from Memphis! I have not sullied my name. I have not defiled that of a pure one.[1]

"Listen, he who is never at rest, coming forth from the temple of Osiris! I have not cursed the king. I have not cursed my father.

"Listen, he who loves, coming forth from the mummies! I have not obstructed the navigation of a boat upon the water.

"Listen, young man, who shines over the abyss! I have used no haughty word.

"Listen, he who makes men good and comes forth from Sais! I have not blasphemed God.

"Listen, he who interrogates the gods, coming forth from Heliopolis! I have done no harm to the slave before his master.

"Listen, basilisk who comes forth from the Oasis! I have done no harm to any one.

"Listen, serpent coming forth from the abode of Ptah! I have not raised up my body while invoking the divinity.

"Listen, Thot, coming forth from Amenti! I have not debased God in my heart."

Notice, that in this repetition of the negative confession, a higher degree of perfection is attained. Not only has the deceased done no harm himself; not only has he induced no one else to do it; but he has not hindered good from being done; he has not debased God in his heart; he has not assumed a pharisaical attitude before the gods; he has not spoken evil words. He has shown himself humble, modest, benevolent, since he was true.

[1] The word *oneb*, pure, "purified," is constantly employed to designate the priests.

We now come to the third part of this chapter, which is appropriated in the rituals to the affirmative confession. From the artistic point of view, it must be remarked that this affirmative confession, copied after that of the ancient rituals, comes before us in this papyrus with suppressions and additions, very easily seen, which give it quite another aspect. It may be said that the demotic text is here, as also in all the preceding, very superior to the hieroglyphic.

"I pray before you, O gods! I know you and I have made your names known. Do not overthrow me! Do not impute to me my sins before God with whom you are! No sin of mine comes before you again, since I have done that which is sweet to the hearts of men and gods. To that I have put my hand. I have given bread to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothing to the naked, a boat to him who had none. I have given the divine offerings to the gods, bread and water to the deceased. These things save me. You have revealed to me that by reason of this you have no accusation to bring against me before the great.

"My mouth is pure by the things which I have said. My heart is pure. Before (that is, ostensibly) and behind I am pure in all things. There is no member of mine that has done wrong.

"Calm, thou comest to me (O my God), thou dost draw near to me. All salute me, when they see me, because I have heard the great word which Osiris has spoken to confirm this."

It must be noticed that the corresponding part of the hieroglyphic text ends quite differently. According to M. Pierret's excellent version, the last sentence declares: "He who perceives it says: "Let him arrive in peace; for Osiris [i. e. the deceased] has heard the great conversation between the ass and the cat in the abode of Pat."

I prefer here "the great word of Osiris declaring the deceased innocent," to the "*great conversation between the*

ass and the cat,"—whatever may be the meaning elsewhere attached to these expressions for those initiated into the mysteries.

After this we meet in the Pamont ritual a new fragment which has not anything at all corresponding in the hieroglyphic or hieratic rituals. The one hundred and twenty-fifth chapter is entirely interrupted in the demotic by the introduction of this new chapter; while in the hieroglyphic ritual it is continued by paragraphs of little interest, which the demotic has not translated. The inserted chapter, in this latter text, commences by a spoken picture (just as the one hundred and twenty-fifth chapter opens with a spoken picture):—

"In the city of Memphis, a statue of Sokar Osiris with the face of a hawk, having a goddess who protects it and having for a diadem a silver basilisk upon the head. It is before this statue that the divine truth conducts man."

After this setting of the scene comes the title (as with the one hundred and twenty-fifth chapter):—

"Words spoken by the truthful Pamont, born of Tsepsemont, in blessing Osiris."

Then the words attributed to the dead:—

"I come. I cause myself to be received by thee in thy presence. I appear before thee to-day. I make pure offerings to thee: bread, beer, beef, goose, wine, all kinds of good food.

"Arise, Osiris! Consume thy good offerings! Thy hand is powerful.

"Listen, Osiris! Be appeased! Good is thy name of majesty that may be appeased. Thou makest thyself good, according to thy name,[1] for me.

"Blessings upon thee! Thy name is He who judges the way.[2]

[1] Osiris is called *Oun nofre*, "the good being."

[2] This expression, "the road," "the way," is also found in Babylonian usage, as well as in the Bible, to designate the conduct of man during his life.

"In thy name of judge, listen, Osiris! I come to address myself to thee. I have justified thy word before the gods who judge."

Here the god speaks in his turn: "Thou hast given food to those who are in the tomb. Thou hast prayed to the gods. Thou hearest the word of truth to-day."

Let us ask, to what the scene which has just been described, and which is entirely foreign to the Book of the Dead properly so called, refers? This scene takes place upon the earth, in the city of Memphis; while the judgment occurs far off from the earth in the abode of the dead. Was there, then, an indispensable ceremony to insure the entrance of the dead into the kingdom beyond the tomb? It was so among the Greeks. They believed that the dead, in default of a funeral, could never be admitted into Pluto's domain, but wandered unhappy among the living in the state of shades. The Athenians, especially imbued with this belief, showed an unpitying severity towards those generals, conquerors or not, who, in a naval battle for example, had neglected their dead. In Egypt, we learn from another ritual (that of funerals, entirely different from the Book of the Dead, which has been translated by M. Schiaparelli)[1] that a solemn sacrifice was offered in honor of the dead before he was introduced into the tomb. It is evidently this religious service, comprising divers offerings, to which reference is made in the preceding chapter of the ritual of Pamont.

In Schiaparelli's ritual for funerals, the statue to which offerings were made was that of the dead man himself, become Osiris. In our demotic ritual, the statue is that of the divine Sokar Osiris, considered as a judge, but surrounded by

[1] [Il Libro dei Funerali degli Antichi Egiziani, Tradotto e Commentato da Ernesto Schiaparelli. Torino, 1882. 2 vols. See also, Le Tombeau de Rekhmara, par Ph. Virey, Paris, 1889, in the splendid series of government publications, Memoires . . de la Mission Archéologique Francaise au Caire. —H. Osgood.]

his wrappings as a mummy and protected by a goddess, according to the expressions of the demotic text. Who is this protecting goddess? Is it a Truth, winged after the manner of Isis, who sometimes received this title of "Xut" protecting Osiris? Is it Isis, herself winged, who often, in the same posture, plays the same part to the reclining Osiris? Is it Isis without wings, protecting the reclining Sokaris, as in the mythological naos of Amasis, in which Sokaris has a human instead of a hawk's head? Or did the author have before his eyes and did he wish to depict the vignette which, in the traditional funeral ritual, usually accompanied the one hundred and forty-eighth chapter? In this vignette, Sokar Osiris with a hawk's head,[1] but with a human body, and surrounded with his wrappings like a mummy, is placed erect on a sort of pedestal, where the goddess Ament protects him, and thus receives the offerings of the dead. However it may be, the text does not at all represent that of the one hundred and forty-eighth chapter, pre-eminently mysterious, which must be communicated to no one except the king or to the officiating priest.

As he lays the scene in Memphis, the author of the Pamont papyrus has in full view the ceremonies of funerals properly so called. One must not be surprised if he puts the divine statue of Sokar Osiris in the place of the statue of the dead, for we have already had occasion to call attention to this tendency of the later epochs to realize fully this identification of the dead with Osiris, under all his mythological forms, this *good god*, into whose bosom he was made to enter, according to neo-Platonic ideas. From this point of view our papyrus is extremely interesting. Its date places it very near the time when the famous Valentine, inspired, according to Tertullian, by Egyptian theology, created in

[1] We have recently seen a very fine Egyptian bronze, with incrustations of gold, representing Sokaris or Sokar Osiris, with a hawk's head, seated on a bench, behind whom is a goddess with wings extended to protect him.

Christianity the pantheistic sect that soon filled the whole world. From the time of Tertullian, the Valentinians were, by far, the most numerous of the heretics.[1] The pagan Ammonius, who was the teacher of Plotinus, of Longinus, and of our Origen, must have drawn his neo-Platonism from the same Egyptian source. With the Valentinians, with the disciples of Ammonius, including Origen, words and cabalistic formulas play an important part. The *Pistis Sophia*, attributed to Valentinian, and which we possess in the Coptic, contains portions which recall in some particulars the funeral rituals, with the peculiar phrases, and the Gnostic questions and passwords.

The divinity is at the same time one and many, in the Valentinian doctrine of this epoch. Without losing, for all that, its unity, it filled the world with its emanations of persons who took bodies, and each one constituted a divine being having its special domain. In Origen, as in the Pistis Sophia, each part of the world, each star, each people, each city, each physical or moral division of the universe, has its spirit, which rules there as the human soul rules over the body. So that the whole world is animated in this way and possesses a distinct life in all its parts.

The gnosis, the supreme science of the theologian and of the initiated, consisted in knowing these beings, knowing them by their names, for the idea attaches itself closely to the name in order to form the being in its emanations from the word, the thought, the speech, of the creating god. Hence the sovereign power of the cabalistic formulas, in which all the Gnostics believed, whether pagan or Christian. By means of the name, one reached the being, and this being must obey if one possessed the formula created, at the

[1] Upon all these questions see the memorial which I published in 1873 in the Contes Rendus de L'Académie des Inscriptions, entitled: Première étude sur le mouvement des esprits dans les premiers siècles de notre ère. Vie et sentences de Secundus (Maisonneuve).

same time, for that purpose by the Supreme Being. Thus a man could overcome every obstacle, whether in the world of the living or the world of the dead. It is the same in this demotic papyrus; and it does not, in this, differ in any way from the most ancient specimens of the funeral ritual. In fact, to enable the deceased to cross the threshold of the blessed abode, the author of our papyrus takes up again at this point the traditional funeral ritual. But the large amount that is here borrowed from the one hundred and twenty-fifth chapter in hieroglyphics is made by our author a new chapter, with the title: "Writings which cause one to penetrate into the abode by the leaves of the closed door." This abode, we have just told you, is the kingdom of Osiris, the habitation of the blest. The examination does not commence until the deceased arrives at the leaves of the door; while in the Book of the Dead, before allowing him to penetrate thus far, he was obliged to pass a sort of examination, entirely Gnostic and for us incomprehensible, but which must have appeared natural to the numerous sects into which initiation, with its mysteries, was one of the chief things.

It has been my object to give a general idea of the whole papyrus, and I shall not translate the whole of this chapter, which would be tedious to those who have not received the initiation indispensable to a full comprehension of its import. Here is merely the opening:—

"O Osiris Pamont, come! penetrate into the hall of rectitude, that thou mayest be known!

"The door takes up the word and says: I shall not permit thee to pass into the interior until thou hast told me my name. He says to it: He who opens the breast is thy name.

"The leaves of the door speak with him saying: We shall not permit thee to pass unless thou hast told us our name. He says to them: Your name is Those who know the decrees.

"The right side of the door speaks with him and says: I will not let thee pass unless thou tell me my name. He says to it: Thy name is He who does the truth."

After this the left side of the door, the threshold of the door, the lock, the key, the panels, the door posts, the ground, and finally the porter, speaks. Here we resume the literal translation of the manuscript: "The porter says to him: I will not announce thy name if thou hast not told me mine. He replies and says: Thy name is He who knows the constitution of the heart and who knows what is within the bosom.

"The porter says to him: I will bring thee before the god who is present.

"The Osiris Pamont says to the porter: Who is the god who is present?

"He replies to him: It is he who is great in the world. He says to him: Who is he who is great in the world?

"He replies to him: It is Thot, who will save thee.

"Thot speaks to him as follows: Let them bring you. Come before Osiris! I will bring thee in. What have you to say for yourself?

"The Osiris Pamont speaks before Thot, saying: I am pure from all evil, from all sin. I am not among those who in their day have erred. Thot says to him: I will bring thee before him who is in the heaven of fire; before him whose divine abode is surrounded by living cobras, in whose house is found the water which envelops the earth.

"Enter, he adds, before Osiris. I will bring thee in there. I will provide thee with the bread from the store-house; the offerings, *hotep*, of the store-house. O Osiris Pamont, son of Pamont! I will forever justify thy speech."

All of this, though still impregnated with Gnosticism, is much clearer than the corresponding paragraphs of the one hundred and twenty-fifth chapter of the hieroglyphic Book of the Dead.

In short, the demotic ritual of Pamont constitutes, as a whole and in its details, a work intelligently conceived, harmonious, and entirely original. It is also signed and dated:

"This has been written by Menkara, son of Pamont, for his great father whom he loves, Pamont, son of Pamont, son of Hermodorus, brought forth by Tsepsemont, in order that his soul might live before Osiris Ounnofre, the king of the whole world, the king of the abyss, the chief of Amenti. May he bless Menkara his son before Osiris, the great god, and also his children, forever! Written in the tenth year of Nero Claudius Cæsar Sebastos Germanicus, Autocrator."

What strikes us in this subscription is that the son, considering his father a god, asks him to bless him and his children forever before the supreme god.

This Egyptian doctrine appears to be the same that began to invade the rest of the world, at the epoch when, on the site now occupied in the city of Rome by the Christian convent of Minerva (St. Mary upon Minerva), there rose a temple of Isis, of which numerous absolutely Egyptian remains have recently been discovered; at the time when, on the site of St. Germain-des-Pres, in Paris, there rose another temple to this same Isis, of whom one statue, preserved until the last century (when it was relegated to a place under the porch), was then destroyed, because some good women performed acts of adoration before it; at the epoch when, as we see from Petronius, even in Italy the pillage of the boat of Isis was considered one of the greatest of sacrileges.

Egyptian doctrine came before the people with these two faces: one all Gnosticism, the other all morality. Of these two faces the one which most faithfully represented the old traditions in all their purity was certainly that of morality.

Egyptian ethics is at times of striking beauty. Far superior to Jewish morality [?], it sometimes equals Christian ethics. The son of Pamont has summed up the great features of this ethics in a clear and forcible manner.

His father, justifying the words of the good being, conforming himself to his precepts, must not merely do no evil,

but he must also do right. He not only did not kill, did not steal, did not commit injustice; did not bear false witness; did not defame; did not dishonor any one's hearthstone; made no one infirm; caused no one to hunger or thirst; caused no one to weep! But he gave bread to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothing to the naked, a boat to him who, having lost his own, found himself thus deprived of his means of existence. He also fulfilled all his duties towards all classes of society; wounding no one by his pride, respecting those whom he ought to respect, not making his people work to excess, not wronging any slave in the mind of his master: showing himself in all his life, in all his actions, in all circumstances, a good being, like the supreme good being, carrying in himself the image of the divine Osiris, and by this means becoming another Osiris after death.

In the study of Egyptian law, our admiration is often excited by the equity, the gentleness, of this legislation, which, in so many features, resembles our own, particularly in all that concerns the condition of women, the rights of children, etc., which often may be be regarded, if we are unprejudiced, as being superior to it. This legislation is the daughter of that ethics, which so profoundly separates the Egyptian religion from the infamous paganisms of Asia Minor, for example.

In this religion the Gnostic part, the mythology properly so called, could change infinitely, from city to city, from epoch to epoch. But that which remained always and everywhere, that dominated even to the point of causing all the rest to be neglected, was the idea of the good Being and of his imitation by man, called to be good like him. The Egyptian temples in Italy, Spain, Gaul, Brittany, in all parts of the ancient world, were specially consecrated to the myth of Osiris, that is, to the mythological history of that good Being whom one must imitate upon earth. One must not be astonished that this myth spread at the same time with

Christianity and was confounded with it in the Valentinian and in the other Gnostic sects. This was only the acting out of this Egyptian morality, the wisdom of Egypt, which was so much admired by the sages of Greece and of Judæ.

It seems to me that among all the monuments from the valley of the Nile, established for eternity, none had a more solid base than this Egyptian wisdom, which rose higher and higher in succeeding generations, but which appears to us in its earliest form brilliant, colossal, dominating the ancient nations, in the maxims of Ptah-hotep, while the pyramids were building, and more sublime, more resplendent still perhaps, in that negative confession of which we find so many reflections on the funeral tablets of the ancient empire.

ARTICLE III.

IS SPACE A REALITY? OBSERVATIONS ON PROFESSOR BOWNE'S DOCTRINE OF SPACE, MOTION, AND CHANGE.

BY THE REV. PROFESSOR C. M. MEAD, PH.D., BERLIN, GERMANY.

SINCE in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1886 I made some animadversions on Professor Bowne's doctrine of Time, President Strong has discussed (Jan., 1888) the general subject of Modern Idealism. While his article may seem to have covered the whole ground, and to have refuted this Idealism in all its assumptions and positions, it may yet be well to follow it up with a more limited discussion, which seems to be needed as a complement to my previous article, and which, while less comprehensive than Dr. Strong's able discussion, may yet serve to bring out more sharply the points of difference between the Idealist and the Realist. In presenting these criticisms, I desire again to express my almost unqualified admiration of the ability and brilliancy of Professor Bowne's discussions of the deepest and driest of metaphysical problems. But together with a vast deal of clear-headed and masterful presentation of important truths, he advocates a system which, I am firmly persuaded, cannot stand the test of thorough inspection.

With respect to space, as with respect to time, our author finds himself constrained to say that it cannot be regarded as an objective reality, but only a way or form in which the mind views things. He admits that this notion conflicts with that of spontaneous thought. But, he thinks, we are

driven to his conclusion by the self-contradictions into which we are drawn by the attempt to carry out the spontaneous thought. This he aims to show by urging the following difficulties:—

1. "The conception of space as an all-containing form is an inconsistent metaphor borrowed from our sense-experience. Forms must always be forms of something; and when there is no reality to produce and limit the form, the form exists only in imagination." Space, simply as form, is nothing. If something real, it "must come under the law of reality in general."[1] If we try to make space a *tertium quid* between something and nothing, it must be able in some way to assert itself as a determining factor in the system of things. For we cognize things as existent only as they in some way act. Being is activity. Space, if real, cannot be "powerless emptiness," but an "active something." If space is regarded as conditioning things and their activities, it must act on them, and therefore must be a thing itself. Moreover, "if space be real and extended, its several parts must be real, and space can have no proper unity" (p. 184). "But the relation of these parts is fixed and changeless." "Each smallest volume . . . . is absolute as to its own existence, but determined in its relations to other volumes." If one replies that the determination is a logical one, the answer is that "logical determination exists only in thought." Consequently we must make space either a "pure nothing or a thing in interaction with itself and other things." But "both of these views are untenable, and the former is absurd." The latter is wholly opposed to the common conception of space, which is that "things and space coexist in mutual and absolute indifference" (p. 186). The upshot is that we cannot view space as nothing, nor regard it as an objective reality.

2. "If space be a reality apart from things, it is something

[1] Metaphysics, p. 181.

uncreated and eternal." No one can suppose that space was created as an infinite void. Hence commonly space has been regarded as an eternal necessity which God himself cannot escape. But "all principles and all manifestation alike must flow from the infinite, and the infinite must be one." "We cannot view space and being as mutually independent; for in that case being and space must be in interaction, if space is to affect our system. But this would destroy the independence of both, and would also make space an active thing, and not space" (p 187). It does not relieve the difficulty to say that "being is in space," for if the two are wholly independent of one another, such an assertion has no meaning. "Instead of saying, then, that being is in space, we must rather say that space is in being" (p. 188).

3. Finally, "if space be a real objective existence, then the infinite, or rather God, is in space, and possesses bulk and diameter." "But such a conception applied to the infinite cancels both its unity and its omnipresence. That which is omnipresent in space cannot be extended in space, for such extension would imply merely the presence of the being part for part, or volume for volume, in the occupied space" (p. 188). The conclusion is, therefore, that space cannot be viewed as a real existence.

These difficulties, it is now observed, have led to another mode of stating the doctrine of the objective reality of space, namely, that space is "a certain order of relations among realities" (p. 189). That is, space is conceded to be nothing apart from things; "but things, when they exist, exist in certain relations, and the sum, or system, of these relations constitutes space."

To this Professor Bowne objects: 1. That this mode of defining space fails to distinguish it clearly from the other. When we try to take the notion in, we virtually presuppose space as a condition of the existence of things. "When space is defined as the mutual externality of things, we have

to call up the general form of space to understand what is meant." But it is conceivable that different elements should be so related to one another as to coexist in the same point of space. "The mutual otherness of spirits, also, though commonly represented as spatial, is properly an otherness of personality, and space has no necessary part in the matter" (p. 190).

Moreover, 2. This view is to be rejected because it assumes the objective reality of relations, whereas all relations are necessarily subjective. "Objectively there is nothing but things and their unpicturable interactions. All that is more than this is contributed by the mind" (pp. 191, 192).

Consequently we seem to be shut up to the third view, "which makes space a form of intuition, and not a mode of existence." "But while shut up to this view by the failure of the others, we seem to be shut out from it by its own overwhelming absurdity" (p. 193). Hence it is necessary to clear away the misconceptions which have clustered about the doctrine. These misconceptions are especially the two following:—

1. The doctrine is commonly made to mean "that our space-intuition is something arbitrary, and without any determining factor in the world of reality." The mind is conceived "as having an arbitrary relation to reality, and hence one which might as well be changed as not" (p. 194). But this is a mistake. "The positions and relations of things in our subjective space are independent of our volition, and their spatial changes take place without any consent of ours" (p. 195). Just as the sensations of heat, sound, etc., are not copies of anything objective, and yet are the subjective symbol, or translation, of certain phases of the object, so "things and their unpicturable interactions are such that they produce in perceptive beings an intuition of space" (p. 195). But the intuition is not independent of the realities; and therefore "any change in the metaphysical interactions of

things is attended by a corresponding change in the apparent space-relations" (p. 196).

2. The other misconception is that this view makes space a delusion, and thus destroys all confidence in the mind. To this it is replied that appearance must not be confounded with delusion, and that realities may be no less realities because they exist only in the mind. "The world of sense-qualities is discovered to have no objective existence, but to be only affections of the subject. They do not thereby become unreal and delusive, for all that was ever true of them remains true of them still." So "when we call space a mode of appearance, we do not mean that it is a delusion, but the form in which being appears in intuition" (p. 198). "And so we come finally to the conclusion that reality cannot be pictured, but must be thought; it must be grasped in concepts and not in images. For the pure reason, therefore, reality exists without space-predicates. In our intuition it takes on the forms of space; in our sensibility it takes on the form of sense-qualities" (p. 199). "The conclusions reached are not forced upon us against reason, but by reason itself" (*ibid.*). This conclusion is not so foreign to our thought after all, since we commonly conceive of mind as unrelated to space. Nor need we assume that space as a form of intuition is only a form of *human* intuition. It may well be a form of intuition, both human and divine. "God is not only pure thought, but he is also absolute intuition and absolute sensibility" (p. 201).

It is concluded, therefore, that, as space as such cannot act on the mind, "our knowledge of space is a mental interpretation of the action of things upon the mind." "Hence there is not the slightest need of admitting an objective space to account for our space-experience" (p. 205). "It is possible that, under certain forms of experience, the mind would never come to the space-intuition." "There is no ground for affirming that the space-intuition is the only one

possible in the nature of being." "It is entirely possible, however, to hold, along with this admission, that the space-intuition cannot be changed in its essential laws and nature" (p. 209).

The foregoing is a condensed statement of our author's doctrine and his defence of it. I have endeavored to state it as fully and fairly as space would allow. Is the doctrine satisfactory? Is the defence conclusive? The doctrine is admitted to be decidedly opposed to the spontaneous impressions of the common mind, but is asserted to be made necessary by the self-contradictions which the common view necessarily falls into. We need, therefore, to inquire very carefully whether the vulgar notion is so entirely untenable as is represented, and, even if insoluble difficulties do seem to belong to it, whether the substitute is less free from difficulties. I remark, then—

1. The analogy of sense-perception does not lend that confirmation to Professor Bowne's doctrine which he tries to derive from it. He repeatedly appeals to the truth that our sensations are purely subjective, and are in no sense copies of any objective reality, as a reason for assuming that our notion of space may be none the less purely subjective. If there is no such thing as color, sound, etc., in the things outside of us, why may we not find out that the space-conception is in like manner merely our mode of thinking of things, and not at all a truthful representation of any outward reality? The argument all along relies on this analogy. Now what shall we say to this?

In the first place, it must be said that the fact of the subjectivity of our sensations is overstated. What is meant when it is affirmed that there is no such thing as sound, heat, etc., except in the sensation of percipient being? "It is amazingly clear," we are told "[to so-called common sense] that the sun shines, whether seen or not; and that sound rings just the same, whether heard or not. But physiology

has discredited these notions utterly" (p. 203). Now for one, in spite of physiology, I do not hesitate to express it as my opinion that the sun does shine, whether seen or not. What has physiology proved respecting light and sound? As to sound, it has been discovered that the sensation is caused by vibrations in the atmosphere striking the tympanum of the ear. If there is no ear, there can therefore be no *sensation* of sound. The *ringing* is wholly in the ear. Now physicists in their investigations have no doubt made known many things once not remotely suspected by the common mind. That a high tone is caused by a rapid vibration and a low one by slow vibrations, is doubtless an established fact. But what of it? Is there no sound unless these vibrations strike on a sensitive ear? That depends simply on the definition of the word "sound." If it is defined as being merely the impression made by atmospheric vibrations on the ear, then of course sound is purely subjective. But if it is defined as atmospheric vibration itself, then it is not purely subjective. So with regard to light and color. Is color a quality of objective things? No, says Professor Bowne emphatically. Science has shown that it is all in the eye. But how does it get into the eye? Does the eye, or the mind back of it, produce the sensation at option? Oh, no! the sensation is caused by certain peculiar undulations of the impalpable substance called ether. The sensation of sound is likewise caused by atmospheric vibrations. It is by means of this discovery alone that "physiology has discredited" the common sense notion. But the vital question here is this: *Are these vibrations and undulations themselves objective realities?* Or are they, too, nothing but subjective sensations? How do the scientists learn about the vibrations? Evidently by the use of their senses. Have they really learned anything? If they have, is the thing learned an objective fact, or only a new subjective impression? If the latter, then it becomes a question whether anything has

been gained after all. According to the idealists and phenomenalists sense-impressions are no criteria of objective fact; they are simply subjective impressions. One is just as much and just as little as the other to be taken as an index of the nature of the thing-in-itself. Accordingly, if the more recent discoveries about undulations and vibrations are only a new stock of subjective sensations, we are no better off than before. Or perhaps we are worse off; for if the new impressions are in any way in conflict with the older ones, then there is a sort of civil war going on within us, and there is no arbiter to settle the quarrel. On the other hand, if the new discoveries are not merely a new accession of subjective sensations, then they have disclosed something respecting the objective world. If the old assumptions of common sense have been proved to be mistaken, this has been proved by the fact that something new is *known* concerning the world of things outside of us. The scientists certainly have always supposed themselves to have learned some facts respecting these sense-experiences. But according to phenomenalism it is doubtful whether their claim can be admitted. For the theory of modulation presupposes the fact of space and of motion in space. Professor Bowne, however, tells us that space and motion are not objective realities at all. But if this is so, then the new scientific theories which are appealed to as having discredited the old notions of things are themselves discredited. The investigators of nature, after having made careful observations and measurements of moving objects in space, if they really believe the metaphysician who tells them that there is no motion and is no space except in the imagination, will probably conclude that it is of no use to make any further investigations. But if they should trouble themselves to ask the metaphysician, how he found out that space and motion are realities only in the mind, what shall he say? He must say, "You scientists have shown by your discoveries that the common impression about the objectivity

of sound, color, etc., is entirely erroneous : and so I infer that the common impression about the objectivity of space and motion may be erroneous too." It would not require much metaphysical acumen on the part of the scientists to enable them to reply, "Oh, no! this will not do. If we have made the discoveries you speak of, it has been done on the assumption that space and motion are objective facts. If they are not such facts, then we cannot pretend to have made any discoveries at all ; and therefore you can make no inferences from them." In short, a philosophical theory which allows us to know nothing about an external world except that it somehow causes in us certain sensations, must make each of those sensations an ultimate fact, and has no right to set up one against another. Every sensation, on this theory, is as valid as every other. If they conflict with one another, there is no help for it; and we have no right to make any one or more of them the standard by which the others are to be judged or rectified.

But, in the second place, even if we make all the concession that we honestly can make to the theory of the subjectivity of sensations, we must still demur against making the notion of space analogous to those of sound, fragrance, taste, etc. There is no *a priori necessity* of attributing any of these secondary qualities to matter. We get the sensations of redness, of smoothness, of sweetness, etc., from experience. They come to us, it is true, in spite of ourselves; we do not originate them at will. But we find ourselves under no *necessity* of thinking that the world of reality must have such and such sensible qualities. When, however, we come to the notion of space, there is an *a priori* necessity laid upon us, if we think of an objective world at all, to think of it as in space. We annihilate our conception of a perceptible world, whenever we annihilate space as a condition of it. If, now, we make no distinction between such empirical and such necessary notions; if the necessary generic conception

of space can be relegated to the category of subjective conceptions just as freely as the sensation of smell can be,—then what is left that cannot equally well be put into the same category? The notion of causation, for instance, is it purely subjective? Does it represent any objective fact? Have we a right to infer from our sensations that they are *caused* by anything outside of ourselves? But by what right can we make the inference? We have the notion of causation, it is true; but is it not a mere notion? How can we be sure that it is not an utterly misleading conception, and that we have no right to assume that our sensations are caused by anything outside of us, or even that they are caused at all? Why not say that they are simply ultimate facts of experience? By what right does the idealist impugn the validity of the conception of space, and yet maintain the validity of the conception of causality?

2. We must question the conclusiveness of Professor Bowne's polemic against the common notion of the objectivity of space. The burden of his contention, as with regard to time, is that space cannot consistently be conceived of as a thing, nor as a quality of things, nor as a relation of things; and therefore, since this exhausts the categories of possible conceptions as regards the outer world of reality, it is concluded that space cannot be an objective reality at all.

Now it must be freely admitted that the premise of this argument is correct. Space cannot, more than time, be conceived as a substance, or as an activity, which is found in interaction with other forces of the material world. Nor can we think of space as an attribute of things. We may and must call things extended; and extension may be pronounced an essential attribute of matter. But space is not synonymous with extension; it is rather a pre-condition of extension. It is more; it is the pre-condition of the existence of extended things. Such things cannot be brought into

existence unless there is place to put them in. Nor, again, can space be defined as a relation or as a summation of the relations, of material things. Thus when Canon Birks[1] says that space "is the summation of all those relations of distance, forward and backward, sideways, up or down, in which bodies are known to be placed, or conceived to be placeable, one towards another," the obvious objection occurs, Why limit the definition to *those* relations? There are others, for example, such as those of color, fragrance, chemical difference, which are not included, and cannot be included, in this summation. Why not? What is the rule of selection? The only answer can be that these latter relations are not *spatial* relations; in other words, the notion of space is presupposed in this definition; we are assumed to know that the relation of distance has to do with space, before we include it among those the summation of which constitutes space.

So far we quite agree with Professor Bowne. But his second reason for rejecting this definition of space as a summation of relations cannot be accepted. He says that it assumes the objective reality of relations, whereas all relations are necessarily subjective. This dogmatic assertion, which he repeatedly makes, but nowhere proves, needs to be met only with a dogmatic denial. It is indeed not quite easy to understand it. He seems to hold, in some sense, to the reality of a world distinct from percipient beings. He describes this world as made up of things, or beings, whose characteristic is that they *act*, and act on one another. In treating of the subject of change he says (p. 94) that "the members of the series A, A^1, A^2, etc., are *related* as cause and effect." This sounds like an affirmation of a real objective relation. Still more unequivocal is the assertion (p. 104) that "the thing is able to exist and maintain relations apart from our thinking." In view of this admission we

[1] Scripture Doctrine of Creation, p. 133.

need not be terrified by the assurance that all relations are purely subjective.

But to return to the main question. What shall we say, now, to the argument that space, because not a thing, nor a quality or a relation of things, is nothing but a mental form of conception? Can we clear ourselves otherwise from the charge of holding to something that is self-contradictory or inconceivable? Certainly. To the question what space is, if it is none of these things, we need only to answer: Space is space. As Professor Bowne says of motion (p. 242). "It is indefinable, except in terms of itself." It is an ultimate idea. It is forced upon us when we think at all. We cannot help speaking of it or implying it constantly. But we cannot define it except by synonyms, or by expressions which presuppose the notion itself. Well, what then? Where is the self-contradiction? Where is the absurdity, or the inconceivability? The notion is unquestionably a fact. Confessedly men generally conceive of space as an objective fact. Why not admit that this conception is correct? No contradiction comes in until the objector appears, with his effort to force us into a definition which, because no definition is possible, is liable to bear the appearance of inconsistency. As to the mystery of space, we may freely admit it; but Professor Bowne is not at all reluctant to admit the same respecting things that he firmly holds. For example, he says concerning action (p. 108) that it "must be recognized, but cannot be understood. How a thing can act, how we ourselves can act, how a given state of anything can be the ground of change in other things, or even in itself—all these are insoluble questions." Going on to discuss the topic of interaction, he finds so many difficulties, that he finally concludes that "all finite being must be viewed as simply a mode of the basal one, and without any proper existence" (p. 129). But still he adds: "We do not fancy that this view settles all difficulties. On the contrary, it

leaves the mystery of being and action as dark and impenetrable as ever" (p. 130). He insists, however, that any other view involves contradiction as well as mystery, and that therefore we are logically bound to adopt that view which is free from contradiction, even though it still involves what is inexplicable. It would, however, be easy to show that the contradictions which he exposes in the attempts to explain action and interaction come from just those attempts, and would not exist, if the mystery of action were admitted at once, and the explanations not attempted.

We affirm that there is no contradiction involved in conceiving of space as actual and as a condition of the existence of a material world. The notion of space, though it cannot be analyzed, is a fact, and an essential part of the fact is that space is conceived as objective. Our author, however, says of space, "Our theory excludes it only from things as thought, and not from things as they appear." But it is the most marked characteristic of the conception of space, that space is and must be *thought* as objectively real. As with regard to the notion of time, the most elaborate metaphysical attempts to banish the notion still leave it as something that cannot but be *thought*. The reality of space is implied in the very language by which the reality is explained away.

But we are told that the common notion "leads to a hopeless dualism of first principles" (p. 186). Space is conceived to be co-eternal with God, existing independently of God. This notion, therefore, it is said, is in conflict with the truth "that all principles and all manifestation alike must flow from the infinite, and that the infinite must be one" (p. 187). English and American writers, it is remarked, "have paid very little attention to the general problem of knowledge; and hence . . . . . they have had little hesitation in allowing any number of independent principles" (*ibid.*). "The idealist rightly urges that objective existences must not be multiplied beyond necessity " (p. 205). Very true; only who is to decide

where the necessity ends? Either we must say that there is only one principle in the universe, that God is All and All is God, or else we must postulate something else. The term "principle" is, it is true, somewhat vague; but Professor Bowne uses it freely, and cannot object to others' doing the same. But does he mean that there is only one principle, namely, God? In a certain sense he does. He holds "that there is one basal being in action as the source of the system and of all its laws, principles, and realities" (p. 144). To this no objection need be made; but this very assertion involves the admission of "principles"—how many? That the "basal reality" is "the determining principle of all secondary existence" (p. 145), we may also admit. But if there are (as our author seems to assume) realities and principles distinguishable from God, the "basal being," then the question, how many of these there are, can be determined only by a fair sounding of nature and of mind. If a man finds two or three of these principles, and then says, "This is enough, at this point. I will hold up the law of parsimony *in terrorem* over any who believe in more," it is competent for the others to reply that, while they respect the law, they must be allowed to make their own application of it. Professor Bowne evidently believes in a principle of right and in a principle of causation. He may say that these are not independent principles co-ordinate with God. And so we may say also: yet in some genuine sense morality and causality are real and universal principles, distinguishable from God. If now we say that time and space are likewise universal principles, not independent of God in a dualistic way, yet independent of our minds,—real objective realities just as truly as the principles of right and causality are independent of our minds and are objective realities,—then we shall not allow ourselves to be frightened out of this position by the assertion that two such principles are enough, but that four are too many.

We are aware that it may here be replied that space and time are admited to be mental principles, and that causality is also a mental principle. "The mind deals with its objects under the forms of cause and effect, substance and quality, identity, continuity, and space" (p. 507). "The world, considered in itself, is an order of divine energizing, which, when viewed under the forms of space and time, of causality and substance, appears as a world of things" (p. 460). All these principles, then, seem to be conceived as purely mental principles—the "forms" under which the mind cognizes the not-mind. But are they all really put on a par? Not at all. That we have any notion of a not-self, our author accounts for by assuming "an excitation of the soul by something not itself" (p. 412). The very phrase "divine energizing," above quoted, implies that God, in producing in us the perception of a real or apparent world, acts *causatively*. Furthermore, subjective idealism, the theory that "we are not in a common world, but only seem to be," is rejected on the ground that such a theory, though incapable of disproof, implies that God is deceiving us. "Our only ground of assurance is the ethical conviction that such a tissue of deceit and magic would be disgraceful and outrageous" (pp. 471, 472). He concludes, therefore, that the presentations which we have concerning the world-process "are real revelations, and not individual phantoms" (p. 472). But our point now is that in all this it is implied that our notion of the world is *caused* in us by something outside of us, whether directly by the world or indirectly by divine power. Causation, then, is not merely a subjective "form," according to our author, but an objective fact. Space and time, on the contrary, he affirms to be purely subjective.

3. But we go further and allege that our author's doctrine does not escape the difficulties which he charges upon realism. His contention is that the common view of space "hovers between making space something and nothing"

(p. 205). Let us see now whether his doctrine of change does not lie under the same condemnation. "Change," he says, "is the most prominent fact of experience; and, since we view being as the source of all outgo and manifestation, we must provide for change in being" (p. 77). On this ground of experience he rejects the Eleatic doctrine of the essential changelessness of all things, and sets himself to the solution of the problem, how change can be postulated without contradiction. How can a thing be changed and yet be the same thing? The question is answered by saying that being is in fact a becoming, that the world is a process, a flow, and that change is therefore the normal state of things. The general fact is stated in the formula that A becomes A^1; A^1 becomes A^2, etc. The two are identical only in the sense that the one is developed out of the other (p. 95). They are "different things, having no other connection than a mutual interconvertibility according to a certain law" (p. 94).

Now the question we raise here is, whether change is something or nothing, or hovers between the two. Is it a thing, an agent, a cause? Professor Bowne holds that "being is cause" (p. 45), that "causation includes all action" (p. 102); and accordingly a thing may be defined as an agent, an activity, or a cause. But is change to be defined by any of these terms? He does not seem so to teach. He says, "Change penetrates to the centre of the thing" (p. 99); change, therefore, seems not to be the thing itself; it certainly can hardly be conceived as a second thing entering into the centre of the first thing and making it into a third thing. "The members of the series A, A^1, A^2, etc., are related as cause and effect, although, by reversing the conditions, any one may be cause, and any one may be effect" (p. 94). The process of change is defined by saying that "something becomes something else" (p. 92). Change is a becoming. But when it is said that one thing becomes another, it cannot be meant that the becoming is a *thing*,

distinct from A and A^1. To be sure, sometimes this principle of change is represented as all-absorbing. "If we make becoming the absolute principle, nothing ever is, in the sense of a fixed existence, but is constantly becoming" (p. 82). According to this, then, change seems to be called the only reality. But if it is such, then our dilemma is only transferred from the "becoming" to the "thing" that becomes. Is the thing a real thing? If not, if it is really nothing, then the "becoming" is a predicate of nothing. There is an eternal becoming—an eternal process, or flow—but there is nothing that becomes! On the whole, however, our author sticks to the representation that in the process of change something becomes something else. He even goes so far as to say that where there is no appearance of change there is still a series; only it should be represented by the formula A, A, A, etc., which means that there is a "continuous reproduction of A" (p. 83). "Reality is incessantly reproducing itself, either in the form A, A, A, thus producing the appearance of permanence, or in the form A, A^1, A^2, etc., thus producing the appearance of change" (p. 95). Change is here represented as a series or succession of things or realities. The realities are represented by A, A^1, A^2. The change is the process by which the one becomes the other. But the question comes back, Is the change a *thing?* Apparently not.

But is change, then, *nothing?* Certainly not. What is declared to be a characteristic of all the universe, what is sometimes even promoted to be "the absolute principle," cannot be called nothing. And so, so far as can be seen, our author's doctrine of change can hardly escape the charge which he brings against the ordinary doctrine of space, namely, that it "hovers between making" change "something and nothing."

Let us pursue this doctrine of change a little further, and see how it accords with the author's idealism. We do not

wish to induce him to abandon the doctrine. We rejoice that as to this one point he is willing to fall back on common sense, and we welcome him as a fellow-believer in the objective reality of change. But we find it difficult to follow him in his representation of the doctrine. He assures us that A, when it becomes A^1, is changed to its centre. A^1 is no more like A than it is like B, strictly speaking; it is said to be like A only in the sense that it can be developed out of A and cannot be developed out of B. A and A^1 "are related as cause and effect" (p. 94). But to this the objection naturally occurs that, as Professor Bowne elsewhere (p. 106) properly insists, no effect is the result of a single cause. "All conditions are co-operating causes." "All effects in the system must be viewed as the result of the interaction of two or more things." What becomes then of the standing formula A, A^1, A^2? It cannot be said that A causes A^1, for a "complex of things" constitutes the "ground of an event." So then the formula should rather be A+B +C=D; and thus the careful distinction that A can pass into A^1, but cannot pass into B, proves to be fallacious. All things pass into one another, and the effort to maintain a faint show of identity in the midst of the incessant process of change seems to be a failure.

Let us look at this question from another point of view. Change is asserted to be a fact on the ground of actual experience and observation. But what does experience cognize? Instead of dealing with A, A^1, B, B^1, etc., let us take a concrete case—water changing into ice. How do we know that the water has become ice? Granted that before we saw water, and now see ice, are we sure that the one has been developed out of the other? If we are, it must be because we have observed that the ice has taken the place of the water, that the water has not been removed, and replaced by ice brought from somewhere else, but has been annihilated as water, and become ice. But this can be known only

on condition that we have an antecedent knowledge of the *space* relations of the water. It is a particular body of water, identified as being in a particular *place*, which we perceive to have become ice. If we are sure about the change of the water into the ice, we must also have known about the quantity; and this again involves a space-relation. If, say, a glass has been known to be one-quarter full of water, and is afterwards found to be full of ice, we know that the ice cannot all come from that water. In short, we can have no knowledge of such a concrete case of one thing changing into another, except as we antecedently have an acquaintance with the space-relations of the object changed.

We may go further and say that, on Professor Bowne's theory, it is impossible to affirm that water is changed into ice at all. Even if we concede that we now see ice where before we saw water, what of that? In a flowing river one body of water every moment occupies a space just occupied by another. Is the one changed into the other? It will not avail anything to say that in this case we see one body of water moving away and another coming in; for according to phenomenalism there is no objective motion at all. The notion that the water moves is a mere notion. All we are permitted to know is that in the one case one body of water *seems* to have been replaced by another body of water moving into the same place, whereas in the other case a body of water seems to have been replaced by a body of ice without our having had any experience of seeming to see motion. But how do we know but that the water disappeared unbeknown to us, and the ice took its place without our seeing the process? We only know that, whereas we before had sensations which suggested water to us, now we have sensations which suggest ice. That the one has been changed into the other, this philosophy does not allow us to *know* at all. For our knowledge, if we have it, comes from the use of our senses, and the senses only give us im-

pressions which are purely subjective—impressions which do not represent or reproduce in us any objective fact. At the best we are only allowed to assume that something objective to us has caused us to have these sensations. But even then we can only go so far as to say that this objective cause makes us have first this sensation, then that. "In any case," we are told, "the infinite appears as the real objective ground of our sensations; and we have seen that, if these sensations were given, the world of finite persons and things might fall away without our missing them" (p. 480). If, then, our sensations are of themselves no evidence that there is a world of finite persons and things, still less can they give us evidence of the change of one thing into another. On our author's ground we are allowed to know only that we have a succession of sensations, and that certain of these sensations are associated together under the purely subjective categories of time and space. But just because these categories are purely subjective, we are debarred from drawing from them any inferences as to objective fact. We have an *impression* that what was water a little while before has now become ice. But this impression involves, as an essential element of it, the conceptions of time and space. A substance occupying a certain portion of *space* at one *time* has at another time been replaced by another substance. The notion of *change*, as we have seen, does not *necessarily* come in even when we assume that the substitution has taken place. But the notion of change has no meaning except as time is involved. Professor Bowne's contention that the notion of change logically precedes that of time I have considered in my previous article. But even if we should try to believe his proposition, we are blocked at once by the obvious fact that in any concrete case of experience of change we are obliged to make our observations under the conditions of time and space. When we think we see a thing change, we can only mean that what *before* was one thing is

now another thing. Even our author can hardly deny this. His own language implies it. "Change, in its scientific and philosophic sense, implies causal *continuity* of being, and is identical with becoming. The *past* founded the *present*, and the *present* founds the *future*" (pp. 79, 80). Again he says, "The process alone *abides;* its phases are *forever* coming and going" (p. 82). "Nothing is in the sense of *enduring*, but is *always* becoming" (p. 83). Again, "Our doctrine of change, therefore, does not conflict with the unity of the thing, for the thing is *never* A and A^1 and A^2 at the *same time*" (p. 93). I have italicized the terms which denote time as an element in our notion of change. But even if the author had been still more successful than he was in describing change without implying time as presupposed in it, he yet can hardly pretend that men are not obliged to perceive and think under the mental "form" of time and space, and that in *every empirical cognition of change* time and space necessarily enter into our conception of the process. He confesses that our sense and intuition are tied down to these forms; only our reason has discovered that time and space are nothing but principles of intuition and not of things. Very well, but still the actual experience of *seeing things change* must take place through the "forms" of time and space. This Professor Bowne squarely admits: "If space be a principle of intuition, its necessity in intuition is fully explained, and the impossibility of intuiting things apart from it becomes apparent" (p. 205). "The doctrine does not imply that events can be conceived as temporarily coexistent, any more than the ideality of space implies that things shall be conceived as spatially coincident" (p. 232).

Accordingly it is confessed by this form of idealism that in our actual cognitions—in our "intuiting" of things—it is impossible for us not to conceive them under the forms of time and space. If we cannot "intuite" things except under these conditions, *a fortiori* we cannot cognize *changes* in

things except under the same conditions (for the cognition of things must precede that of changes in them); and yet, strange to say, Professor Bowne would have us believe that the very notion of time is the consequent of change! "In the common thought time exists as a precondition of change; in our view change is first, and time is but its form" (p. 237). "Time depends on change; and the idealist's claim must be that time is but the subjective aspect of change, or the way in which we conceive change" (p. 227). And space in like manner is made dependent on cognition. "The mind is under the necessity of having no unrelated objects in intuition as well as in reflection. Hence it is forced to relate its objects to one another in intuition, and the result is our complete space-intuition, in which everything is related to everything else, and has its proper place" (p. 444). Here, then, space is described as the "result" of the mind's necessity of "relating" its objects—the necessity we find ourselves under of putting everything into its "proper place." "The conception of space as a unit," it is added, "is, doubtless, a product of abstraction from the results of this relating activity" (p. 445). So, then, the mind's first business is to put things into their proper places. How this can be done unless there is place to put them in, we are not told. But the mind is "under the necessity" of doing it; and what *must* be done of course *can* be done. Having got things thus put to rights, the mind finds that it has developed a conception of space. "We do not claim," we are told, "that we start with any conception of space whatever, and, least of all, that space is originally known as one, infinite, etc. But the soul has the necessity of relating all its objects in intuition, and hence, whenever any new point is posited, it at once relates it to all other points. But the positing of points is possible in all directions, and thus arises the conception of a space extending equally on all sides" (p. 445).

Now this may be all very luminous to some; but those

not versed in metaphysical subtleties must be impelled just here to put in a question or two. The soul of the baby, we are given to understand, signalizes the beginning of its career by "positing points." Whenever a new point is posited, it at once "relates" it to all other points. One might ask, What shall be done with the *first* point before any other points have been posited which it can be related to? But this may sound like trifling with a serious subject; and we pass on to ask, What is meant by saying that points can be posited "in all directions," *before* the conception of space arises? To the unmetaphysical and untrained mind this looks very much like an absurdity. It *seems* impossible to posit points in all directions, unless there are all directions to posit them in. And it *seems* self-contradictory to assume that all these directions exist, except as they imply the existence of space. This is certainly the judgment of "common sense," and for one I have not got so far above common sense as to be able to see the matter otherwise. At all events, a philosophy which undertakes to persuade men to abandon the common notion of space on account of the contradictions which are said to beset it, can hardly expect to be successful so long as it cannot but seem to indulge in contradictions in the effort to recommend itself.

Let us look at this matter in another aspect. Motion, we are told, must be regarded as phenomenal, not real. This follows directly from the doctrine that space is not objectively real. But immediately after it is said, "Motion is a form of change, but all change is not motion" (p. 242). Now the first question here suggested is this: How is it, if motion is a form of change, that change should be represented as a real objective fact, while motion is declared to be not such a fact? Does the author mean that only such changes as do not involve motion are objectively real? It seems to be necessary so to understand him. But it would be interesting to see how such a distinction could be carried out.

What changes in the world around us can be specified which are not produced by some kind of motion? All changes of position consist purely in motion. But changes in stationary things are none the less caused by motion. When water freezes, or milk coagulates, or cider ferments, or a wet cloth becomes dry, or an apple decays, the change consists in a movement, though it may be an invisible movement, of particles. The more minutely physical phenomena are investigated, the more is it found that all the changes that take place are nothing but some kind of chemical or other movement of the constituent parts of the visible objects whose changes are observed. Even when these movements cannot be perceived, the *effects* are perceived through the agency of some kind of motion. Thus, the change of color on a growing apple is perceived, we are told, only by virtue of certain undulations which affect the nerves of the eye. Scientists are inclining more and more to believe that there is incessant motion in the atomic elements of material substances, even where the most powerful microscope is unable to detect it. In a certain sense, then, there may be motion where there *seems* to be no change; but where can change be found which does not involve motion?

When now we are told that not all change is motion, it may not be safe to question the truthfulness of the statement. But we must at least be allowed to ask for what has not been given—a single instance of change in which there is no motion. If the author has in mind mental changes—changes that have no relation to space—well and good. But he has laid down the doctrine that change is a reality outside of the mind. Now what kind of changes there can he point out to us which do not consist of motion, or which are not made cognizable by motion? He seems to be very familiar with the physical sciences, and apparently attaches much importance to the results of physical research. It is largely on the ground of what has thus come to light that

he impugns the judgment of common sense with regard to sense-perception. But the whole drift of physical science is in the direction of discovering some form of motion to be the essence, or at least the invariable characteristic, of all the changes that are observed to take place.

It is, therefore, quite incomprehensible why Professor Bowne, after he has relegated time, space, and motion to the category of subjective "forms," should so zealously champion the objectivity of change. We cannot get any idea of change except through intuitions which are controlled by notions of space, time, and motion. The more the phenomena of change are examined and analyzed, the more they seem to consist in nothing but motion of some sort or other. And yet while motion, and with it time and space, are all abolished as being mere appearances, change is defended as being an objective reality! And on what ground? In the chapter on "Change and Becoming" the only ground given seems to be that "change is the most prominent fact of experience" (p. 77). This, however, could be equally well urged as a ground for believing in the objective reality of space and motion. Why change should be singled out as something whose reality should be taken for granted, is hard to see. Yet this is practically taken for granted; and the author's whole strength is employed, not in proving the reality of change, but in trying to show that one can believe in its reality without absurdity! At the best his success in showing this cannot be called very great; and the effort would be a manifest failure, if he kept before himself and his readers in this chapter, what he argues later, that motion which constitutes the soul of all we know of change, is nothing but a subjective conception.

Our author's general assumptions are those of pure idealism. But he nevertheless shrinks from drawing the extreme conclusions which his premises might warrant, and therefore undertakes in the latter part of his book to distinguish be-

tween subjective idealism and his own view, which he calls objective idealism, or phenomenalism. While rejecting the atomic theory, in so far as it assumes the existence of independent substances, he accepts it as a working theory; but when speaking metaphysically he would define atoms as "a series of related elementary activities in the infinite such that they produce for us the appearance of a world of things spatially discrete" (p. 303). To these activities he would attribute in some sense an objective reality. But why does he not make clean work with his idealistic assumptions, and declare mental states and activities to be the only reality? Why does he not account for the coincidence of the impressions of different minds covering an outward world by assuming that God simply "produces consistent and harmonious ideas in different minds"? His reasons are these: (1) "Our ability permanently to modify phenomena seems to point to something beyond our presentations;" (2) "the phenomenal world not only suggests a reality beyond our thoughts, but also a history. The fossils and strata of geology, and the general wear and tear of things, point to a continuous and independent process;" (3) "perception claims to be a revelation of things and processes without us; but on this theory of subjective idealism it is a pure fiction" (p. 471).

Well, what is the objection to supposing that it *is* all a "pure fiction"? This is certainly the conclusion to which the whole drift of our author's philosophy tends. "Our ability permanently to modify phenomena" proves nothing, if his philosophy is correct; for the notion of *permanence* is a temporal notion; and time he has discovered to be no reality at all, but only a mental illusion. But even if this were not so, this permanent modification of phenomena may be, like most other experiences, only a seeming. When a man paints a house red which has previously been white, he permanently modifies the color. But then, since color, as

we have been over and over assured, is all in the eye, and has no objective reality, the modification of the color must also all be in the eye.

Then the second reason is equally inconclusive. "History" and "continuous process" are terms which again imply *time;* but since time has been shown to be nothing but a mental crotchet, what right have we to project this mental "form" upon outward things, and talk as if they had existed and changed in time? I know that Professor Bowne thinks there can be a series or succession without time; but I know also that, when he is expounding his theory of A, A^1, A^2, etc., he tells us that "the thing is never A and A^1 and A^2 *at the same time*" (p. 93, italics mine)—which explanation, if it means anything, means that, after all, time is involved in the process. If the thing is not A and A^1 at the same time, then it must be A and A^1 at *different* times. A must come *before* A^1, or *after* it, in *time.* When a man says he sees a fossil, what is the fact, according to phenomenalism? Why, he has a mental modification which consists in his having certain sensations described as those of color and of hardness, and certain intuitions described as those of form and extension. That is all. And that is all in the mind. How does it "point to a continuous and independent process"? All that we know of processes we know (or think we know) under the "form" of time; the notion of process is therefore a mental notion purely. To infer a geologic process which took place when no one was looking on, is projecting this subjective time-condition into the objective world, and is quite illegitimate.

The third reason is as impotent as the others. "Perception claims to be a revelation of things and processes without us." Well, what of that? Has not our author elaborately argued that the "claims" of perception are for the most part fraudulent? Perception claims to tell us of form and motion and density and color and chemical qualities in out-

ward things. But the philosopher assures us that none of these claims are to be conceded. In short, every particular thing that perception says about "things and processes without us" is serenely discredited; and it is hard to see why, after giving perception the lie so long, he should at last yield anything on the simple ground that perception "claims" it. Indeed, we may go further and say that just what our author says "perception claims," is just what it does not claim. Perception has to do only with perceptible qualities. We perceive form, color, weight, etc.; but the "thing" under or behind these sensible qualities, though irresistibly inferred by the mind, is not what "perception claims" to reveal.

There seems, then, to be no satisfactory reason, on the ground of our author's philosophy, for concluding that there is any outward reality attested by our perceptive experience. And that these reasons are metaphysically unsatisfactory, he himself virtually confesses, when he immediately afterwards admits that the purely idealistic view "is entirely possible and admits of no disproof." His real reason is not a metaphysical one at all. It is, he says, simply "the ethical conviction that such a tissue of deceit and magic" as pure idealism charges upon the Supreme Being "would be disgraceful and outrageous" (pp. 471, 472). Now we must honor his strong confidence that God cannot be guilty of such conduct; but it is difficult to suppress the conviction that this argument, if it is worth anything in settling metaphysical problems, needs to be employed at other points, or else cannot be legitimately employed at all. He relies upon it especially in combating the doctrine of "solipsism" which extreme idealism leads to—the doctrine that "our thought of persons other than ourselves is as purely a subjective product as our thought of things other than ourselves." To adopt such a view, he says, would be "to reduce philosophy to a low and disingenuous farce, and to justify the contempt of every

earnest mind. We say disingenuous, because every such speculator forthwith seeks to induce others to accept his views, although by hypothesis they are only fancies of his own" (p. 457). To which we must all say Amen, and for the obvious reason that the doctrine carried out to this extreme involves a positive *absurdity*. A holds himself to be the only real person, and B, C, etc., to be merely the phantoms of his mind. B, on the contrary, holds *him*self to be the only real person, and A, C, etc., to be phantoms. All are at once real persons, and all are phantoms. This bald absurdity would seem to be sufficient reason for throwing the doctrine overboard. But, strange to say, Professor Bowne does not think this reason sufficient. According to him, since "the infinite mediates all interaction of the finite;" since "God is the cause of causes and the true objective ground of our changing states,"—it follows that, "if these states were given in their present order, we should as certainly construct a world of persons as we do a world of things. If the world of persons should drop away, we should never miss them, but should continue to have the same apparent personal interaction and communion which we have at present." "What, then," it is asked, "is the real ground for admitting the existence of persons?" And the answer given is: "The true reason can be found neither in psychology nor in metaphysics, but only in ethics. Our belief rests ultimately upon the conviction that it would be morally unbecoming on the part of God to subject us to any such measureless and systematic deceit" (p. 457).

So, then, we have this singular state of things—or rather, state of mind: Solipsism is discarded, not because it involves an absurdity, although it does involve an absurdity, but because it makes God a deceiver. The reality of space and motion is discarded, because it involves an absurdity, although it in truth does not involve an absurdity, and although the denial of their reality makes God a deceiver!

This last imputation the phenomalist, I know, will repudiate. But he cannot succeed in escaping from it. If time, space, and motion, which the mind is compelled by its very constitution to regard as objective realities, can be pronounced to be merely subjective "forms," then they are delusions. It does not help the matter to say that we are endowed with a rational faculty which enables us to discover that time and space and motion are not the objective realities which all men are naturally compelled to think them to be. This only amounts to saying that, though men are deceived, a few men are shrewd enough to find out that they are deceived. Nor is it of any use to compare men's notions of space and motion with the delusive impressions of a color-blind man. If all perception of color is purely subjective, it is not clear but that the color-blind man sees just as accurately as any one else. But if our notions of time, space, and motion are mere notions, then we are deceived, in spite of the pretended elucidation of the matter which "reason" has involved. For there is no principle of our rational nature more necessary and more ineradicable than our impulse to regard time, space, and motion as "forms" of things. If one man's "reason" tells him that this impulse is an entirely mistaken one, it is pretty certain that the reason of most other men will pronounce this man's reason to be itself mistaken. There will never be an end of delusion of some sort, until reason learns to adjust itself to the fundamental intuitions of the mind.

ARTICLE IV.

THE HISTORY OF "EXTREME UNCTION."

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THE rite known as "Extreme Unction" in the Roman Church, and reckoned there as a sacrament, among four others, to which the Reformed churches deny that title, has a singularly intermittent history. Before tracing the scanty evidence of the earlier centuries, and the comparative abundance of evidence in later ages concerning it, some few remarks on the two passages of the New Testament with which it is in theory connected, may be serviceable.

St. Mark vi. 12, 13, records briefly the first mission of the twelve. The verbs are noticeably in the imperfect tense, as of a sustained course of action, i. e. they kept on from time to time, as occasion offered, "the anointing of the sick with oil and (so) healing them." It is noteworthy that the same evangelist (in the disputed final passage, however, xvi. 18) records, among the signs promised to "follow them that believed," "that they shall lay hands on the sick (ἀῤῥώστους, as in vi. 13) and they shall recover." There is no recorded use of oil by the Lord himself. St. Mark records his laying his hands on the sick (vi. 5), and their touching the hem of his garment (ver. 56). Some have thought that he enjoined the use of the oil by the twelve. But probably its general Jewish use as a therapeutic agent is the more natural ground of its use by them. The unfailing effect of recovering the sick, and probably its instantaneousness and thus evident character, were the proofs of supernatural power. From the

next quotation from St. James, as also from the practice of the apostles, when fully commissioned after the Pentecost, it is presumable that the name of the Lord Jesus was used by the twelve in their earlier exercise of the gift. For St. James says (v. 14–16): "Is any sick among you? let him call for the elders of the church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord. And the prayer of faith shall save the sick; and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him. Confess your sins one to another, and pray for one another, that ye may be healed: the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much."

Here, again, it seems as plain as in the record of St. Mark given above, that the "saving" of the sick means their rescue from bodily sickness, and the "raising up," their restoration to health. The use of the word *σώζω* by our Lord, as in the phrase "Thy faith hath saved thee" (sometimes in A. V. variably rendered "hath made thee whole"), is too well known to need citation. Nor is that of *ἐγείρω* less clearly established, as used by St. James here, by Matt. ix. 5, 6; Mark ix. 27; John v. 8; Acts iii. 6, 7; although frequently used also of raising from the dead, and rousing from sleep. It is, however, noteworthy that most stress is by St. James laid upon prayer. The prayer is that of "the elders," who represent "the church;" it is to be directed "over him" (*ἐπ' αὐτὸν*, note the case, not *αὐτῷ*), which may probably have been made more express by laying hands on the patient, according to Mark xvi. 18, as above. St. James, then, conditions it further as "the prayer of faith," and ascribes the result personally to the Lord, "working with them, and confirming the word with the signs following" (Mark xvi. 20). Again, in the last verse of our passage, St. James returns to emphasize the effective character of such prayer, and enlarges the special precept here into a general duty, binding on all as brethren in Christ; "pray for one another that ye may be healed," where

the last word (ἰάθητε) carries forward the same idea as σώζω and ἐγείρω in verse 15. And thus the "anointing with oil," while it follows the apostolic precedent of the first missionary twelve, is at the same time a compliance with and sanction given to a therapeutic custom, as noted above, of much wider currency than the infant church would then represent. That church had witnessed the ministry in Jerusalem both of St. Peter, who would naturally remember and retain the practice which he had shared, and also of St. Mark, who records it. This leads us to feel sure that St. James was merely reinforcing by his precept an usage already well known in the Church of the Circumcision, of which he appears in the Acts as the apostolic bishop (xv. 13, 19; xxi. 18; cf. Gal. i. 17; ii. 9).[1] The "unction" then seems regarded as rather instrumental and secondary, and faith and prayer as the primary medium through which the desired end was to be wrought.

Nor should we fail to notice by the way, the interweaving of the higher, spiritual blessing with the bodily cure. This is exactly in our Lord's own method, as shown in the example of the paralytic, to whom his first words are, "Son, thy sins are forgiven thee" (Matt. ix. 2). He saw, as it were, through the body's needs into the deeper needs of the soul. St. James, in refusing to separate them, follows the Master's lead. Given "faith" and the "effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man," embodied on behalf of the whole "church" in its official heads "the elders," and the result is at once physical and spiritual. And thus the precept expands into the treatment of the sick man *as a whole*, not a fragmentary, being. For indeed no less is the scope and range of that "faith" which is the vital essence of prayer. It is the gift of that Spirit which "searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God," and therefore penetrates to all that is within the man. The bearing of these remarks will be seen further when we come to consider the mediæval and modern usage founded upon this apostolic "unction."

[1] Euseb., Hist. Eccl., § 44, 12–15.

Some commentators have thought fit to distinguish "miraculous faith," as though a thing *sui generis*, from that which opens the door of the human soul to God, and which is "counted for righteousness." To discuss fully such a question here would lead us too far from our subject. But it may be remarked in general, that our Lord seems to contemplate *one* kind of faith only. The well-known words spoken to or by, not the apostles only, but others who fell in the way of His mercy; as the Jewish afflicted father, the Syrophœnician anxious mother, the Gentile centurion, and others, all seem to ring a single note, not to involve or distinguish a higher and a lower tone. Such are, "Where is your faith?" "Have faith in God," "If ye had faith as a grain of mustard seed," etc. Again, "Lord, increase our faith," "If thou canst believe," "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief," "O woman, great is thy faith," "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel,"—all too well known to call for references here. And it may be further questioned, whether the distinction of "miraculous" from other faith is not an afterthought of commentators, founded on the assumed fact that miracles have ceased, and on the demand for a theory to account for the cessation. With these remarks I must let the question stand aside. It may, however, be admitted that the *degree* of faith in both healer and healed, conditions the result.

We know that the personal influence of St. James was great among his countrymen, and Eusebius cites Clement and Hegesippus[1] as attesting the fact. He wrote, in fact, "to the Twelve Tribes of the Dispersion."[2] But his utterances in his Epistle cannot be viewed as exclusively directed to the Jewish or to any section of the early church. The same applies to this particular injunction which we are discussing.

We know from St. Paul that "gifts of healing" were among

[1] Hist. Eccl., § 44, 15–25; § 45, 1–3; § 77, 40—§ 80.

[2] James i. 1.

that wide repertory given "for the edification of the body of Christ," among the Gentile Christians. Further, the object of apostolic ordinances being assumed to be the binding *all* believers together in one brotherhood, so that there should be in Christ "neither Jew nor Gentile," to provide any such ordinance for the use of Hebrew or proselyte Christians *only*, would surely tend to loosen that comprehensive bond, and continue that exclusiveness which Judaism had fostered. Nor is the wide and free action of the Spirit, as described by St. Paul, "dividing to every man severally as he will," irrespectively of ecclesiastical *status*, inconsistent with the assumption which underlies St. James' words that some, at any rate, of the "elders" would be found qualified with this special "gift of healing." Or, setting such special gifts to individuals aside, his words may be taken as a direction how, in case of need, to seek for such gifts, and as an assurance that "those who sought" should "find" them, in the due exercise of their ministry, "in the name of the Lord." Further, it is supposable that, as the head, under Christ, of the Church of the Circumcision, he might have personal knowledge of the "elders" among the communities of the Dispersion, whether forming distinct local churches or grouped therein with Gentile brethren. This personal intimacy may possibly have guided his words as regards their application at the moment. How long they would continue applicable, depends on the wider general question, How long the whole class of supernatural gifts in the physical sphere continued to mark the progress of the Christian church. And here it is further to be noticed, that mutual confession of offences is coupled with mutual intercession, both being exercises of the same spirit of love, as though equally conditions of the gift. In short, its exercise needs an atmosphere of charity. Perhaps it is not too much to say that in that atmosphere only can it flourish. Thus we have love coupled with faith as prerequisites. And this may possibly suggest an answer to the

above question as to the duration of this whole class of gifts. Not only by faith becoming mere otiose assent to formal propositions, but by "love waxing cold," would their vital atmosphere degenerate, and they themselves tend to die out. But on this debatable question we need not now further dwell; and pass on to the witness of the earlier post-apostolic ages.

We search the Apostolic Fathers in vain for any trace of the practice as prescribed by St. James, or any reference to his words. The "Teaching of the Twelve Appostles," lately exhumed by Bryennius the Patriarch from the mausoleum of the past, is equally void of any such trace, although largely tinctured with a tone derived from that early period, when the Church of the Circumcision was a distinct and important factor in Christianity. The first notices which meet us of a kindred import seem to found themselves upon the text of St. Mark rather than on that of St. James. Thus Tertullian[1] relates of the Emperor Septimius Severus that he was healed of a disease by the anointing of a Christian, one Proculus, for all that appears, a layman. This must have been before 211 A. D. Tertullian, having been born about 150 A. D., is thus a contemporary witness. The next case is that of the healing of a woman by a woman, similarly by unction of oil, the healer being named Eugenia, somewhere in the third century. The next is recorded by the historian Sozomen, a great admirer of saintly anchorites, who says of Benjamin, one of that class, probably late in the fourth century, who dwelt at Sectis, "that to him God gave such grace that without medicine, by mere touch of hand, or by use of oil, over which he used to pray, he cured the sick" in apostolic fashion. Here it should be noted that we have oil mentioned as an alternative only. Hilarion the Eremite, also, according to Jerome, could heal with oil. He died about 370 A. D. It is of course impossible to weigh the

[1]Ad Scapulam, c. iv.

evidence in these cases as regards the fact itself. But at any rate they attest the belief, as current from the second century downward, that the gift of healing by the use of oil was persistent in the church; and they seem to incline to the view that the power was a special gift to some person of holy character, without reference to official *status*.

Next, it may be noticed that parallel with these recorded or alleged facts, runs a rather scanty *catena* of patristic passages in which the text, as above, from St. James, or a part of it, is quoted; but in which it seems adduced *not* in reference to any rite then current and founded upon it, but merely to illustrate the pastoral office in respect of the remission of sins. Thus Origen, in a "Homily on Leviticus," says: "There is yet a hard and painful remission of sins through penance, when the sinner washes his couch with tears, etc., and when he is not ashamed to declare his sin to God's priests, and seek his cure." It will be observed that the connection of remission of sins with official absolution is the subject here. Then follows immediately, "wherein also is fulfilled that which the apostle [St. James] saith, 'But if a man is sick, let him call,' etc." Obviously the purpose of Origen here had no connection with any use of unction, save the accidental one of its being united in the same passage. The whole force of what he quotes, lies, for his purpose, in the words relating to confession, to sin, and to forgiveness through the agency of the church's officers.

Chrysostom[1] again says, "For not only when they regenerate us, but also afterwards, they [priests] have power to remit sins, for, 'Is any man sick among you? let him call,' etc." Here the same remarks apply as to the words of Origen above. Victor of Antioch (*c.* 401 A. D.), commenting on Mark vi. 13, introduces our passage from St. James, just as a modern commentator might, to illustrate it; but this purely hermeneutic reference has obviously no bearing whatever on

[1] De Sacerdotio, iii.

any *rite* as practised in the church: it is merely an explaining of Scripture by Scripture. Cyril of Alexandria[1] (*c.* 449 A. D.) quotes the passage from St. James among many others bearing on his subject; the special reference, if any, being to intercession as an element of worship.

So far, then, we have bare citations of St. James' text, with no suggestion of any ritual practice founded upon it. Our next authority, however, *does* seem to suggest some such practice in connection with it.

Among Augustine's "works" of doubtful genuineness is the Sermon ccxv., "De Tempore," now ascribed by many to Cæsarius of Arles of the early sixth century. In it occurs the passage, "As often as any infirmity occurs, let the sick man receive the body and blood of Christ, and then let him anoint his body, that what is written may be fulfilled in him, 'If any man is sick, let him call,' etc." Here it seems almost certain that some error, either of author or transcriber, has established a corrupt text: for how could "what is written be fulfilled" by a patient thus self-anointed? All the tradition of the exercise of the power of cure by oil is against such a self-application of it. Moreover, as he could not communicate himself, but must be indebted to the clergy for that, why should he be left to transgress the rule of St. James exactly in the point which the author presently quotes St. James to enforce? Both textually and practically, therefore, the notion seems absurd. But, of course, the building on a single corrupt passage in a comparatively late writer, is the most unsound of all argumentative structures. It is giving the "Extreme Unctionist" the benefit of the gravest of critical doubts, to admit that even here, in a sermon of no certain authority in the early sixth century, we touch bottom at last on an isolated shoal of tradition in his favor. And this is some hundred and thirty years later than the last expiring trace of any claim to the exercise of the gift of healing

[1] De Adoratione, l. vi.

by oil as a *fact*, specially vouchsafed to some person of eminent holiness. The two *catenae* of testimonies have, as we have seen, nothing in common. It is impossible so to correlate them as to marshall them in support of one another. It is only in this last and doubtful link of the second *catena* that any stretch of critical ingenuity can detect even a convergence; and this link is separated by too wide a chronological gap for any argumentative contact to be possible.

But I have reserved for special remark a letter from Innocent I. (Pope, 411–417 A. D.) to one Decentius, a bishop, who had asked, whether the sick might be anointed with oil, and whether the bishop might anoint. The pope replies in the affirmative to both queries, and quotes St. James as in support of his decision. But how is it possible that the question could have been asked, if there had been, as the unctionists allege, a continuous tradition and practice of the sacramental or other rite of unction from primitive times? The letter is absolutely decisive *against*, and not for, any such rite so deduced. The rite assumes to be (1) sacramental, (2) exercised by presbyters, (3) deduced by tradition from St. James. How could a bishop of the church fail to know of one of its sacraments? How could he ask whether a bishop could officiate, if it were (as on the theory it must have been) open all along to presbyters to do so? How could a pope fail to remind him that it had existed from the beginning, if the fact were so? How could he answer in this timid and tentative way, unless the practice had been a somewhat questionable novelty? What should we think of a contemporaneous papal rescript, answering, "Yes; water may be used in baptism, and a deacon may apply it"? Yet, how is this reply more absurd, on the Romish theory, than the other?

But, adds Innocent, "The oil being made by the bishop, not only priests, but all Christians, may use it for anointing, as their own or their friends' necessity may require." Here,

then, we have a hint of an entire deviation from the earlier tradition. The essential sanctity is now derived from the bishop, but transferred to the oil, which becomes, as it were, the *res sacramenti*, and conveys the miraculous virtue which any Christian can apply. The personal holiness which was the apparent basis of earlier tradition as to the fact of cure, becomes materialized in the unguent. In short, all the conditions which we traced as early prevailing, of vital faith, vital love, vital holiness, have vanished from this official manufactory of the unguent through episcopal benediction. It can be made in any required quantity, under this ecclesiastical patent, and kept ready on demand, to be a patent medicine at a druggist's store. A grosser degradation of an apostolic practice, it is not easy to conceive. Alban Butler indeed argued, or rather asserted, that the lay application of it is devotional only, and the clerical, alone sacramental. But there is no hint of this in the words of Pope Innocent, which are, as we have seen, inconsistent with the sacramental idea.

But, about the same time, or probably not earlier than the rescript of Pope Innocent I., the Eastern Church was bestirring itself in the same direction. We find a rule enjoined in the eighth book of the "Apostolical Constitutions," as follows: "Let the bishop bless the water or the oil. But if he be not present, then let the presbyter bless it, with the deacon standing by. But if the bishop be present, let the presbyter and the deacon stand by, and let him say: O Lord of hosts, the God of powers,[1] the creator of the waters, and the supplier of oil, who art compassionate and lovest mankind, who hast given water for drink and for cleansing, and oil to give man a cheerful and joyful countenance; do Thou also now sanctify this water and this oil through Christ, in the name

[1] *δυνάμεων*, with apparent reference to the use of the word *δυνάμεις* in the New Testament, as signifying supernatural powers. See Matt. vii. 22; Acts xix. 11 *et al.*

of him that hath offered them; and grant them power to restore health, to drive away diseases, to banish demons, and to disperse all snares through Christ our hope. [With doxology following.] Amen." The offerer then took home for use the water and the oil.[1] Similarly the earliest *ordo Romanus* (*c.* 730 A. D.) appoints on Maundy Thursday a form of benediction for the oil then to be offered, for the benefit of any sick, for whose domestic use it was then taken by the offerer.

Thus the earliest tradition concerning healing with oil makes it a spiritual gift, among other gifts of the Spirit himself indwelling in the man or woman, and seemingly dependent more or less on his or her conformity with the mind of the Spirit, i. e., on personal holiness. The latest relegates it to the sphere of official mechanism. Every bishop has an official holiness; "whatever he blesses, is blessed." Therefore this guarantees sufficiently the quality of the oil for all needful purposes. But we can even trace in outline the links of belief which lead us gradually from the one of these to the other. An eminent saint who, let us suppose, had been gifted with this power during life, lay a dying. Anxious that the gift should not wholly perish with him, the sorrowing relatives, etc., bring oil to him, to receive his parting benediction. They piously cherish in it the memory of his virtues, and recognize the efficacy of his spiritual presence. In it "he, being dead, yet speaketh;" and his works, in a literal sense, "do follow him" among the living still.

We realize these conditions, in fact, when we read what Gregory of Tours relates of the dying Monegund, "Oil and salt were brought to and blessed by her when dying, and

[1] In allusion, probably, to this, Theodore, an Oriental from Tarsus, but Archbishop of Canterbury 668 A. D., says that, *according to the Greeks*, it is lawful for the presbyters to make consecrated—he calls it "exorcized"—oil for the sick, to be used in case of need. These evidences show that, in the fifth century, the *oleum infirmorum*, blessed by bishop or presbyters in solemn function, was established in the church's system, but *not* reserved for presbyteral application.

they retained healing virtue." Farther still, the growing warmth of veneration for relics, chiefly the personal remains, tombs, etc., of martyrs and saints, gave a strong secondary source to holy oil. It exuded from holy sepulchres, it distilled from holy bones, it was exhaled from monumental shrines anointed with common oil. Such reliquary oil, as Procopius relates, was obtained for the use of the Emperor Justinian, and cured him of a disease. Thus Augustine[1] relates even a restoration to life by the use of "the oil of St. Stephen," how obtained or prepared he does not say; and "knew a maiden of Hippo," from whom a living presbyter interceded that a devil might depart, and in his intercession his tears fell and mingled with oil, by anointing with which she was released. Here we have, indeed, a type truer to St. James' exemplar, in respect to the intercessory prayer of an "elder of the church;" and one which only stoops to the lower type in respect of the rather grotesque material machinery. Much more would the holy sites of gospel history be, we might expect, fruitful in the same virtue. The Chapel of the Nativity at Bethlehem and the (as believed) actual spots of the Cross and the Sepulchre, were requisitioned in the same cause and with the same result, says Paulinus Petrocorius (*c.* 460). Oil exposed there was believed to imbibe the sanctity of the shrine, and acquire healing virtue. Nay, it seems that in Chrysostom's time the faithful would abstract oil from the sanctuaries of the church, probably kept there for lamps, etc., and use it to anoint themselves, "in faith and in due season."[2] And so Elizius of Gaul[3] advises the sick to "faithfully seek the blessed oil from the church wherewith his body may be anointed;" meaning probably such oil as had by formal benediction been set apart for such use. These examples extend from

[1] De Civ. Dei, lxx.

[2] Hom. xxxii. on Matthew.

[3] De Rectitudine Catholicæ Conversationis, sect. 5.

the early fourth to the late seventh century; and in none, save Augustine's "maiden of Hippo," does the intervention of the presbyter form a feature. We find, however, a solitary instance of this missing feature in the case of St. Chlotilde, who, in 554 A. D., *secundum Apostolum inuncta est sacerdotibus.* The two introductory words certainly give this the air of a revival of, or conscious recurrence to, a standard from which there had been an established deflection before; and thus the case makes against, rather than for, any continuity of tradition from the apostolic time. Further and later, in the eighth century, we have evidence of the Armenian rite, in which the presbyters are directed to "bless on each occasion so much oil as was needful for the sick, using proper prayers." What the words "on each occasion" mean, does not clearly appear. They may refer to "each occasion" of sickness, but also to any specially solemn function which drew a number of presbyters together, as a synod, or the like. Similarly, in the same century, Boniface, in the West, bids all presbyters have the *oleum infirmorum* blessed by the bishop, and to keep it by them. This brings us to the period of Pepin's ascendency or near it, when the practice became more or less prevalent in Gaul (*c.* 744 A. D.); and seventy years later was, by a canon of Chalons (813 A. D.), formally enjoined on the Gallican clergy.

We see then, on reviewing these *data*, what we might be prepared to expect. The currency of Scripture in the church universal was wide enough to prevent the words of St. Mark and St. James from being ever wholly lost to its consciousness. Accordingly, we find a record of events, practices, and church rules, which have mostly some contact at some one point or more with that scriptural record. But as parallel development progressed, points of deflection were reached, earlier in one branch of the church, later in another, which, while they stopped somewhat short of one another, yet

were able in the eighth century to present something of a *consensus* of degenerate usage. The Armenian seems to diverge least widely from the norm of St. James, the Romish to go farthest in its departure, the Greek to keep somewhere between the two. This last does not erect its unction into a sacrament, as neither does the Armenian. The Romish, indeed, has undergone much further development since the simpler rule of Pepin's day, at the hands of Pope Innocent III., in the late twelfth century, of Pope Eugenius at the Council of Florence, and finally of the Council of Trent, and its defenders have no right now to found themselves even on the questionable amount of *consensus* which the eighth century exhibits. By enjoining the administration of "unction" only when recovery is hopeless, Rome cuts herself off similarly from a scriptural injunction having recovery for its special object. The church which went originally furthest in its departure from the norm, has expanded the abnormal form thus reached still farther, and since stereotyped, in the rigid lines of sacramental perpetuity, what is in effect an inversion, in its most essential point, of the apostolic rite. A form of anointing the sick was retained by the early Reformed Church of England in the first Prayer Book of King Edward VI. It was, however, merely to be used "if the sick person desired it," had no sacramental efficacy ascribed to it, but contained petitions alike for pardon of sins and restoration of body. Nor is there any reason why it should not have continued, or might not be with edification restored. And this leads us on to notice the revived pretensions of what is sometimes vulgarly called "Faith-healing" in the modern day, as illustrative of the principle, although not of the practice, of the apostolic age. Given those conditions of faith, love, and holiness, which constitute what we may call, without irreverence, a high pressure of the spiritual atmosphere, and there is no reason apparent, in the nature

of spiritual things, why the same "signs," or some of them, should not "follow them that believe" now as then.

Each case, however, must rest for its individual authentication upon its own evidence. And this mostly rests on minute details, impossible to sift or verify by personal research, and apart from it valueless. No such attempt will here be made. But one may here be allowed to refer to a single instance, resting on the evidence of no less a person than Canon Wilberforce, who says :—"I have no shadow of doubt that I was healed by the Lord's blessing upon his own word recorded in St. James. . . . . My internal ailment was of such a nature that leading surgeons declared it to be incurable except at the cost of a severe operation, which leading physicians thought me unable to endure at the time with safety. While endeavoring at the sea-side to gain strength for the operation, the passage in St. James was impressed with indescribable force upon my mind. I resisted it and reasoned with myself against it for two months. I even came up to London, and settled in a house near the eminent surgeon, that I might undergo the operation; but the spiritual pressure increased until I at last sent for elders,—men of God, full of faith,—by whom I was prayed over and anointed, and in a few weeks the internal ailment passed entirely away. 'This was the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in mine eyes.'" [1]

The present writer remembers citing the case to the attendant on a sick-bed at which he was then officiating; the suggestion was, however, declined. The initial difficulty in all such suggestions is to rise above the feeling that, in adopting it, one is trying an experiment—saying in effect, "Is the Lord among us, or not?" Such a question would never have occurred to the believer of St. James' days. It is difficult through centuries of strife and division, of formalized faith, chilled love, and degenerate holiness, to feel one's

[1] See his letter to the Daily Telegraph (London), for May 2, 1889.

way back, as it were, to the right hand of Christ himself, and realize that personal presence which should be as true now as ever, resting on the word of him who "liveth, and was dead, and is alive for evermore." And here, therefore, we recur to what was remarked above concerning the power, scope, and range of that faith which opens the soul to God. His Spirit is not impoverished, nor its power impaired, by the wear and waste of time. It runs freely, like the electric spark along its conductor, traversing the long catenary of the ages which hangs between us and its first effusion. If we could rise even to the level of that prayer, "I believe, help thou mine unbelief," casting ourselves unreservedly upon him as a present reality, as did they who said, "Lord, behold he whom thou lovest is sick," why should not our sickness obtain his condescending touch, and respond to his quickening power? Why should he not still save in body as well as in soul? Let us remember his words of old by his servant Isaiah, who "saw his glory and spake of him": "The Lord's hand is not shortened, that it cannot save; neither his ear heavy, that it cannot hear: but your iniquities have separated between you and your God, and your sins have hid his face from you" (Isa. lix. 1, 2).

ARTICLE V.

TRICHOTOMY: A BIBLICAL STUDY.

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CONSCIOUSNESS and revelation alike bear witness that, to speak in a general way, man is a being with a dual nature. I have a body; I am also conscious that I have a soul, of which my body is but the instrument. This is the true Ego; an immaterial essence, which thinks and feels and wills; but a material body has been assumed into organic union with it. Thus I am body and soul. In a like general way, in the account of creation as given in the book of Genesis, we read of two different elements as entering into the constitution of man; the one, material, a body, made "of the dust of the ground," the other, immaterial, the נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים, "the breath of life (lives)," breathed into man by God, in the day that he created him. On this point, then, consciousness and Scripture bear consentient testimony; there is a dichotomy in the nature of man. But this being granted, the question still remains, whether a further analysis is possible. Philosophy, indeed, whether right or wrong, long ago insisted that a further distinction must be made in the immaterial part of man, as containing in the unity of the one person, first, the ψυχή, or "animal soul," and secondly, the νοῦς, or "intelligence." Whether these names were well chosen or not, or whether there was any sufficient ground for the distinction, we do not yet inquire. But the fact that long ago such a distinction has been made by an influential school of philosophy, at least suggests that there may probably be in human consciousness some phenomena which seem to point

to a duality in the immaterial part of man. The application which was made of the doctrine of a trichotomy by the Gnostics, and later, in the fourth century, in the formulation of the Apollinarian doctrine of the person of our Lord, no doubt has had much influence, even until now, in predisposing theologians against a view which has seemed to them to accommodate itself too readily to certain forms of erroneous doctrine; as, in a matter so important as the constitution of the person of Christ. But there are many indications that in our time, partly as a result of an exegesis less than in former days under the control of the dogmatic spirit, and still more in consequence of recent discoveries in physiology, the minds of many are inclining again to affirm the reality of a true trichotomy in human nature, as attested apparently both by Holy Scripture and by modern physiological research.

Stated as a biblical question, the question may be put in this form: When the sacred writers speak as they do of "body, soul, and spirit," do they mean thereby to denote the soul and spirit as being in some sense different and distinct entities, or do these two words simply denote the same thing under two different aspects? The latter view has been expressed by the late Dr. A. A. Hodge as follows: "The word πνεῦμα designates the one soul, emphasizing its quality as rational. The word ψυχή designates the same soul, emphasizing its quality as the vital and animating principle of the body." The only argument which he gives in support of this view is in these words: "That the *psuche* and the *pneuma* are distinct entities cannot be the doctrine of the New Testament, because they are habitually used interchangeably and indifferently." To this, Dr. Charles Hodge, in his "Systematic Theology," adds two other arguments, which will be noticed later. If, however, this affirmation be correct, then so far as this is a biblical question, no further argument is needed. But whether it be correct or

not, is a question which can be decided only by a careful examination of all the passages in the Bible where the words rendered "soul" and "spirit," or their Hebrew and Greek equivalents, occur. The original words which are thus translated, are, in the Hebrew, נֶפֶשׁ, נְשָׁמָה, and רוּחַ; in the Greek, ψυχή and πνεῦμα. What, then, are the facts as to their usage? and does that usage authorize us to say that both designate the same entity, "the one emphasizing its quality as rational, the other emphasizing its quality as the vital principle of the body;" and that they are "habitually used interchangeably and indifferently"? or are they used with discrimination, in such a manner that they appear, according to that usage, to denote different elements of our immaterial nature?

In investigating the facts, it is well to remember the law of development of doctrine in the Scriptures; and therefore we should not lay undue stress, either way, upon the usage of the Old Testament, especially in the older books. Still it will be instructive, especially as the New Testament usage in Greek is much influenced by the use of the corresponding Hebrew terms, to review rapidly the facts regarding the usage of the Hebrew words. The facts with respect to רוּחַ are as follows. Primarily and by etymology it means "wind," in which sense it appears about one hundred times. Examples are: in Gen. iii. 8, "in the cool [lit. the wind] of the day;" Ex. x. 13, "the Lord brought an east wind;" Jon. i. 4, "the Lord sent out a great wind," etc. Immediately derived from this primary signification, we have the signification, "blast," or "breath;" as, e. g., in Ex. xv. 8, "with the blast of thy nostrils;" Job iv. 9, "by the breath of his nostrils are they consumed;" Isa. xi. 4, "with the breath of his lips will he slay the wicked;" and, probably, though not certainly, in the narrative of the Flood, in Gen. vi. 17; vii. 15, 22; in all other places, about two hundred and twenty in number, it is rendered "spirit."

The word נֶפֶשׁ occurs much more frequently, about seven

hundred times in the Old Testament. It also has much greater diversity of meaning. The radical meaning, like that of *ruach*, is probably "wind," but it does not occur in this sense. From this, as in the case of *ruach*, the meaning "breath" naturally comes; but *nephesh* is so rendered only once, in Job xli. 21, "His breath kindleth coals." In very many places it denotes the life or animating principle, whether of man or beast; as, in Lev. xxiv. 18, "he that killeth a beast" (Heb., "he that smiteth the life of a beast;" R. V., "he that smiteth a beast mortally"); Deut. xix. 21, "life shall go for life." Next, in a sense still broader, *nephesh* denotes the whole man, both soul and body; as, in Ex. xii. 16, "that which every man must eat;" Josh. xi. 11, "they smote all the souls;" and xx. 9, "whosoever killeth any person." In this sense it is thus often used where we should use "person," "individual," or simply "man." But the word even denotes, in a similar manner, an animal, as made up of soul and body; as, in Gen. ii. 19, where we read, "Adam called every living creature;" and in Gen. ix. 10, 15, 16, it is similarly used of the animals that went in with Noah into the ark. As thus often in a broad sense comprehending the entire personality of man, soul and body, it is often used pleonastically with a possessive pronominal affix, as a personal pronoun, as often in the Psalms; e. g., Ps. xi. 1, "How say ye to my soul?" i. e., "to me;" xxii. 29, "none can keep alive his own soul," i. e., "keep himself alive." As thus used of the whole person, the *nephesh* is even said to die, and is spoken of as dead. Thus it occurs in this idiom in Num. vi. 6, "he shall not come near to a dead body," "a dead *nephesh*;" and ix. 6, 7, "defiled by the dead body (*nephesh*) of a man."

נְשָׁמָה, like the two words already noted, primarily means "wind," and then "breath." It is much less common, however, than *ruach* or *nephesh*, only occurring twenty-four times. Of these passages, in seventeen it is rendered

"breath" or "breathe;" in three places more, "blast" (2 Sam. xxii. 16; Job iv. 9; Ps. xviii. 15). In only two places it is translated "spirit;" Job xxvi. 4, "whose spirit came from thee?" and Prov. xx. 27, "the spirit of man is the lamp of the Lord." In one passage alone it is rendered "soul;" viz., Isa. lvii. 16, "the souls which I have made." In Job xxxii. 8, A. V., it is rendered "inspiration,"—"the inspiration of the Almighty;" but the Revised Version gives the more usual rendering "breath."

Summing up now the results of this part of our induction, we find that, as regards *nephesh* and *ruach*, they are by no means used indifferently and interchangeably. The facts are as follows:—

1. Both *ruach* and *nephesh* are used in the physical sense of "breath;" *ruach*, frequently, *nephesh*, but rarely.

2. Both *ruach* and *nephesh* are used to denote the life or animating principle, whether of man or beast; but while this is the most common sense of *nephesh*, it is rare with *ruach*, which in this sense, indeed, perhaps occurs in no other place than in the sceptical passage in Eccl. iii. 21, "Who knoweth the . . . . . spirit of the beast, whether it goeth downward to the earth?"

3. Both *ruach* and *nephesh* are used in a broader sense, as comprehending the whole immaterial part of man, not only the principle of animal life, but also the higher rational spirit. But with this generic reference *nephesh* again appears to be the more common word, and *ruach* is employed more rarely.

4. While *nephesh* is frequently used to denote the whole man, soul and body, *ruach* is never thus employed. Still less can *ruach* be used, like *nephesh*, to designate an irrational animal, as made up of a soul and a body.

5. While *nephesh* is even applied to the body after the soul has left it, such a usage never occurs with *ruach*. On the contrary, רוּחַ is contrasted with בָּשָׂר, "flesh," as some-

thing vastly higher (Isa. xxxi. 3).

6. Accordingly, by metonymy, the *nephesh* is said to die and be dead, a usage which never occurs with *ruach*.

7. So also, the idiom by which *nephesh* is used with a possessive suffix to denote, in a periphrastic and sometimes emphatic way, the personal pronoun, rarely, if ever, is found with *ruach*.

8. But finally, whenever the reference is to God or to angels, *ruach* is always found, and *nephesh* never.[1] In other words, *nephesh* is never used except of the immaterial principle as in connection with the animal body.

Certainly these facts warrant us in saying that it is not true that *nephesh* and *ruach* are interchangeable. There appears to be a difference between the two words, of such a kind, that, while the one may be used both of the Creator and the creature, the other is applied only in the sphere of the organized creation.

The use of *n'shama* corresponds rather with that of *ruach* than with that of *nephesh*. In proportion to the frequency of its occurrence, however, it is used more frequently than either *ruach* or *nephesh*, in the material sense of "breath." But, on the other hand, when *n'shama* is used of the immaterial part, it is even more closely restricted than *ruach* to the spirit of man and of God. Indeed, we find no instance of its application to an irrational animal; it is never used to include both soul and body; nor is it by any rhetorical figure ever spoken of as dead. As regards its Greek equivalents, we may dismiss the matter by simply saying that it is always represented in the Septuagint either by πνοή or ἔμπνοος.

The facts as to the usage of ψυχή and πνεῦμα can be briefly stated. The New Testament use of these words is based upon that of the Septuagint, in which *nephesh* is always rendered by *psuche*, and *ruach* by *pneuma*, except in Gen. xli.

[1] It is only an apparent exception, when *nephesh* in union with a possessive suffix is applied to God, as under 7, above. See footnote below, to *psuche* 3.

8, "the spirit of Pharaoh was troubled," where, only, *psuche* stands for the Hebrew *ruach*. Hence the Hellenistic use of *psuche* is much broader than the classical, as it is applied in all the instances above mentioned in the case of *nephesh*. Hence it comes that *psuche* and *pneuma* are employed in the New Testament to denote the whole immaterial part of man; as, in Matt. x. 28, "able to destroy both soul and body in hell," where the Greek has *psuche;* and James ii. 26, "the body apart from the spirit is dead," where the Greek has *pneuma*. Still it is not true that the words are used indifferently and interchangeably. In particular, the following facts are to be observed :—

1. *Psuche* alone, like *nephesh*, is used of the life, whether of man or beast; as, e. g., in Matt. ii. 20, "they are dead which sought the young child's life;" vi. 25, "Take no thought for your life;" Rev. viii. 9, "creatures which had life;" and of animals; as, xvi. 3, "every living creature died in the sea."

2. As a significant fact, in accord with ordinary Old Testament usage, the Holy Spirit in the New Testament never attributes *pneuma* to irrational animals; the possession of *pneuma* stands out in the whole New Testament as the peculiar distinction, among earthly creatures, of man alone.

3. And, on the other hand, in the New Testament, as in the Old, the possession of *psuche* is never affirmed of God or angels.[1] God is *pneuma*, not *psuche;* angels, *pneumata*, not *psuchai*.

We must conclude, then, that it is not true that these words "are habitually used interchangeably and indiffer-

[1] Such an expression as is found in Matt. xii. 18, where God is represented as using the words "in whom my soul is well pleased," cannot be justly urged, as it has been, as an exception to this rule; for in this place the Greek ηὐδόκησεν ἡ ψυχή μου is simply a translation of the original Hebrew words in the passage in Isa. xlii. 1, here quoted, where we have the expression רָצְתָה נַפְשִׁי. But, evidently, in this place we have one of the exceedingly numerous instances where *nephesh*, as above remarked, has lost its specific meaning, and

ently." It is indeed freely granted that in the absence, both in Hebrew and Greek, of any more generic term, both *ruach* and *nephesh*, and *psuche* and *pneuma*, sometimes designate the whole immaterial part of man; but they do not therefore always, or even most commonly, carry, each and all of them, that one comprehensive meaning. It is equally plain, from the study of the passages in which these words severally are used, that *ruach* and *pneuma* do designate an immaterial existence of a higher order than *nephesh* and *psuche*. Man is represented as having both a soul (*nephesh*, *psuche*) and a spirit (*ruach*, *pneuma*); God has—or rather essentially *is*—Spirit (*ruach*, *pneuma*).

However then, under other circumstances, we might be justified in ignoring or declining to attach dogmatic weight to any passages in which the *psuche* is apparently distinguished from the *pneuma*, the actual usage of the Bible seems to forbid us to regard such expressions as we shall have now to consider, as merely pleonastic or accidental. As already remarked, it were not indeed strange, if in the Old Testament we should not find a distinction between the terms for "soul" and "spirit" sharply and indubitably indicated, even if such a distinction were a fact. It were not consistent with the law of progress in the revelation of doctrine which is to be observed throughout Holy Scripture. And yet, in Job xii. 10, we find a passage in which the two words are apparently used with discrimination in accordance with the distinctions already shown; "in whose hand is the soul (*nephesh*) of every living thing, and the breath (*ruach*, marg. R. V. "spirit") of all mankind." With good reason, too, Professor Delitzsch has called attention to the language

in combination with a possessive suffix is used, with no reference to its distinctive meaning, as an emphatic form of the personal pronoun. Hence nothing can be affirmed here of the Greek ἡ ψυχή μου which is not true of the Hebrew נַפְשִׁי, which it represents. See Gesenius, Hebrew and English Lexicon, *sub voc.* נֶפֶשׁ, 5.

in Gen. ii. 7, where we are told that the human *nephesh* was the result of God's breathing into man the נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים, "the breath of lives." Are we to identify the antecedent *n'shama* with the resultant *nephesh?* Still, for the reason already given, we are not inclined to press any such statements as proof-texts on the constitution of man's immaterial nature. It is enough to call attention to the fact that they are such as are in perfect harmony, to say no more, with what we should expect on the assumption that the *psuche* and the *pneuma* were distinct entities.

But the New Testament, to many, seems much more explicit. The *locus classicus* is 1 Thess. v. 23, which reads (R. V.): "The God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." In this passage the second clause certainly appears to be a fuller explication of the reference in the term ὁλοτελής, explained by Jerome as signifying *per omnia vel in omnibus;* so also the Vulgate renders *per omnia*, "through all," *sc.* "all parts of your being." And then what this "*omnia*" includes, is set forth by the terms, "spirit," "soul," and "body." As to the significance of these words we heartily accept the words of Dean Alford, who says: "*Pneuma* is the SPIRIT, the highest and distinctive part of man, the immortal and responsible soul, in our common parlance: *psuche* is the lower or animal soul, containing the passions and desires which we have in common with the brutes, but which in us is ennobled and drawn up by the *pneuma.* That St. Paul had these distinctions in mind is plain from such places as 1 Cor. ii. 14." To the same effect are the remarks on the same passage by Bishop Ellicott, who says, that we have here "a distinct enunciation of the three component parts of the nature of man: the *pneuma*, the higher of the two united immaterial parts, being the *vis superior, agens, imperans in homine* (Olsh.); the *psuche*, the *vis inferior quae agitur, movetur in*

impero tenetur (*ibid.*), the sphere of the will and the affections, the true centre of the personality. . . . . To assert that enumerations like the present are rhetorical (De Wette), or worse, that the apostle probably attached no distinct thought to each of these words (Jowett), is plainly to set aside all sound rules of scriptural exegesis." With all which we cannot but fully agree. To suppose that we have here a mere tautology is quite out of accord with the rest of the verse. Surely the πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα are exegetical of the term ὁλοτελής, in the former clause of the verse. How, again, can the assumption that Paul did not mean to indicate any distinction, be harmonized with his explicit statement made to the Corinthians, that the things which he taught in his Epistles he taught "in *words* which the Holy Ghost teacheth"? We are thus, for our part, quite unable to avoid understanding the apostle here to teach a trichotomy of the nature of man. It is not indeed the trichotomy affirmed by the Platonists, who thought that the νοῦς in man was a part of the eternal self-existent God, or Logos. It needs to be emphasized that this erroneous notion has no necessary logical connection with the affirmation of a trichotomy: since the question as to the *fact* of a trichotomy is quite distinct from that as to the essential *nature* or *origin* of each part of man's threefold nature.

Scarcely less decisive than the words of the apostle in 1 Thess. v. 23, seems to us the use by the same apostle of the two adjectives, respectively derived from these two nouns, in 1 Cor. xv. 44. In that place the apostle is distinguishing this present corruptible body from that which we are to receive in the resurrection, and to what he has just before said, adds: "it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body." It may be remarked in passing that the translation of the adjective *psuchikon* here by "natural," is so unfortunate that it seems truly strange that the New Testament revisers, with the example of the Vulgate and other

versions before them, did not render the adjective, in the absence of any English adjective derived from "soul," as *psuchikos* from *psuche*, by the word "animal." "It is sown an animal body," expresses very happily what Paul evidently meant; but the body of the resurrection, in the new order which is to come, will be just as "natural" as the present. Now if the original terms *psuche* and *pneuma* are only different names for the same immaterial part of man, then we confess ourselves unable to derive any definite idea from the apostle's statement. For we cannot, with some, understand the term *psuchikon* to refer indeed to the human soul, one and indivisible, and the term *pneumatikon* to have reference to the Holy Spirit, defining the body of the resurrection as one formed by him. For, in the first place, we do not find that, according to New Testament usage, *psuche* is employed as antithetic to *pneuma*, in the sense of the Holy Spirit. The antithesis is then expressed not by ψυχή, but by σάρξ, "flesh," denoting corrupt human nature in its totality. And, in the second place, so soon as we accurately define the term *pneumatikon*, it appears that, if referred to the Holy Spirit, it will not bear the meaning which the obvious antithesis requires. On the other hand, if the *psuche* implied in *psuchikon* denote that animal soul which man possesses as an animal, and the *pneuma* implied in *pneumatikon*, that higher immaterial part in virtue of his possession of which he is said to be made in the image of God, then the two adjectives can be explained each in strictest analogy with the other, and the antithesis intended will be brought out with the greatest clearness. For, as regards the term *psuchikon*, we can hardly doubt that when Paul so calls the present body, he intends to describe it as a body formed by the organizing energy of, and adapted to the necessities and desires of, the *psuche*. Now, although it is true that the resurrection of the righteous is said to be brought about by the energy of the Holy Spirit as dwelling in the believer, no one, we apprehend,

would maintain that the operation of the Holy Spirit in the formation of the resurrection body is to be thought of after the manner of that of the *psuche*, as the organizing principle of the body which we now have. Else it were hard to see, since a *material* identity is denied to the resurrection body as compared with the present (ver. 37, 38), in what then the continuity of the new body with the old could consist. But assume that the word *pneumatikon* refers not to the divine but to the human *pneuma* spoken of by Paul in 1 Thess. v. 23, and the sense of the words becomes perfectly simple and clear. The *soma psuchikon*, or body which we now have, is one formed by the *psuche*, or animal soul, like the body of any other animal; an organ perfectly adapted to its needs and desires, and perfectly to these only. This we leave in the grave. But in the resurrection the believer will receive a *soma pneumatikon;* i. e., a body in which not the *psuche* but the *pneuma* will be the organizing principle, and which will therefore be as admirably and perfectly fitted to be its expression and the instrument for its free activity as is the present animal body for the animal *psuche*. The present body, as we all painfully feel, is but a very weak and inadequate organ for the activity of the spiritual life. Hence the Holy Spirit promises that in the resurrection we shall have a body as well adapted to our higher nature as this is to the lower nature which we now have.

The necessity which the context forces on us for some such interpretation of these words, is so evident that even Dr. C. Hodge has been compelled to disregard, in his comment on this passage, his elsewhere expressed opinion, that the adjective *pneumatikon* in the New Testament always designates that which pertains to the Holy Spirit; and, although strenuously denying a trichotomy in man, yet he admits that in this place the *pneuma* implied in *pneumatikon* does not refer to the Holy Spirit, but to something which pertains to man, and that something different from

the *psuche* which is implied in the adjective *psuchikon*. His words are: "A natural body (*soma psuchikon*) is a body of which the *psuche*, or animal life, is the animating principle; and a spiritual body (*soma pneumatikon*) is a body adapted to the *pneuma*, the rational, immortal principle of our nature." And, again, he defines the former as a body "adapted to the *psuche*, or principle of animal life," and the latter as "a body adapted to the *pneuma*, or principle of rational life." He is careful explicitly to add, and quite correctly, that "'spiritual' in this connection does not mean animated by the Holy Spirit."[1] Than this nothing could be more satisfactory; and had we nothing else one would naturally infer that the writer accepted the trichotomy as a fact implied in these statements of the apostle. But, to avoid this almost inevitable inference from such language, he adds the caution, that "the Bible uses these terms without intending to teach that the *psuche*, or *life*, is a distinct substance from the *pneuma*, or *rational spirit*, but only that as we have certain attributes in common with irrational animals, so we have now a body suited to those attributes; and, on the other hand, as we have attributes unspeakably higher than those which belong to brutes, we shall hereafter possess bodies adapted to those higher attributes."[2] But of this assertion that the Bible does not here intend to teach any distinction of substance between the *psuche* and the *pneuma*, no proof is given. Moreover, this attempt to avoid the inference of a trichotomy which might so naturally be drawn from his first clear statements, seems to us to involve a degree of confusion of thought. The expressions "adapted to the principle of animal life" and "adapted to certain attributes" are interchanged, as if equivalent. And yet "a principle of life" and "attributes adapted to that principle" are

[1] For these statements and others like them, see Dr. Hodge's Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, pp. 347–348.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 348.

not the same thing. If there are attributes, they presuppose a substance in which they inhere. And, on the other hand, how can we conceive of "a principle of life" with all its wonderful powers and properties, except as a substance in which these properties inhere? But if "a principle of life" cannot be thought of except as a substance in which certain attributes inhere, and if, as Dr. Hodge, under the stress of these words of the apostle, verbally admits, there are in man two "principles of life," a "principle of animal life" and "a principle of spiritual life," how can one escape the conclusion that in 1 Cor. xv. 44, Paul assumes a trichotomy as a fact, and that in Pauline phraseology, *psuche* and *pneuma*, "soul" and "spirit," designate these two elements of man's immaterial nature?[1]

In the light of these passages, other statements of Scripture, less dogmatic in form, should fairly be interpreted, and, while they had not been in themselves decisive, they now acquire value as confirmatory of the doctrine. Thus, even Heb. iv. 12, despite the denial of its relevancy by anti-trichotomists, seems not to be without force by way of confirmation. We grant that it is true, indeed, that "the word of God" which is here said to pierce "even to the dividing of soul and spirit, and of joints and marrow," does not divide the one "metaphysically" any more than it divides the latter "physically." But certainly it is meant, to use the words of Delitzsch,[2] that it does so "inquisitorially and judicially," searching out and revealing the presence and defilement of sin in each and every part of man's complex nature,—both of his material part, the body, and of his immaterial part, the soul.

The words of Jude, ver. 19 of his Epistle, are also deserv-

[1] Dr. Hodge in his Systematic Theology candidly admits that if a trichotomy be denied there is "difficulty in explaining" this passage; and that the words of the apostle "seem to imply that . . . the two [the *psuche* and the *pneuma*] are separable and distinct." *Vid. op. cit.* Vol. ii. p. 50.

[2] See his Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, *sub. loc. cit.*

ing of note in this connection: "These are they who make separations, sensual (marg. "animal," Gr. ψυχικοί), having not the Spirit." (R. V.) As thus given, the reference is made to the Holy Spirit, as is indeed possible. But it is more than probable, if the above interpretation of more explicit passages be granted, that the reference here is not to the divine, but to the human spirit; for, as previously remarked, the antithesis which we should expect if the former were intended, would be not *psuchikoi*, but *sarkikoi*, "fleshly," in the ethical sense of that term. These words would thus appear to hold up the unregenerate man, or apostate Christian, as a man who, being destitute of spirit as a controlling power, is therefore *psuchikos*, a man under the dominion of the animal nature alone. The thought receives illustration from the expression used in 2 Pet. ii. 12, concerning the same class of persons: as "creatures without reason, born mere animals." (R. V.) Thus the words in Jude harmonize with more explicit teaching as to a trichotomy, adding the very momentous suggestion that the unregenerate man is a man in whom the spirit is as if it were not; dead, at least in such sense that it no more can exercise its proper functions.[1]

The words of Paul in 1 Cor. ii. 14, 15, read in the light of the more explicit passages above discussed, are also instructive on this subject. We read, "The natural (Gr. ψυχικός) man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; and he cannot know them because they are spiritually judged. But he that is spiritual (Gr.

[1] In so far we can agree with Alford's interpretation of these words "'Not having the spirit,' . . not directly the Holy Spirit of God (the absence of the article would be no objection to this) but the higher spiritual life of man's spirit in communion with the Holy Spirit. These men have not indeed ceased to have a *pneuma*, as a part of their own tripartite nature: but they have ceased to possess it in any worthy sense: it is degraded beneath and under the power of the *psuche* . . . . so as to have no real vitality of its own." (Comm. *sub. loc. cit.*)

πνευματικός) judgeth all things, and he himself is judged of no man." As for the frequent interpretation which refers the word *pneumatikos* here, as everywhere else, to the Holy Spirit, we must urge still, as in other cases, that this does not bring out the force of the antithesis with *psuchikos*, and that instead of the latter, if the reference were to the Holy Spirit, the word *sarkikos* was to be expected. And it is a further advantage of the interpretation which here again refers the adjective *pneumatikos* to the human *pneuma*, that it includes and implies the indirect reference to the Divine Spirit, as spoken of in the context. For it was the teaching of the Lord (John iii. 6) that the spirit in the renewed man is born of the Holy Spirit of God; which fact shows how it is that, as the apostle here teaches, only the man in whom the spirit has been quickened into life by the Holy Spirit, can, in virtue of this relation thus established, understand the things of the Spirit of God. The words thus teach that the spirit, born anew in man from and by the Holy Spirit of God, has a faculty of discerning spiritual things of which the *psuche*, or "soul," is wholly destitute.

Against these intimations of the later revelation, the contention of the elder Dr. Hodge, that the doctrine of trichotomy contradicts the account given of man's creation in the book of Genesis, which recognizes only two elements in man's nature, "body" and "soul," seems to us of little force. For, in the first place, it is a question whether even this passage in Genesis does not itself imply a trichotomy, as Delitzsch and others have insisted. But even if we accept his interpretation of Genesis ii. 7, his argument would have little weight. For in Hebrew, as also in Greek, since there are only the two words for "soul" and for "spirit," yet if it were required to speak of the *whole* immaterial part of man, there would be no alternative, even though these two were in themselves distinct, but to use one or other of the two specific terms in a generic sense for that purpose. We may

grant, then, without prejudice to the above argument, that the object of the writer of the narrative in Genesis was only to teach us that both the material and the immaterial part of man was the work of the creative power of God; for surely, if it should later appear that there was a dualism in the immaterial part of man as thus created, there would be in this no contradiction to the earlier statement.

It is further argued by Dr. C. Hodge against the truth of a trichotomy, that "consciousness reveals the existence of two substances in the constitution of our nature; but it does not reveal the existence of three substances."[1] To this we answer, first, that though we admit that consciousness does not witness to the existence of more than two substances in our nature, in the broad sense of that word, material and immaterial, yet this alone does not disprove the possible reality of a dualism in man's immaterial part. The mere silence of consciousness on this or any matter, as regards direct testimony, is by no means equivalent to contradictory testimony. To illustrate, there is much revealed in Holy Scripture, as to the work of the Holy Spirit in the heart and the agency of Satan on the soul, as to which consciousness is absolutely silent. But because consciousness does not directly discriminate between the workings and suggestions of the Holy Spirit in the mind of man and those due to the man himself, surely we shall not argue that therefore in these matters the testimony of consciousness contradicts the testimony of theword. Silence is not of necessity contradiction.

But we may venture to go much further. We argue rather that when the facts of consciousness and intelligent scientific observation are carefully studied, they do most powerfully confirm the testimony of the word of God, as to a distinction in man's nature between the "soul" and the "spirit." The physiological facts which bear on this sub-

[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. ii. p. 49.

ject have been so clearly summed up by Sir William Dawson, that we cannot do better than to give his words. He says:—

"We know . . . . that the gray cellular matter of the brain constitutes a reservoir of sensory and motor energy. . . . Further, there seems the best reason to believe that the mass of the brain is directly connected with sensation and motion, though there seem to be means of regulation and co-ordination of sensations and actions in connection with the front and back portions of the cerebral hemispheres. There are facts indicating that the anterior portions of the hemispheres are the organs of a certain determining and combining property, of the nature of animal intelligence, and that the posterior portions, in association with the sympathetic nerve, are connected with the affections and passions. . . . Now all this . . . . is possessed by man in common with animals. They, like us, can perceive and reflect, and have affections, passions, and appetites. They, like us, can perform reflex or automatic actions, altogether or partially involuntary. Even in animals this presupposes something beyond the mere organism, and which can combine and compare sensations and actions. This is the animal or psychical life, which, whatever its essential nature, is something above and beyond mere nerve power, though connected with it, and acting by means of it. But in man there are other and higher powers, determining his conscious personality, his formation of general principles, his rational and moral volitions and self-restraints. These are manifestations of a higher and spiritual nature, which constitutes in man the shadow and image of God . . . . . The more recent discoveries as to the functions of brain . . . . serve to correct the doctrines of those who have run into the extreme of attaching no importance to the fleshly organism and its endowment of animal life . . . . These discoveries are tending to establish definite boundaries be-

tween the domain of mere automatism and that of rational will . . . . . In so far as these results are attained, we are drawn more closely to that middle ground occupied by the New Testament writers, which . . . . gives a fair valuation to all the parts of the composite nature of man. . . . . The New Testament has undoubtedly pointed to solutions of the mysteries of our nature, at which science and philosophy are beginning to arrive by their own paths; just as, in another department, the Bible has shadowed forth the great principles and processes of creation, in advance of the discoveries of geology."[1]

We make no apology for introducing this long citation from one who has spoken so truly and so well; words which, we believe, the continuous progress of scientific investigation has only the more confirmed. We believe, therefore, that instead of the facts of consciousness contradicting the doctrine of a trichotomistic division in human nature, in so far as they are accurately read and their significance scientifically interpreted, they are tending more and more to establish its reality, and thus must henceforth more and more incline all for whom the word of God speaks with authority, to accept this trichotomistic explanation of such passages as we have discussed.

But the question will at once come up, if we admit that there is a distinction between the soul and spirit, in what this distinction consists. It needs, however, to be carefully observed, that the exegetical question whether the Scriptures teach a trichotomy, will not be affected in the least, even though, with our present imperfect scientific knowledge, we should not be able to draw the line of demarcation between the soul and the spirit, with infallible precision. We must needs speak on this matter with a degree of reserve, and wait for fuller light, which may possibly require us to modify

[1] Princeton Review, Nov. 1879; article, "Points of Contact between Science and Revelation," pp. 602–606.

some statement. The Scriptures, however, and the facts of human life as made known by modern physiology, seem to warrant some such suggestions as the following:—

The soul and the spirit are not to be conceived of as two distinct substances *in the broad sense* of that term. That is, we are not to regard them as substances *generically* distinct, as when we contrast matter and spirit. Thus, as already remarked, it is quite true that, taking the words "spirit" or "soul" in the broad sense, the Bible does teach, and consciousness affirm, a dichotomy, no less really than a trichotomy, of substance. But the word "substance" is used not only in this broad and generic sense, but also in a sense narrower and more specific. Using it in the broad sense, we say, for instance, that, so far as we know, there are but two substances in the universe, matter and spirit. But, on the other hand, in the narrow sense of the word, we say with equal truth, that there are many substances; that iron is one substance, copper another, and so on. All which expressions simply mean, of course, that the one substance, matter, exists under many different forms. Now in the light of Scripture and modern investigation, we appear to be warranted in saying that while soul and spirit are not two substances in the broader sense of that word, they are so in the narrower sense: that immaterial substance, like material substance, exists under more than one form.

It should be hardly needful to remark that this mode of speaking, however imperfect the expression may be, by no means implies materialism. We are dealing merely with a single point of analogy between the two cases. So far as we are able by our senses to distinguish one form of matter from another, the distinction between them lies in this, that in these diverse forms matter is endowed with various properties. Yet all these various forms of matter have certain qualities in common which are essential to the very idea of matter. Such, notably, are extension and inertia. When

we speak of a certain form of matter as a different substance from another, we never mean to intimate that these essential properties are wanting, but only that others, not incompatible with them, are superadded. Precisely so as regards immaterial substance: when we say that it apparently exists under different forms, it is not thereby suggested that its essential qualities as immaterial substance are wanting, but only that in one case it has certain powers or properties which it has not in the other. When we speak of soul and spirit as distinct, we only mean that immaterial substance in the case of the soul, the principle of animal life, is endowed with one set of powers; in the case of spirit, the higher principle of spiritual life, it is endowed with another and higher class of powers. The *generic* characteristics in either case are the same; the *specific* characteristics are different. Both soul and spirit, as contrasted with matter, which has extension, are essentially non-extended; both soul and spirit, as contrasted with matter, which has inertia, are substances essentially active. The mode of activity in the two is, however, different. The characteristic activity of the former appears to be most clearly revealed in automatism and spontaneity; that of the latter, in free moral self-determination. It is indeed true that precisely to determine which elements in our various actions are to be assigned to the soul and which to the spirit, may even be forever impossible. Many of our activities are, no doubt, a complex result of the joint working of both the soul and the spirit in variant proportions. But so much as this it seems safe to say, that, at the one extreme, all automatic and involuntary actions are certainly to be referred to the soul, which we possess in common with animals; and, on the other, all acts of free moral self-determination are to be regarded as the manifestations of the spirit: a conclusion which is in harmony with the fact that in the Old and New Testaments the word "soul" and its equivalents are applied to all animal existences in common with mankind,

while, with a uniformity scarcely ever broken, the word "spirit" and its equivalents are applied only to free moral agents, human, angelic, or divine.

We are thus led to regard the spirit as the seat of those characteristics in man which unquestionably distinguish him from even the highest types of animal life. These *differentiæ* are not found in the possession by man of the powers of knowing, remembering, or even of affection and aversion, all which are to be observed in many of the higher animals, as also, to a limited extent, the power of reasoning. It is possible indeed that these powers may be common both to the soul and the spirit. In any case, it is plain that these which are common to man and the brute cannot constitute the *differentiæ* between them, nor be regarded as exclusively faculties of the human spirit. But there is more in man than these powers of knowing and feeling, and of such reasoning as is possible to brutes. It is when we rise to the region of the higher intellectual, moral, and spiritual life, that we discern man's true glory, and find that of which it is safe to say we can discover no trace in the highest animal. No horse, dog, or monkey has a conscience, the power of distinguishing abstract right and wrong, or even of abstract reasoning; and, especially, no brute has the faculty of recognizing and knowing the invisible God. In other words, no animal is capable of religion. Still less has any animal, like the regenerated man, a faculty of loving, trusting, and communing with an unseen God. Certainly, in these activities we must recognize the specific and peculiar action of the *pneuma*.

And this inference is fully borne out by the words of the apostle Paul in 1 Cor. ii., already referred to, where he speaks of this power of judging the things of the Spirit of God as precisely that which distinguishes the spiritual from the psychical man. One almost of necessity infers from this that this power does not belong to the *psuche*, and is therefore

beyond the attainment of the man in whom this is the dominant power, while the *pneuma* is virtually dead.

Without endeavoring at present a more precise discrimination, we may now in conclusion note briefly what appear to be the bearings of the doctrine of a trichotomy upon certain important Christian doctrines: and, first, as to the conclusion toward which this view, regarded in the light of other Scriptures, seems to point as to the condition of the natural, unregenerated man. This is repeatedly described in the Scriptures as a condition of death. This death of course is not death of the body, though it involves this as its ultimate issue. We accurately describe it in common theological language as spiritual death. It is death as regards the spirit. As regards the body, the natural man is alive; as regards the psychical life, he is also alive; but as regards the spirit, he is dead. And yet we are not to understand death in this case as involving the non-existence of that which is dead. Indeed, it does not necessarily imply this even with the body. That is dead in which there is cessation of all normal activity. So with the spirit in man; it is dead as regards all normal exercise of its functions. That it is yet, however, in some sense existent, is plain from the phenomena of conscience, the like of which we see not in any irrational creature. The condition of the spirit in the unregenerated man may be illustrated by the condition of the intellect in an idiot. That of which reason is the manifestation exists in him as in other men; but it is powerless as to the exercise of its functions. The idiot is a man who is intellectually dead; and just so the natural or "psychical" man is a man in whom the spirit is dead—powerless as to the proper exercise of its functions, in apprehending God and communing with him, and by the strength thus received ruling, as it normally should, the soul and the body. In a word, the psychical man is a man who is among spiritual beings what an idiot is among intellectual beings. Or, to

change the illustration, as the eye may still exist and even retain the power of distinguishing light from darkness, while yet the man may be none the less truly and hopelessly blind; and just as the light which for the seeing man is a means of sight and the source of delight, may become for such a man the occasion of exquisite pain, even so, it would appear, it is with the man who, alive indeed as to soul and body, is yet, because of death reigning in the spirit, spiritually blind. The *pneuma* in this man is in such a sense existent that he has still the power of discerning between light and darkness; and yet the spiritual light which is poured out around him, causing holy joy to regenerated souls, becomes to him, not the instrument of gladsome vision, but of intense pain and distress; which in its last degree of intensity doubtless constitutes the peculiar and inexpressible anguish of lost souls. And to follow out the analogy; as, while the eye still remains an organ of the body, man may even at last lose even the power of distinguishing light from darkness, so that practically he is as if he had no eyes, in some such way, as it would appear, is it possible for the psychical man to become in a peculiar and awful sense, in the words of the apostle Jude, "twice dead," "animal, not having a spirit."

And this leads us naturally on to the view which the Scriptures apparently require us to take of regeneration. It consists essentially in the impartation, by the Holy Spirit, of a new life to the dead spirit of man: according to the word of our Lord, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot see the kingdom of God;" and that other word:—"that which is [thus] born of the Spirit, is spirit." Nor can it be justly objected to this, that it makes regeneration to be only partial. For even so is it yet as true as on any other supposition, that regeneration affects the whole man. It is with the impartation of the new life as it was with the curse of death which fell on man because of sin. It meant death in every part of man's being, but it did not take

effect to the uttermost through all parts of his being at once, but only reached its consummation in the death of the body long afterward. The doom took effect on the spirit first of all, in that man at once lost spiritual life; and then, the spirit being dead because of sin, the regulative power being gone, death now went on to work out its sad effects in both soul and body. And so with the new life; it begins just where the death began, with the spirit, but stops not there; it goes on sanctifying soul and body, until, at last, as the spiritual death which began with the death of the spirit ended with the death of the body, so the life which is imparted to the spirit works on through our union to Christ as the life, by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in our spirits, till it reaches its full revelation and expression in the resurrection from the dead. And thus we now learn that the regenerated man is one who differs from other men, not merely in that he is a better man morally, but radically in this, that he is a man in whom the spirit, which in others is dead, has been quickened into new life by the Divine Spirit, and thereby empowered to resume its proper place of regnancy in man, as ruling and controlling, after the mind of the Holy Spirit, all the activities of both soul and body.

We may well also observe the bearing of this doctrine, if accepted, on the grand and yet so mysterious doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. The old Corinthian question is often still asked, though by no means always in the spirit either of scoffing or of incredulity, "How are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come?" In the answer which the apostle Paul gave to this question, no one particular is perhaps more instructive than this; that whereas the present body which is laid in the grave, "is sown an animal body (*soma psuchikon*); it is raised a spiritual body (*soma pneumatikon*)." What the apostle means when he describes our present body as a psychical, or animal body, we have already seen. Certainly the thought is this,

that it is a body formed by and adapted to the needs and conditions of the *psuche*, or principle of animal life. This term describes the facts most precisely. The body which we now have, is in the same sense and for the same reason an animal body as that of any beast of the earth. The closest similarity exists between the body of man and that of the higher mammals. There is, indeed, something in man higher than the *psuche*, the animal soul, but this body, although affected manifestly by its presence, elevated and dignified thereby far above that of any brute, yet is none the less in all its essential characteristics, "an animal body." Now in contrast with this we are told that the body which Christ's people shall receive in the resurrection will be a "spiritual body (*soma pneumatikon*)." Certainly the two terms, *psuchikon* and *pneumatikon*, must be understood after the same analogy. If the present animal body is one in which the organizing principle is the animal soul, and which is adapted to its needs, so the spiritual body will be—not certainly a body which is immaterial, which were a contradiction in terms,—but a body in which not the animal soul, but the spirit in man, that which in him is affiliated with God, the Supreme Spirit, shall be the organizing principle, and which shall be as perfectly adapted to all its almost infinite longings, as perfect an organ of its transcendently exalted activities, as is the present body to those of the animal soul. Thus it follows at once, as the apostle says, that it must be "incorruptible;" for a body which is capable of dying cannot be an adequate organ of an immortal spirit, which in virtue of its very nature ever recoils from death and reaches forward with irrepressible longing to life everlasting. It must be a "powerful" body; for we are continually reminded how the activity of the renewed spirit is constantly restricted, fettered, and limited by the weakness of a body which, at its best, is yet only animal. All the faculties and powers which the present body has, in so far as they may

be suited to the use of the perfected spirit, the resurrection body must therefore have, only with an unknown increment of power. Further, in that even with all these present faculties perfected we should still be under various limitations, often felt most painful, it is to be expected that a spiritual body, one which shall as perfectly satisfy the need of the spirit as the present body the needs of the animal soul, should also have new powers and endowments, at which as yet we can only guess. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be," even in respect of the life of the spiritual body. And so the other particular which the apostle adds in the context, is also included in that brief but most pregnant sentence, "it is raised a spiritual body;" it will be a glorious body. For if even this gross, unplastic, animal body, formed by and the special expression and organ of the animal soul, yet through the union of this with the spirit, often attains so much of beauty and dignity, and that even despite the presence and working of sin and death even in the holiest, what must a body be which shall be formed by, and be the perfect expression and organ of, a spirit, made perfectly holy and glorified! Surely it shall be endowed with a glory which excelleth.

It may not be amiss, before closing, to call attention to the possible bearing of this doctrine of a trichotomy on the question so hotly debated in our day, as to the origin of man. On the one hand, there are those who, under the powerful constraint of many undoubted facts which need not be here rehearsed, believe and insist that man, with all his present exalted powers, is simply and only the result of a natural process of evolution from the brute. For a divine interposition in a creative way, as the immediate cause of his origination, they see no place at all. At the other extreme, stand many theologians and honest believers in the absolute truthfulness of the Bible record, who insist that as regards his whole nature, body, soul, and spirit, man is the

result solely of the direct and immediate creative efficiency of God. And so to this day the debate goes on. But the thought occurs, in the light of this doctrine of trichotomy, whether between these two opposing schools of thought an eirenicon may not be possible; at least as regards all such evolutionists as are not committed on *a priori* grounds to the denial of the possibility of the supernatural. If the distinction between the spirit and the animal soul in man be granted, then is it not possible that, if the facts should at last appear to compel all candid men to admit that man is genetically connected with the lower animals, we might yet fully admit this, and yet hold with perfect consistency to an immediate creative interposition of a personal God, as the efficient cause of his appearance, without which his origination by any mere process of natural descent had been utterly impossible? Or, to put the case more fully:—

Grant that the facts with regard to the human body and its organizing principle, the animal soul, point to its derivation in the way of descent from a lower type of animal life; may we not argue from analogy that, since other powers which man undoubtedly possesses, of which it is idle to pretend that the highest brute possesses a trace, are demonstrably identical in kind with powers belonging to the Supreme Being who made the earth and the heavens,—powers which, on the present hypothesis, we assign to the "spirit," as distinguished from the "soul,"—these point no less unambiguously to a derivation in the human spirit, in some way, from the Supreme Spirit? And is it not then at least a possible solution of this profound question, that we may admit the animal soul and body of man to have been derived from other and lower orders of animal life through a process of genealogical descent, while none the less insisting that for the origination of the "spirit" of man, that in him which makes him "man," we are compelled to postulate, as the only adequate cause, the immediate creative intervention of

a personal God, who "made man in his own image" by breathing into his nostrils the breath of *lives*, and endowing him with a spirit like unto his own?[1]

We may now sum up the conclusions to which we have arrived. If our analysis of the teaching of the word of God is correct, then we seem warranted in laying down the following propositions:—

1. That man is composed of two substances, material and immaterial, which are in the Bible, as in common parlance, often designated as soul and body.

2. That the immaterial part of man comprehends, in an organic and personal union, two distinct entities, distinguished in the Scriptures as *psuche* and *pneuma*, "soul" and "spirit."

3. That to the former, the animal soul, are to be attributed all those powers and faculties, however different in degree, which man has in common with the brute.

4. That to the latter are to be attributed all those powers and faculties, intellectual and spiritual,—as, especially, knowledge of God and communion with him,—which clearly differentiate man from the brute, presenting between the two an impassable gulf, not to be bridged by any possible process of education or development.

5. That in the psychical or animal man, as the New Testament calls him, man as he is born into the world, the *pneuma*, or "spirit," although indeed not non-existent, is yet dead as regards any normal exercise of its functions, and can only be quickened into life by the supernatural operation of the Divine *Pneuma*, who is God the Holy Spirit, an act which the Scripture calls "a begetting," and the result of which the Lord designates as a "new birth."

6. Further, and by necessary consequence, the spiritual man is not merely a man whose natural powers and

[1] It may be worth while to remark that something like this seems to be the position of that most eminent evolutionist, Mr. Alfred Wallace.

faculties have been developed and strengthened by various discipline, but a man in whom the spirit, dead in other men, has been thus made alive with new life from God, and thus restored to its original and normal place as the supreme and dominating power in man, holding his whole being through the might of the indwelling Divine Spirit in the subjection of love to God's most holy law.

7. That, as the consummation of this saving work begun in the new birth, those who are thus regenerated by the Holy Spirit are at last to exchange these present weak and corruptible psychical or animal bodies for bodies spiritual, powerful, incorruptible, and glorious; and that these shall be distinguished from the bodies which we now have, fundamentally in this, that whereas these are formed by and specially adapted to the animal soul, so those, on the contrary, shall have for the animating and organizing principle the renewed and then perfected spirit, and shall be a perfect visible material expression of its inner spiritual perfection and moral beauty, as also an absolutely perfect and most glorious organ for its heavenly activities in the eternal kingdom of God.

ARTICLE VI.

SEVEN FAILURES OF ULTRA-CALVINISM.

BY THE REV. JOHN MILLER, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY.

THE Northern Presbyterian Church, just now in the throes of a dangerous revolution, is the largest branch of the largest Protestant body on our planet. It is not so large as the Methodist, if we count only in America. It is not so large as the Episcopal, if we count only in England and America. But if we count over all lands, and include all churches presbyterially governed, our reckoning will hold. So enormous an interest, just now so deranged, is worth watching, not simply if we be Presbyterians, nor solely if we be Christians, but if we be men of any school; for there are strange problems in it, and things hard to be understood, of people probably above the average of intelligence in Christendom.

These presbyterially governed men have sinned in two particulars: first, like cannel coal, they are awful for splitting up,—"Burghers" and "Anti-Burghers," "Associate" and "Reformed," "Free," "United," and "Established" making one nation, at least, provoke a smile, when their church course is talked of; and, second, they shock conscience by certain outrages on faith, which the best hearts dare not and ought not to endure; and which have wrecked truth and roused doubt in all seats under Presbyterian control. It is time that the world should understand this.

What we affirm is, that there have been seven strongholds of Presbyterian theology; I mean by that, seven successive fortresses of this hyper-calvinistic faith; and that

every one of them has bred defection; and that in a sense, not merely of driving men into a recoil antagonistic to the pious founders of the school, but revolutionary in the end to the pious revolutionists themselves; so that Dr. Martineau last year, a very determined Unitarian, cries out in a sort of mental agony, that he is unwilling to have spent his life in giving help to a body that can be dreamed of as a mere philosophy, and that if he is a Unitarian, he wishes to suppose his labor to have been for a scriptural and religious Unitarianism. Our position therefore is, that the world has tried ultra-calvinistic thought to the extent of seven successive centres of it; that that trial has ranged over four centuries; and with the punctuality of light has produced infidelity in every land where it has reigned. Is it not time that such centres should begin to suspect their system?

If men say, This thing is built of wickedness; it is but the usual wave by which one age is set up in pious teaching and which recedes the next, then I wish to rejoin—and this is a large motive for writing—that waves are little incident to other teaching. Methodism has growth, and without such recoil. Episcopacy works harder, and goes lower down into the slums and outways of men than an age ago. It apes Rome too much, but with more power of recovery, and with more groping back to better sense, than we have ever seen in Presbyterianism. And if we look at Rome herself, or at her Eastern rival, I know no such worsement in either, as Dr. Martineau now points at in alarm; I can find no such blood-poisoning in both, as I can find at Princeton; much as I prefer Princeton, of course, as long as it can be sheltered from itself, to anything I can find in either pope or patriarch.

Let it be understood definitely,—I charge that there is a certain system of dogma that is called Calvinism; which is true in very important features; which has held the devout adherence of very pious and singularly gifted men; which has erected itself into the very highest usefulness, till its

uniform fate came hovering into view; and then, that in seven different trials it has succumbed every time, and poisoned the air with its deadly influences. The object of this article is to ask whether seven times is not enough, and whether the seventh time, if it is not already too late, ought not to find the seventh seat of this odious mischief ready to listen to terms, and to hear the summons of Providence to find out the causes of the evil.

A very unfair way of telling what Calvinism really is, viz., the quoting of single passages, is nevertheless the very fairest way to tell why it comes to grief. Moreover it tells the remedy. If Calvinism has such enormous good as to rear the noblest specimens of men, and it seems therefore unfair to quote scatteringly, why, I beg, is that not the very way to quote, and why are not they the very passages to leave out? And why, by placing wiser ones in their place, may we not keep the good, and hope to cure the deadliness of the teaching? Let me give a specimen:—

"Those persons whom the Lord, in order that they may be the organs of his wrath and examples of his severity, has created to contumely of life and to destruction of death, those persons I say, in order that they may come duly to their end, he, one while, deprives of the faculty of hearing his word; and, another while, even by the very preaching of it, the more blinds and stupefies."

This is Calvin himself; and let me quote further:—

"So he directs, indeed, his voice to them; but only that they may be the more deaf; he kindles light before them, but only that they may be the more blind; he propounds doctrine to them, but only that by it they may be the more stupefied; he applies the remedy to them, but only that they may not be healed."

Is it any wonder that seven schools, one after the other, should breed pestilence, when these ignorant wickednesses emerged more into day?

And again; still Calvin:—

"Predestination we call the eternal decree of God, by which he has determined in himself what he would have to become of every individual of mankind; for they are not all created with similar destiny; but eternal life is fore-ordained for some, and eternal damnation for others. Every man, therefore, being created for one or the other of these ends, we say he is predestinated either to life or to death."

Now, what is really the fault of this Calvinianism? Is there no predestination? It is bad philosophy and bad divinity, both, to imagine any such idea. Do we not see how cosmogonies even of the most godless kinds, lean heavily to the side of sequence? How can God sustain and not control? Can there be anything like Waterloo without predestination? Think of that dwarf Corsican changing the map of Europe, and God not in it. At any rate, suppose John Calvin had all he pleads for in the Deity except the horrid manner of it, and Calvinism could not have wrecked its seats as it has done one after the other.

If any one wants to convince himself of this, let him resort to Colonel Ingersoll. He does not attack the naked forms of predestination, but blurred and blotted copies. Look at Stuart Mill. If Calvinists would only listen, his words are real sermons. I can hardly object to them. "If, instead of the glad tidings that there exists a being in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving' does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may." "I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him,

to hell I will go." We do not say that this is in the highest taste, or betokens the highest moral temperament; but we do say that it is true in every syllable. It would be wicked to imagine such a God, and this is the vice of Calvin; not that he teaches predestination; materialists teach the like of that; but that it sets God to predestinating with so little morals himself; and sets him to reprobating; not that reprobation is not a sequence from predestiny, but that the *morale* of it, in the way it is put, makes it cruel. This shines out in these words from Calvin, and it shines too in Ingersoll. Ingersoll does not attack predestiny, but, in all that pile of pamphlets, only the bad morals in which such doctrines are put. There is a certain predestiny vital to any cosmogony whatever. Ingersoll does not attack that, but the moral motives out of which it professes to begin. We have looked through his papers and have found no other point of attack. As the lightning, fond of a certain mountain, strikes it in its veins of hematite every time; so Ingersoll never strikes the fact, but only the parody of the fact. Look at the assaults of Spencer. They are like all his philosophy, resting on principles in which he has been steeped in the land of his birth. Give Spencer his "first principles" (and they are exactly the reigning philosophy, which he had been bred not to challenge), and all his agnostic iconoclasms crowd in; and allow for him his Calvinistic neighborhood, and the sentence which follows, is, like Ingersoll's pamphlets, irrefragably correct. Mark him now; he has been bred up by the tincture of Calvinistic morals. I have no doubt that he would say that he seemed giving the gospel theism correctly. And yet listen:—"It is difficult to conceal repugnance to a creed which tacitly ascribes to the unknowable a love of adulation such as would be despised in a human being."

Let me seize upon this sentence, doubtless sincere in Spencer, as a type of the poison of his bringing up.

We have been longing to hear from some of the Revisers

an attack all along the line against such dreams as this. Who told Spencer that "adulation" was God's end in what he does? When such a thing as my eternal damnation has such a querl after it with the men of Westminster as, "all for the glory of his power;" when a child is to begin with the idea that "the chief end of man is to glorify God;" when the phrase "mere good pleasure" is attached to our governor, and that on terrible occasions of irremediable destinations in our case; when, as the masterful arrangement for hell, comes the general sentence, God "for his own glory hath foreordained whatsoever cometh to pass," it becomes a marvel that men, above the average of character, should assemble at Westminster; and, under the belief of something wrong, after a dangerous interval, should assemble now again for purposes of reform, and not seem to notice the question. May not predestination be a fact, and, as a mere corollary, then also preterition, but may not the outrage be in the *motive?* May not the poison really be that we have read God wrong in the affair of *character;* and that the son of a preacher, viz., Ingersoll, and the very brightest mind, viz., Spencer, are the divine Nemesis, to scourge us into the discovery, and to implore Princeton, for example, which may stand as the seventh seat, not to repeat the mistake, and, Chinese fashion, to go over the same round, and stand by Calvin in his preposterous morality?

Just here let me block one game. Excellent ministers will say, We are not standing by Calvin; we are listening to the apostle Paul. Let us speak to that very fully.

What Ingersoll thrusts at most, and what Calvinists are troubled by oftenest, is the doctrine of election. It will be certainly fair if we take that hardest doctrine and the hardest chapter of it, viz., the ninth of Romans, as an illustration of all I want to say.

I wish instantly to point the finger to what Paul appeals to. He has quoted a difficult passage. He has fallen upon

the very "*preterition*" that has been stirring New York. It comes in the shape of the toughest Calvinism. Paul prepares it for the scalpel by making it absolutely tougher. He is a fair polemic, therefore. For, after quoting the verse, "Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated," he intensifies it all, for he says, "the children being not yet born, neither having done good nor evil that the purpose of God according to election might stand, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger." "What then?" says Paul. And I wish to put my finger swift upon the spot where Paul sets his pen. It is a remarkable fact. In all those presbytery debates no one stepped up to the side of Paul. One man would deny predestiny. It would have cost him his frock a decade ago. Many denied that there were reprobates; though if there are not, where are the elect? Our venerable Ex-President at Princeton would interpose a cushion of love. But, just there, *what sort of love?* All are fighting wild enough for the whole of the century to be consumed in bringing them together. While, all the while, Paul begins his apologetics by putting his hand upon the very word which, alas for us! has not yet been heard in this discussion. Listen to him, "What then? Is there *unrighteousness* with God?" Paul afterwards plunges into as much mystery as you please. He does not seem to care for that. Indeed he goes for his reassurance into a nest of Scriptures where the Deity boldly tells Moses, "I dwell in the thick darkness." He resorts to a passage where the Almighty hides Moses in a cleft of the rock, and where the moral is, "Thou canst not see my face." There is no harm in passages where God fronts us as a king, and where the verdict is, "The heaven for height, and the earth for depth, and the heart of kings is unsearchable." Paul does not care for the like of that. He has long learned at the feet of Gamaliel, that the world was crowded with cruelties, which seemed to come from the hand of his Creator. This he did not care for. But he was wiser than

all our Revisers, for he instinctively turned, like Eli, to the ark, to anchor one thing firm, viz., the righteousness of God.

And if any one asks, Do not all teach that? there is just the serious part of our reply. All of the seven seats have taught just the opposite. It has been a case where natural conscience, as with Spencer and with Mill, has judged things more correctly than the highest Christians. It is a case of God's extreme patience with us. Much in the pages of Voltaire is more moral than half of Calvin; and there are men who will be high in heaven, whose eternity will celebrate the mercy of their Prince; who do him less honor in their exhibition of his traits, than Ingersoll does in much that he has written.

Calvinists have not only promoted Mill and prompted Spencer and nursed much that is wrong in the Arminian faith; they have not only stripped God of morals by not giving him *our* morals, and, therefore, quite moving him out of our sight as to the possession of any; they have not only made his end "display," and his motive "himself," and his morals to be manufactured at "his will," but they have actually read these things into the Bible, and made that exquisite book falsify its divine originals.

Ever since Colonel Ingersoll was a boy, there have been held up to him, as out of his father's house, three texts belonging to this very ninth chapter. Every one of them is a mistranslation. Extreme creeds like the Westminster, the moment they touch upon election, lay their hand upon these three; quote them first and quote them oftenest; and, strangest of all, the Revisionists, though eager for just such proof, have met these texts quoted against them, and known of their presence as almost sole proof-texts for Dort and the Articles of Concord, and have not in a single instance turned upon them as spurious; that is, as right enough in the Greek, but as utterly alien and opposite as they appear in English.

The reform, therefore, that we propose is this:—

1. That Calvinists recognize and repent their seven failures. They have followed each other in Geneva, France, Holland, London, Ireland, Boston, and let us say, Princeton. We naturally begin with Calvin. His city is anything but *his* city at the present moment. It is a living protest against him. Strangers who call themselves by his name, find it hard to light upon his burial-place. It is without a monument. And the very pulpit where he stood, gathers worshippers who protest against his beliefs, but what is more portentous, are dissatisfied with the pose in which his influence has left them, and, like Dr. Martineau, are shrinking from the length to which the recoil from them is carrying their younger men. Crossing into France, the influence has been repeated. Education has flouted Calvinism. Aristocracy has carried away its wealth. Protestantism would die out if left to what it got from Geneva, and Calvinism is striving to get back, creeping up into place again by the stepping-stone of the more illiterate and least sensible of the people. What a glorious thing it would be if the revision now agitated would embalm the splendors of Calvinism, and drop its brutishness! for the length of these cycles of health as compared with the rebound is not great enough. Better a little less truth, as in Wesleyanism or some ritual church, than such quick decay; and, above all, such deep decay, entrapping and appalling those that harsh Calvinism has driven from her teaching. Cross now into Holland; then into London; then into Ireland. Calvin simply repeats his Geneva influence. The dark wood cathedrals of the Dutch are not what they started to be; they are not homogeneously anything that even our Channing or our Dr. Peabody would like, and yet they are of lineal descent from Dort. Why not, in future missions to Holland, try to get back the ruined inheritors of Dort to a simpler and more moral Christianity? And then, over in London, what forbids us to learn from this speech of

Martineau's? In that foremost city the churches of the Confession of Faith are in every instance his churches. We know not one, contemporaneous with that creed, that is not now a stronghold against it; and if even Dr. Martineau shudders, why may not we? Presbyterianism has an account to settle for this uniform result; and when we cross over to Ireland, guilt becomes plainer. A whole synod and a brace of presbyteries have been split off by this Rehoboam-like refusal to amend. The age is hardly in its grave that saw Ulster and that saw Boston in the very gripe of the anaconda that, at the date of this writing, they feel at Saratoga. Is there no responsibility for this? and if Princeton at this very moment, in all her war paint, and in the persons of her most pious and her very most eminent men, is doing what broke off Ulster, and broke off London, and broke off Boston, may it not be a case of judicial hardness of heart? Calvinism made harsh is not by any means morality; and if it has come to that, and immoral consequences have gone into the church, we understand the frown that we are feeling, and why Princeton herself, as we wish now to state, is beginning to produce infidels. Princeton already has a progeny of deniers of the Bible and of deserters of anything like a grave eschatology; and a close student of the seven trials I have mentioned might show exactly where she, the seventh of them, is planting her feet on the road where Martineau has been found to hesitate.

2. But not only should Calvinism admit her misadventures, but now, in the second place, should compass sea and land to devise the remedy. Princeton and Harvard are really on the same track. I know no difference, except that Harvard started a century earlier. The Harvard of a century ago grasped its creed with the same death's clutch with which Princeton grasps hers to-day. This startles us; and the revision feature of the thing gives little hope. The very gestures of the sick patient, the look of his eye, the thick-

ness of his tongue,—all betoken the going over again the malady seven times now repeated. I know not one delegate who went to Saratoga to put forward, as Paul did, the morality of God. On the contrary, the heroic remedy of excision seems to be in the ascendant. The picture is exactly the same as in Geneva and the Hague. Young men in prominent pulpits have been denying preterition. Instead of rectifying God's *motive* in election, we are for denying it altogether. Instead of clearing the Bible of mistaken English, we are yielding its inerrancy; and instead of making God unwilling that we should perish, and mending the divine morality, we are mending at the other end, and questioning our fate as final, even if we be utterly impenitent. The terror of this thing is that it has happened every time.

Now, therefore, let me invite the eye of the well-wishers of Zion—and there are throngs of them—to the *morality of heaven.* This was Paul's impulse at once. Hardly has he ground upon the difficulty, "Esau have I hated," than he warms himself by just the one thing, "What then? Is there *unrighteousness* with God?" The seven fated seats have done just the opposite; Princeton is doing it to-day. To look at the casualties of the faith, and keep on teaching as the seven seats have invariably done; to exalt the sovereignty of God at the expense of his morals; to bring hell into close cousinship with his "mere good pleasure;" to make "God all for himself;" to make the "will of God the ground of moral obligation;" to teach the most horrible facts there are, and then add, "all for the glory of his power;" and to keep doing that when the ship has begun to grind upon the rocks, is as near craziness as anything that is going on in the intellectual world; and Princeton, first in number and in influence, will have done this very thing, if she repeats over, with desperate *insouciance*, the punctual blunders of hundreds of years.

It will be understood, therefore, that our remedy is *morality.* Now, what is morality? It is the character of those

who desire the welfare of others, and love such quality itself. A close hold on this clue would lead us quite out of the labyrinth of Calvinism. Does God make everything for himself? No; for his morality. Is the will of God the ground of moral obligation? No; moral obligation is the ground of the will of God. Does God damn because he chooses to? No; not otherwise than as he chooses to do that which is positively and scrupulously his duty. Does God predestine the lost? He creates the lost, and upholds them, and keeps them in being. Moreover, as he is the maker of the whole machinery of life, the strongest talk about his predestining of it could but give us the trouble of a mystery. And this is the way the Bible speaks of it. Mystery we are invited calmly to assent to; but morality we have a right to know about. And this is just the arrangement the Bible makes for us, and this is just the provision that has been seven times wrecked by ultra-Calvinism.

3. And now, as a third step, we will take a chapter, and to make it utterly fair, we will choose the hardest chapter in the history of our difficulty, the chapter that has all the three of the great proof-texts that even unchurchly people must have seen so often of late in our newspapers; moreover the texts which Westminster, Concord, and Dort use so punctually for hyper-Calvinism, and then we will do still better in the other direction. We will screw up the morality of God to the highest point that he ever demands of men. We will say God's morality is *our* morality. Man's morality is perfect love of others, and perfect love of morality itself. Such morality as this declares that it itself is God's highest good, that to obey it is his highest end, and that as morality is a perfect benevolence and a perfect love of virtue, God's chief end in creating the universe is to make it the holiest and happiest he can possibly devise.

What a shame Calvinists, of all men, do not avail of a start like this!

Predestination, under such treatment as this, becomes the mere predetermination of what it will be moral for God to do when he comes up to the special case in its spot in the eternity. Pile on mystery after that as much as you please. God, in a certain sense, is not responsible for it. If "the Lord is righteous in all his ways;" if wisdom is "by his side a builder;" if "righteousness is his captain, and sets his steps in the way," then he is as helpless to do wrong as we are to do right, and the man that complains of predestination is complaining of truth, and God can step aside at the last and leave us to contend with morals, and show that he obeyed them, and we would not.

This leaves us to a beautiful key to our celebrated chapter. Paul stumbles upon Calvinism—Calvinism in that necessary shape that has not maligned or profaned morality. His whole chapter is to prevent that thing from happening. "What then?" he cries, "Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid." And then follows one of the three great mischief-making texts. It ought to correct itself by its very sound: "I will have mercy on whomsoever I will have mercy." Think of it! Paul making an offer and the very offer being to explain these difficulties of the "confession." What else can we make of it? "Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated," and Paul confessing the difficulty, and then arguing in extenuation of the mystery exactly what follows! Did ever any one hear the like? It makes one sad to think that the world has lived under such a mistake so many centuries. He does not say, "For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whomsoever I will have mercy," but just the opposite, "I will have mercy on whomsoever I *can* have mercy." What an entire revolution in the sense! And this makes this a loving chapter, not a bitter one. And so of the rest; he does not say, "So then it is not of the willing." That would deny all the gospel. It *is* eminently "of the willing." But Paul is reverently applying this negation to

God. This great proof-text really is, "So then it is not of the willing nor of the eagerly hastening, but of the mercy-showing God." Then the last text. It is the worst of all. It has been doing blasphemous work for many a century. It is probably being quoted now all over the land. It reads, "Therefore, hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." It ought to read, "Wherefore, one man whom he has a desire after, he shows mercy to, and another man whom he hath a desire after, he hardens."

The wickedness of old translations appears worse in the sentences that follow. All that about "the potter" is not a something that the apostle adopts, but a better extreme if any extreme has to be admitted. "Say rather, O man." We must not pause upon the detail, but come at once to the greatest outrages of all. What a singular Providence that philological crookednesses should be allowed to give color to blasphemy, and that for the lifetime of Protestantism! "But if" (and we see here how Paul returns to sober argument) "God willing to show his wrath" (How vicious this seems, when the well-balanced original is, "What if God willing to *explain* the wrath"). And then (more condescendingly yet), anything but our common English, "to make his power known." The Greek never means "power." "But if God wishing to explain the wrath, and to make what is possible for him known, endured with much long suffering vessels of wrath"—not with that wicked bias "fitted for destruction," but (altogether more just), "that had fitted themselves for destruction."

Now, as this chapter is itself a great revolution if it be thus rightfully translated, we shall be pardoned if we go over it a little, and fortify the texts which would have been of themselves sufficient to prevent the decay at the great seats of Calvinistic influences.

The first text comes from Exodus. Moses, overwhelmed with the scenes of providential horror through which their

sins had brought the people, utters that memorable prayer, "If not, then blot me out of thy book," and adds to it, some time after, the petition, "I beseech thee, show me thy glory." The puzzle in those back centuries is the same as that at Saratoga. God does two things for him. He has done them for us. He has filled the Bible with them. One of them is, boldly to confess that the creature never can understand the necessities of the creation; and the other is, boldly to avow that God is doing the best he can. To teach one, he hides Moses in a cleft of the rock and enacts that scene illustrative of his speech, "I dwell in the thick darkness;" and to teach the other, he utters what Paul quotes. King James has translated just such passages in a way in which if he had translated this, all would have been well. What a curious history; as though Satan stood at the door of the exegete; indifferences translated exactly right, and the vital put into English exactly wrong; this seems the champion mistake. Elisha says to the woman, "There is to be a famine; sojourn wherever thou canst sojourn," and he is allowed to say what he meant. David says, "I must go wherever I can go." But in this most vital sentence it has been delivered to us all awry. And so of the second text, one need but look at the Greek to see that all the assertions are about God. A match to it is all through the Bible. He is "not willing that any should perish." "He would have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth." "What could he have done more for his vineyard that he hath not done in it?" "He doth not afflict willingly."

And so of the third text. The jeer of the rabble ought to have corrected it, "Let him deliver him *if he has a desire after him.*" It is the same Greek. "One man whom he has a desire after, he shows mercy to;" and then all the mystery that remains is the common mystery among men of how they harden under the very strivings of the Almighty.

Princeton, four centuries ahead of Geneva, ought to be

able to remedy those infant blunderings. She has had centuries to learn. She has had consequences to help her into knowledge. She has had voices from seven seats, her own among the last. She is on the rim of a sceptic gulf, which she has seen open before all those others; and that with strange agreement of time. And if she simply pushes forward and plunges headlong without any distinct knowledge of any other hemisphere of earth where her experiment shall be tried, how can she clear her conscience of the worst picture of all the seven?

ARTICLE VII.

CRITICAL NOTES.

I.

"NERO REDIVIVUS."

BY THE REV. WILLIAM E. BARTON, WELLINGTON, OHIO.

"THE beast that thou sawest was, and is not; and is about to come up out of the abyss, and to go into perdition. And they that dwell on the earth shall wonder, they whose name hath not been written in the Lamb's book of life from the foundation of the world, when they behold the beast, how that he was, and is not, and shall come. Here is the mind which hath wisdom. The seven heads are seven mountains, on which the woman sitteth; and they are seven kings; the five are fallen, the one is, the other is not yet come; and when he cometh, he must continue a little while. And the beast that was, and is not, is himself also an eighth, and is of the seven; and he goeth into perdition" (Rev. xvii. 8–11, R. V.).

The Praeterist theory of interpretation of the Apocalypse, which rests on the postulated early date of the writing of the book, is now adopted by a large and increasing school of interpreters in America, England, and especially Germany, who find it, unlike the thousand far-fetched and fanciful interpretations based on the assumption of the later date, simple, consistent with itself and with other known facts, and manifestly fulfilled, for the most part, in events near at hand when the book was written, and repeatedly alluded to with statements that these things must "shortly come to pass" (i. 11); that "the time is at hand" (i. 3; xxii. 10); that these things "must shortly be done" (xxii. 6); and closing with the emphatic and repeated assurance, "surely I come quickly" (xxii. 7, 20). Not only does it imply what Christ foretold, a fulfilment of all these things while that generation lived (Matt. xvi. 28; xxxiii. 26; xxv. 34), but states that the generation then living had scarce time for repentance before the final catastrophe (xxii. 11).

The book is explicit in statements from which its own date may be determined. It was written while the temple was still standing (xi. 1), in the city in which our Lord was crucified (xi. 8), before the three and one-half years' war in which it was trodden under foot of the Gentiles (xvi. 10). It was written during the supremacy of the seven-hilled city (xvii. 12) which perse-

cuted the church(xvii. 6; xviii. 24), and while its sixth monarch (xvii. 10) was ruling over the nations of the earth (xvii. 18).

The fact that the numerical value of the letters in *Neron Kaisar* is, in Hebrew, 666 (xiii. 18), and that the number 616 given in a few MSS. is readily accounted for by the omission of the final "n" from Nero, as it was sometimes written, would seem to identify the beast beyond question. And it is easy to see that the essential conditions required for a fulfilment of the prophecy concerning his coming again, are met in the reign of the later persecutor, Domitian. The reference to the beast as being, and not being, and coming, have thus a deeper significance than a mere identification of the beast with Nero, the hero of a dozen legends that he should not die, or had not died,[1] and was coming again:[2] it connected his persecution with that which was to come, inaugurated by the same government, under an emperor of like spirit toward the church, and so much like him in character as to be called "the bald Nero."[3] The resemblances between these two persecutors are well brought out in the recent work of Rev. Alexander Brown, of Aberdeen, entitled, "The Great Day of the Lord" (pp. 187–188).

Most Praeterist interpreters thus agree that the beast which was of the seven, and is also an eighth, is Nero and Domitian; but so far as the writer is aware, no one has shown satisfactorily how this can be consistent with the number of the Roman emperors. Farrar makes the effort by striking out Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, on account of the brevity of their reigns. But this evidently will not do with Galba, for Farrar believes, and is probably correct, that the book was written in the reign of Galba; and John is specific in telling us that the then reigning monarch is to be counted: "the one (or the sixth) now is."[4] Brown says: "The most probable interpretation is that Vespasian may be John's sixth emperor . . . . The seventh, who continues a little while, is Titus, who reigned only twenty-six months."[5] But it is not easy to see how John, writing in the reign of Galba, should have considered himself as writing in the reign of Vespasian. A sufficient answer to this theory is the fact that none of John's contemporary readers, for whom the book was primarily intended, and some of whom must have been desired to understand the puzzle, would have guessed at so ingenious an explanation. Moreover, the twenty-six months of Titus were only those which elapsed from the time of his father's death to his own: he had been reigning with his father for eight years before this.

The list of Roman emperors as usually reckoned is as follows:—

1. Julius Cæsar.
2. Augustus.
3. Tiberius.
4. Caligula.
5. Claudius.

[1] Tacitus i. 2; viii. 2. [2] See Stuart's Commentary *in loc.*

[3] See Farrar's Early Days of Christianity, p. 553.

[4] Farrar's Early Days, pp. 412, 474, 482. [5] The Great Day of the Lord, p. 186.

6. Nero.
7. Galba.
8. Otho.
9. Vitellius.
10. Vespasian.
11. Titus.
12. Domitian.

This is the simpler reckoning, in some respects, as according to it the book was written in the reign of Nero. But many interpreters with much reason begin the list with Augustus. Both methods have excellent authority, and ancient as well: Tacitus adopts one method; Suetonius, the other. But Julius was not emperor, and is usually reckoned with the others more to give the *gens Juliae* complete than for historical exactness. It is better to begin the list where the empire began, with Augustus. This brings the writing of the book in the reign of Galba. If the question should be asked, Why should John have concealed the name of Nero, if he were already dead? the answer is, that the beast is both generic and specific: representing the emperor, indeed, but as the representative of the government, which more exactly the beast depicted. Nero was indeed dead, but the persecuting power lived, and other persecutions were to come. If the book was to be of service to the church, it must not be the occasion of increasing their persecutions; in short, the reason is exactly the same, whether Nero were dead or alive.

If it be objected, again, that the Neronian persecution, if already past or just dying out after his death, is thus described historically and the prophetic character of the book is destroyed, the answer is, that, whether these persecutions were just past or at their height, the prophetic character of the book is the same: its mission was not to inform the church of what it already knew, but to prepare for another persecution, and assure the church of the final triumph of the church of Christ over opposing Judaism and persecuting Rome, and finally all the enemies of Christ to the end of time.

There is no other question as to the kings that had fallen when John wrote. If he intended the list to begin with Augustus the list is settled as far down as the sixth from him, namely Galba, in whose short six months' reign the book was given to the church. Concerning the subsequent kings the task is more difficult. But the matter becomes somewhat more simple when we place ourselves as nearly as possible in the position of the seer, looking forward over the history of the church, and recording in advance some of the most important events in its immediate future. He could hardly represent the reigns, if they could be called reigns, of Otho and Vitellius. Neither was entitled to the crown. Their reigns were synchronous, and occupied but a few months. Otho in Rome and Vitellius in Germany, each proclaimed himself king. During their struggle, the church had peace. Just as those lists which begin with Julius skip the interval between him and Augustus, the seer in looking forward to the next real monarch would skip the vastly shorter interregnum of Otho and Vitellius. It was not a reign nor two reigns; it could not be

represented by a head nor by two heads; there was no way to describe it in harmony with the chosen figure of the seer; and there was no need to describe it, for it was too short to be important from lapse of time, and brought no events of interest to the church in connection with the events of this portion of the prophecy.

Vespasian began to reign in December, 69, and reigned ten years. When he ascended the throne, his son Titus was in Palestine, commanding the armies which overthrew Jerusalem. Soon after the return of Titus, two years later, Vespasian took Titus into his throne with him. Titus outlived his father two years. Interpreters without exception, so far as the writer is aware, count this as two reigns. But nothing can be simpler than to suppose that from the standpoint of the seer, this joint reign of father and son, each of which projected two years at its own end, constituted together a single period in its relation to the church.

If to this it be objected that this joint reign was thus twelve years, which is not a "short space" or "a little while," but a long one when compared with the reigns of Vespasian and Titus' immediate predecessors, the answer is that no such comparison need be assumed as referred to in the text. The short space is not that of a comparatively short reign, but a comparatively short respite from persecutions during the ascendency of the seventh head. The purpose is not to tell how long one emperor shall continue as compared with others, but to assure the believers that the interval between the apparent destruction and reviving of the persecuting power was to be but "a little time."

The list of emperors as John seems to have intended to represent them, then, reads thus:—

1. Augustus (B. C. 31–A. D. 14).
2. Tiberius (14–37).
3. Caligula (37–41).
4. Claudius (41–54).
5. Nero (54–9th of June, 68).
6. Galba (June, 68–Dec. 68).

Interregnum (Dec. 68–Dec. 69).

{ Otho (Jan. 3d, 69–April 15th, 69).
{ Vitellius (Jan. 3d, 69–Dec. 69).

7. { Vespasian (Dec. 69–79) and
   { Titus (71–81).
8. Domitian.

The failure thus to show that the eighth is properly Domitian, has led some excellent commentators to look with disapproval on the interpretation as referring at all to the superstitions of *Nero redivivus*.[1] Others have failed to find in this passage anything else than a reference to the superstition, and hence find no fulfilment of the prophecy.[2] The reference to this current su-

[1] See Cowles, Com. *in loc.*, who replies almost with severity to Stuart.

[2] See review of Renan's L'Antechrist in Edinburgh Review (Oct., 1874), Vol. cxl. p. 249.

perstition need not imply that John believed it, but it served his purpose in helping to designate the beast, and at the same time conveyed more tangibly the desired truth of the revived persecuting power. In the same sense in which John the Baptist was Elijah, Domitian was Nero. They had the same character, the same office, and the same relation to the church that their forerunners had.

II.

BRACE'S "UNKNOWN GOD."[1]

BY FREDERIC PERRY NOBLE.

CRITICISM, when it must confine itself to pointing out defects, is a task as unpleasant as it appears unlovely. This is especially the case when the book is a work of such catholicity and Christ-like spirit as "The Unknown God" of Mr. Brace. The sermon which he puts into the mouth of an ideal missionary is a model, deserving the study of every candidate for the foreign field. His closing prayer is of elevated and tender devoutness.

But Mr. Brace is not felicitous in his exegesis of the Scriptures which strike the keynote of his thought. His idea of biblical inspiration is nebulous. The interpretation of several forms of pre-Christian faith is in flat contradiction to the testimony of students and authorities. More than a few misstatements and apparently unaccountable errors occur.

1. Mr. Brace holds that in Acts xvii. 23 "the" with "unknown god" is equally correct with "an," while agreeing better with Paul's argument. Several considerations make this assumption at least doubtful. Hellenic usage did not require "the." Meyer adds: "In public calamities of which no definite god could be assigned as the author, in order to propitiate the god concerned, by sacrifice, without lighting on a wrong one, altars were erected which were destined and designated *agnosto theo*." This would seem to dispose of the fancy that this altar was "built, we may suppose, by pious Greeks to gain the protection of some foreign god or by some genuine worshipper of the 'God of All.'" The altar indicated no definite god, and bore witness to no deeper thoughts than those of the popular polytheism. Again, Paul's next words are: "*What* accordingly ye worship in ignorance, *that* set I forth unto you." He did not say "Whom . . . Him," for the best manuscripts have a neuter and not a masculine pronoun. In other words, Paul refers not to a person but to a thing, and thus declares that the Athenians are ignorant of any personality in that power which here they call "divinity." The effectiveness of the ensuing argument consists to some extent in this very contrast

[1] The Unknown God; or, Inspiration among Pre-Christian Races. By C. Loring Brace, author of "Gesta Christi," "Races of the Old World," etc. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1890. (pp. ix. 336. 6¼x4.) $2.50.

between the neuter and the masculine, the thing with the person. Since the adjective *agnosto* means not only "the unknown" but equally "the unknowable," the inscription was virtually the affirmation of agnosticism.

2. Passing by the other instances of the incorrect interpretations, or the acceptance of the less likely renderings which characterize Mr. Brace's exegesis, his understanding of inspiration requires notice. If he distinguish Hebrew inspiration from Gentile inspiration, it cannot be discerned, or is else a distinction without a difference. He believes that "every human being can recall . . . . moments when sudden and grand visions of truth, not to be accounted for by any apparent causes, burst upon his mind. Such may be divine inspirations, perhaps not miraculous, but from the ever-acting Spirit of God, working through the laws of the human soul" (p. 301). But is not that a far cry from a mere human vision of truth to the divine inspiration? Divine influence is one thing, divine inspiration is to Christian thought altogether another. The former is universal, the latter specific and particular. Mr. Brace appears to think of one, but in all his writing to speak of it as of the other. He had said: "This inspiration [viz., opening the soul to the spiritual influence of the true Light from God which lighteth *every man*] may be defined as a supernatural elevation of the moral and spiritual faculties; . . . . . a power is given to see moral truth more distinctly, and better to know God" (p. 300). It may be; but such definitions lose us more than they gain. If the power to see moral truth more distinctly elevate Æschylus and Dante and Emerson to the level of Isaiah or Paul or David as spokesmen of God, the inspiration of the poet differs only in degree from that of the spiritual seer. In fact, however, no man can read candidly the holy Book of Jewry and of Christendom, and then read the sacred writings of the Gentiles, without feeling, if not clearly seeing, that in the one there is an element which is not in the others. The latter indeed have a golden thread of divine truth running through the mass of error, but the former is the very word of God, and in it are the presence and personal power of the Holy Spirit. The touchstone that defines Jewish and Christian inspiration, and differentiates it from all other inspiration as divine, is this of its result: The Bible when rightly interpreted furnishes full and infallible principles of faith and conduct. But the Vedas allow theft, and the Koran teaches salvation by works. These differences in kind as well as degree between the outside revelations of God and the divine inspiration recognized by Christianity, are what Mr. Brace does not seem to see. To his eyes the Buddha was to a high degree inspired; but Christian thought cannot accept such inspiration as aught more than providential inspiration, or the natural light and natural revelation in every soul, but subject to human limitations and liabilities, while not guided by a special spiritual inspiration.

3. Mr. Brace maintains for stoicism that its first and last word is spiritual. Be it so; but if anything is certain in philosophy, it is that the whole drift and tenor of the Stoics was pantheistic. Yet our author slurs over the great middle term, and gives an altogether erroneous view of the school. Did

space permit, witness after witness could be cited to give testimony. It is claimed that "to Seneca returned the conception of God as One;" but Seneca said: "Will you call God the world? You may do so without mistake, for he is all that you see around you. What is God? The mind of the universe: all that you see and all you do not." Zeller, in "Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics," proves Seneca to be a pantheist. Mr. Brace's own pages contain refutation in abundance of his idea that Seneca was a genuine theist. Schwegler says: "It seemed to [the Stoics] impossible to dissever God from matter. God is the active, formative energy of matter dwelling within it and essentially united. The Stoics considered God and matter as one identical substance which on the side of its changeless energy they called God."[1] Ueberweg adds, "The working force in the universe is God."[2] Lewes confirms this: "The active element which forms things out of matter [is] reason, destiny, God."[3] Even Canon Farrar declares that with Seneca "God is no personal, living Father, but the fiery, primeval, eternal principle which transfuses an inert, no less eternal matter, and of which our souls are, as it were, divine particles or passing sparks."[4] The singular scriptural parallels in this Spaniard's rhetoric, which weigh so much with Mr. Brace as natural Christianity, are thus handled by Lightfoot: "All deductions made, a class of coincidences remains, of which 'spend and be spent' may be taken as a type, and which can hardly be considered accidentally."[5] As for the remaining Christian phrases and their seemingly Christian ideas, the air was full of them, and all was grist that came to Seneca. The historical probability is that the philosopher had at least a guarded interchange of opinion with the apostle to the Gentiles. Even the monotheism of Marcus Aurelius is such that Uhlhorn can characterize "the Emperor's religion as a fatalistic pantheism; nature was his God."[6]

In his exposition of Buddhism Mr. Brace is scarcely more self-consistent. He does not so discriminate the teachings of Gotama himself from the later developments of this faith that the ordinary reader can form a correct judgment. Take a single instance: On p. 226 Mr. Brace presents, if he does not accept, B. C. 557 and 477 as the years of Gotama's birth and death; on p. 247 he speaks of Asoka arising B. C. 260,—"about one hundred and twenty-five years after the death of the Buddha." How did Mr. Brace resolve the discords of B. C. 477 and 385 into some higher harmony? Such self-contradicting statements abound even in the matters of doctrine. Not seldom he reads Christian conceptions into Buddhist language, as when, despite the almost unanimous testimony of scholars, he persists in regarding what Gotama calls the causer of the body as a personal Creator. Gotama was an agnostic who

[1] History of Philosophy, p. 163. [2] History of Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 194.

[3] History of Ancient Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 290.

[4] Seekers after God, p. 296.

[5] Commentary on Philippians, p. 300.

[6] Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism, p. 283.

stood near the edge of atheism, but Mr. Brace keeps in the background the fact that Gotama's thought was summed up in these words: "The existence of a God is not proved." *Law was the Buddha's God.*

It causes such pain to speak of such shortcomings (so serious and to all seeming so needless) that the present writer cannot pursue the matter. These faults have not been ferreted out, but stare the reader in the face from page to page. What confidence can an author inspire who thus misquotes Plato?—for there is no proof that the "Phaedo" was ever actually spoken by Socrates and his friends—: "Socrates said that at length one would arise among the barbarians who could charm away the fear of death."[1] The correct rendering is this:—

Cebes. "There is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin; we must persuade him not to be afraid when alone with [the goblin] in the dark."

Socrates. "Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily till you have charmed him away. . . . There are barbarous [i. e. foreign] races not a few; seek for him [the charmer] among them all, far and wide, sparing neither pains nor money. . . . Nor must you forget to seek among yourselves too; for nowhere is he more likely to be found."[2]

Now, what *hope* of a Redeemer does this express? Socrates simply says: Seek! He does not add: And ye shall find. What justifies Mr. Brace in claiming that "Socrates has apparently heard of the Jewish or Persian hopes of a Redeemer?" So it is with a sense of disappointment, despite its many merits, that we lay aside the study of "The Unknown God." Mr. Brace had the opportunity and the power to make a contribution of positive and permanent value to comparative theology; he has given us a sketch with many a stroke taken amiss.

[1] P. 294; and cf. p. 179. [2] Jowett, Vol. i. p. 406.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A FULL ACCOUNT AND COLLATION OF THE GREEK CURSIVE CODEX EVANGELIUM 604 (with two Facsimiles) [Egerton 2610 in the British Museum]. Together with Ten Appendices containing (A) The Collation of a Manuscript in his own possession. (B) A Reprint with corrections of Scrivener's list of differences between the editions of Stephen 1550 and Elzevir 1624, Beza 1565 and the Complutensian, together with fresh evidence gathered from an investigation of the support afforded to the various readings by the five editions of Erasmus, 1516, 1519, 1522, 1527, 1535, by the Aldine Bible 1518, by Colinaeus 1534, by the other editions of Stephen of 1546, 1549, 1551, and by the remaining three Bezan editions in folio of 1582, 1588–9, 1598, and the 8° editions of 1565, 1567, 1580, 1590, 1604. (C) A full and exact comparison of the Elzevir editions of 1624 and 1633, doubling the number of the real variants hitherto known, and exhibiting the support given in the one case and in the other by the subsequent editions of 1641, 1656, 1662, 1670, and 1678. (D) Facsimile of Codex Paul. 247 (Cath. Eps. 210), with correction of previous descriptions. (E) Report of a visit to the Phillips MSS., with corrections of and supplement to previous information concerning them, and collations of parts of some of them. (F) Report of a visit to the Public Library at Bâle, with facsimile of Erasmus' second MS. Evan. 2, and a collation of Codex Apoc. N° 15. (G) Report of a visit to the Public Library at Geneva, with corrections of Cellerier's collation of Evan. 75, as supplied with Scholz. (H) Report of a visit to the Library of Harvard College, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A., with information concerning the sacred Greek codices there. (I) Some further information concerning Codex 1ª, an Evangelistary at Andover, Mass., U. S. A. (J) Note on 1 Tim. iii. 15. By Herman C. Hoskier. London: David Nutt. 1890. (pp. cxvi. 139. 7¾×4¾.)

This is one of those carefully prepared and beautifully printed volumes bearing upon textual criticism which every theological library and every original student of the New Testament will find it important to possess. The author was a special friend of the late Dean Burgon, and has pursued his painstaking inquiries in response to the suggestions of that stimulating writer. In the present volume the main interest pertains to the author's collation of the cursive MS. of the Gospels known as 604. This MS. was purchased of a German bookseller in 1882 for the British Museum, and was regarded by Dean Burgon, from the cursory examination he gave it, as one of the most famous codices in the world. It is in fifteenth century binding, but the date of its original transcription cannot well be determined; but from comparative criticism it is believed by Mr. Hoskier to have been copied from an uncial whose text the scribe followed in the main, but occasionally corrected from other MSS. The MS. contains an unusual number of peculiar readings, there being no less than two hundred and fifty which are found in

no other codices, so far examined; while in nearly two thousand instances it agrees with the Sinaitic, the Vatican, Codex Bezae, and others of that class, both of uncials and cursives, which have been considered to be most ancient, in opposition to the great mass of MSS. All this is set before the reader in carefully prepared tables, occupying about one hundred quarto pages, while the collation occupies forty-three pages more.

The author regards his work, even upon this MS., as a complete refutation of Dr. Hort's theory of the classification of MSS., and calls upon scholars to "realize that we are in the infancy of this part of the science," and "not to imagine that we have successfully laid certain immutable foundation-stones, and can safely continue to build thereon." It is not so, he says, "and much if not all of these foundations must be demolished" (Introduction, p. cxvi).

Among the passages in which 604 agrees with the Textus Receptus against the older uncials, and 1, 33, 69 of the cursives, are Matt. xi. 19, where 604 confirms *τέκνων* against *ἔργων* of the older MSS.; Mark vi. 20, where it upholds the *ἐποίει* of the Textus Receptus against *ἠπόρει* of the older MSS. 604 also contains Mark xvi. 9–20, and in Luke ii. 14 reads *εὐδοκία* instead of *εὐδοκίας*. In John i. 18 it sustains *υἱός* against the *θεός* of the Sinaitic and the Vatican. 604 also contains, without any query, the passage concerning the woman taken in adultery (Introduction, p. cxvi).

In his Preface Mr. Hoskier complains with some reason of the confusion caused by changing the numbers by which the cursive MSS. are designated, and especially of Dr. Gregory in his Prolegomena to Tischendorf's eighth edition. For instance, from 450 to 737 Dr. Gregory has "put other codices into the places assigned to them by Scrivener and Burgon, some of which had been filled since 1873" (Preface, p. xx). The confusion is illustrated in this case by the fact that 604, according to Scrivener and Burgon, is referred to as 700 by Gregory, and as 2,610 by Egerton in the British Museum.

From the Preface we learn that Mr. Hoskier is pursuing these investigations as an *avocation*, occupying such time with them as he is "able to snatch from an active commercial career." He certainly has conferred a great favor upon all students of the New Testament, and we shall look for the further results of his work with great interest and expectation. We would call the attention of all students of the Bible to the closing paragraph of the Preface, in which the author puts on record the fact that much more of the deeper insight into the true meaning and teaching of the spirit of the gospel has come to him through the textual study of the letter than in any other way. And so will it always be. Even the ordinary pastor will find such minute study as textual critics are compelled to put upon the New Testament, and such as is illustrated in this work, of the highest value.

A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians. By Charles J. Ellicott, D. D., Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1889. (pp. 342. 6¾x3¾.)

This volume adds another to the invaluable series already published by its

evangelical, learned, and cautious author, and is in many respects the best of them all. The earlier volumes, which were published before the Revised English Version of the New Testament (which Dr. Ellicott was prominent in securing) appeared, were cumbered with many points of discussion with reference both to text and translation which are now practically settled. The present volume therefore contains nothing but the ripest and best results of modern scholarship. The plan of treatment is likewise one which makes it most convenient for daily consultation. The Greek text, with proper critical notes, is given at the top of the page, while the comments are based upon a preliminary grammatical discussion, accompanied with ample references to the literature of the subject. The doctrinal and practical bearings of each passage are then discussed in the light of all its relations to the analogy of faith.

The reader will be glad to have us note the author's views upon some of the disputed questions connected with the Epistle. As to the population of Corinth at the time, Ellicott takes an extremely conservative view, setting it at not more than one hundred thousand, regarding the statement of Athenaeus, which would make it upwards of half a million, as wholly incredible (p. 13). The confidence with which this assertion is made will impress the ordinary reader somewhat unpleasantly, if at the same time he happens to take up the recent commentary of Godet, who, without a word of comment, asserts, as if it were not subject to dispute, that "the city counted from six to seven hundred thousand inhabitants, of whom two hundred thousand were freemen and four hundred thousand slaves" (p. 5). Where such divergences are possible, it would seem appropriate to have a more definite discussion of the original authority, for without it the ordinary reader is helpless in defending the views he may be led to entertain.

With regard to the passages in which Paul is supposed by some to disclaim the possession of inspired wisdom, Bishop Ellicott's views are very satisfactory, and the conclusions at which he arrives, it would seem, must commend themselves to all careful and candid students. Chap. ii. 13 he interprets to mean "that the apostle clothed his Spirit-revealed truths in Spirit-taught language, and thus combined what was spiritual in substance with what was spiritual in form" (p. 66). Upon chap. vii. 40, "I think that I also have the Spirit of God," our author remarks, that "the full and obvious meaning of these words is no ways to be diluted; the apostle in fact claims to be, and truly claims to be, an *organon* (Theod.) of the Holy Spirit" (p. 153). The claim of Paul to have seen the Lord Jesus in chap. ix. 1 is regarded by Bishop Ellicott as real, "even as the other apostles saw him when he appeared to them after his resurrection; comp. chap. xv. 5 seq., where, after recounting these appearances, the apostle specifies with solemn emphasis, He was seen by me also. This manifestation of the risen, and (in the case of St. Paul) ascended, Lord which was vouchsafed, not only on the way to Damascus (Acts ix. 17), but in visions (Acts xviii. 9; xxii. 17) and *perhaps* still more wonderful circumstances

(2 Cor. xii. 1 seq.), place St. Paul on a level, in regard of this important particular, with the very eleven" (p. 164).

Upon the important question raised in connection with chap. vii. 15 as to the right of a married person who has been maliciously deserted, to marry again, Bishop Ellicott holds that "nothing certainly is expressly said, but the tenor of the words seems in favor of the liberty. . . . The only real difficulty is whether such an interpretation can be considered consistent with our Lord's declaration (Matt. v. 32; xix. 9). The ordinary view seems reasonable; viz., that our Lord's words must be understood as referring, by the very nature of the case and of the context, to those, and such as those, to whom the words were addressed, and that, in regard to such cases as those under consideration, nothing further could be deduced from our Lord's command than this—that the *believing* husband or wife was not at liberty to depart. If deserted by the unbelieving, then fresh considerations arose" (p. 135).

Upon the bearing of chap. xi. 26, where the command is given that they should show forth the Lord's death until he come, upon the question of the expected nearness of the second advent, we find these just and important remarks: "No inference can properly be drawn from these words as to any deliberate expectation, on the part of the apostle, of a speedy return of the Lord. Hope may have often made what was longed for *seem* nigh, and may have given its tinge to passing expressions; but when the subject was definitely entertained (2 Thess. ii. 1 seq.), then it becomes clear that the apostle, speaking under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, uses a language perfectly incompatible with any such alleged expectations" (p. 225).

In conclusion, we simply say that for the use of ordinary pastors having even a limited knowledge of Greek, as well as for those who are more familiar with the language, this commentary has no superior. In addition to being a great scholar, Bishop Ellicott has also the equally important qualification of being a safe guide in all important theological questions.

COMMENTARY ON ST. PAUL'S FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS. By F. Godet, Doctor of Theology, Professor of the Faculty of the Independent Church of Neuchatel. Translated from the French by Rev. A. Cusin, M. A., Edinburgh. Volume First. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1886. (pp. 428. 6⅞x3¾.)

This first volume only covers the ground to the thirteenth verse of the eighth chapter. Like all the other commentaries of its distinguished author, this breathes a spirit of profound reverence, and is marked by high scholarly qualifications. The introduction and whole treatment is more ample than that of Ellicott, and the positions taken are equally evangelical. In explaining the passages which represent the Parousia as though it were an event which was to terminate the apostle's own life, Dr. Godet significantly remarks, that "in this Paul only does what the Lord himself did. Jesus very expressly set aside the idea of the nearness of his return (Matt. xxv. 5; Mark

xiii. 35; Luke xii. 45; xiii. 18–21; xxi. 24; Matt. xxiv. 14; comp. Mark xiii. 32); and yet this is how he speaks to his disciples (Luke xii. 36): 'Be ye like men looking for their Lord, when he shall return from the wedding, that when he cometh and knocketh, they may open to him immediately.' This is because, in fact, death is to every believer a personal and anticipated Parousia. The saying of Jesus is therefore for all on to the last day a moral truth, but this truth is only relative, till the promise be accomplished in its strict sense to the last generation. So it is with the sayings of Paul" (pp. 398, 399).

THE EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE. Expository Lectures on all the Books of the Bible. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. (5⅞x3⅜.) Price per volume, $1.50. We have received the following volumes:—

THE BOOK OF EXODUS. By the very Rev. G. A. Chadwick, D. D., Dean of Armaugh, author of "Christ Bearing Witness to Himself," "As He that Serveth," "The Gospel of St. Mark," etc. (pp. xx. 442.)

JUDGES AND RUTH. By the Rev. Robert A. Watson, M. A., author of "Gospels of Yesterday." (pp. viii. 424.)

THE BOOK OF ISAIAH. By the Rev. George Adam Smith, M. A. Vol. I. Chaps. I.–XXXIX. (pp. xvi. 456.)

THE PROPHECIES OF JEREMIAH, with a sketch of his Life and Times. By the Rev. C. J. Ball, M. A., Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn; contributor to Bishop Ellicott's "Commentary," "The Speaker's Commetary," etc. (pp. vi. 424.)

THE FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS. By the Rev. Marcus Dods, D. D. (pp. vii. 399.)

THE EPISTLE OF THE GALATIANS. By the Rev. Professor G. G. Findlay, B. A. Headingley College, Leeds. (pp. viii. 461.)

THE PASTORAL EPISTLES. By the Rev. Alfred Plummer, M. A., D. D., Master of University College, Durham; formerly Fellow and Senior Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford, author of the "Church of the Early Fathers," and editor of "The Gospels and Epistles of St. John," etc. (pp. 435.)

THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS. By Thomas Charles Edwards, D. D., Principal of the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. (pp. vi. 337.)

THE EPISTLES OF ST. JOHN. Twenty-one Discourses with Greek Text, Comparative Versions, and Notes Chiefly Exegetical. By William Alexander, D.D., D.C.L., Brasenose College, Oxford, Lord Bishop of Derry and Raphoe. (pp. ix. 309.)

THE BOOK OF REVELATION. By William Milligan, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of Aberdeen; author of "The Resurrection of Our Lord," etc. (pp. v. 392.)

Pastors and intelligent laymen will find this series of books, edited by W. R. Nicoll, editor of the London *Expositor*, of great value. While absolute uniformity of plan has not been attained, and probably has not been sought, and the volumes are of somewhat unequal value, the set as a whole, so far as issued at least, deserves high commendation as a scholarly, reverent, and perspicuous exposition of the several books treated. When complete, it will form a set worthy of a place on any pastor's shelf, and one which he can for the most part commend to his congregation. The volumes deserve separate mention.

"The Book of Exodus" is one of the best of the series. The treatment of the text is thorough, the discussions by the way are full of suggestions, the style is captivating, the movement is constant and without effort, and the language is transparent and free from pedantry. The author's purpose is not controversial, but he has not "suppressed exposition where it carries weapons." He admits that much that was once believed concerning the book, is now denied or doubted within the church, and he considers his mission to be edification, and in a secondary sense, information, concerning a book of which at least it can be said that Jesus treated it as possessed of scriptural authority. Hence, while himself believing that its teaching harmonizes with the principles and theology of the New Testament, and even demands the New Testament as a commentary upon it, and not shrinking from the defence of his belief against the theories of Wellhausen and others, "by far the greater part of the volume appeals to all who accept their Bible as in any true sense a gift from God."

Among the more valuable of the volumes, is that on "Judges and Ruth." Taking up that "second Genesis, or Chronicle of the Beginnings so far as the Hebrew commonwealth is concerned," Mr. Watson follows one by one its events, describing "the birth throes of national life, the experiments, struggles, errors, and disasters out of which the moral force of the people gradually rose, growing like a pine tree out of rocky soil." Emerging from these scenes of disorder and strife and anarchy, he conducts us into the quiet scenes of the book of Ruth, and tells us again, in fitting words, the story of that sweet pastoral tale. He excels in character protraiture. The pen-pictures of Samson and Gideon and Deborah, especially, are well drawn.

"The Book of Isaiah" treats of the first thirty-nine chapters only. The publishers promise us another volume soon, by the same author, completing the book. The prophecies are arranged chronologically in four groups, in connection with the four Assyrian invasions which determined the prophecies. The author, while accepting the truth of the divinity of Christ, declines to believe that Isaiah saw in the future "a God in the metaphysical sense of the word." "Just because we know the proofs of the divinity of Jesus to be so spiritual, do we feel the uselessness of looking for them to prophecies, that manifestly describe purely earthly and civil functions" (p. 140). Isaiah gave to his generation "the vital kernel of Messianic prophecy," with as much of the essence of the gospel as was possible to communicate to

so early a generation. "But this does not mean that in using these Old Testament prophecies, we Christians should limit our enjoyment of them to the measure of the generation to whom they were addressed . . . . . The Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament are tidal rivers . . . . . It is not enough for a Christian to have followed the historical direction of the prophecies, or to have proved their connection with the New Testament as parts of one divine harmony. Forced back by the fulness of meaning to which he has found their courses open, he returns to find the savour of the New Testament upon them, and that where he descended shallow and tortuous channels, with all the difficulties of historical explanation, he is borne back on full tides of worship" (pp. 143-144).

In "The Prophecies of Jeremiah," the vindication of the character of Jeremiah is most pertinent and just: there is probably not in history a man more misunderstood, either in his own day or in later times. Among the valuable chapters in this volume, is one on the Sabbath, which is not only good, but timely.

"The First Epistle to the Corinthians" will be taken up with interest by all who have read Dr. Dods' volume on Genesis, and know of his trial for heresy. The portion of the Epistle devoted to questions of morals and casuistry, he treats with the best of common sense, with no effect of straining to discover the truth taught. This straightforward, practical good sense is what impresses one most in reading the whole volume. But the treatment of the thirteenth chapter exhibits a praiseworthy tenderness in the handling of sacred truth: for, he says, "Some of the bloom and delicacy of surface passes from the flower in the very handling which is meant to exhibit its fineness of texture." A difference of method appears again in the two chapters on the Resurrection, its place in the creed of the church, and its proofs, where the learned author shows himself powerful as a defender of the truth. Dr. Dods suggests that Sosthenes was joint author of the Epistle (p. 19) and with questionable propriety remarks that "Paul's easy assumption of a friend as joint writer of the letter sufficiently shows that he had no such stiff and formal idea of inspiration as we have. Apparently he did not stay to inquire whether Sosthenes was qualified to be the author of a canonical book; but knowing the authoritative position he had held among the Jews at Corinth, he naturally conjoins his name with his own in addressing the new Christian community."

"The Epistle to the Galatians" is a lucid and forcible rendering of the thought of that wonderful composition, and breathes the true theology of the Reformation.

Dr. Plummer's exposition of the "Pastoral Epistles" is thoughtful and clear. Not every reader, however, will agree with him in supposing that the apostle's statement that a bishop should be the husband of one wife, was meant to exclude remarried widowers from the ministry (p. 118 seq.): and some who accept this conclusion may part company with him when he assumes that the prohibition has passed away; though if his interpretation be correct, his sug-

gestion of the possible reasons for such a restriction as temporary seems reasonable. More will be likely to doubt his conclusion that Paul's reference to Onesiphorus (2 Tim. i. 16.) justifies praying for the dead. He thinks "that neither Scripture nor the English Church forbids praying for the departed; that, on the contrary, both of them appear to give a certain amount of sanction to it: and that what they allow, reason commends, and tradition recommends most strongly. It is for each one of us to decide for himself whether or no he will take part in the charitable work thus placed before him" (p. 330).

"The Epistle to the Hebrews" deserves a place in the front rank of commentaries on this book. It is fitting that one of the most difficult of New Testament books should receive one of the clearest and most satisfactory expositions of the series. The learned author selects, as his typical reader, an intelligent Sabbath-school teacher, a thoughtful layman, with no Greek, and whose desire is to know simply the force of the words, and the connection of ideas of the Epistle. Criticism is excluded, but respect is had to the results of the latest scholarship; and an occasional Greek word at the foot of the page is designed to suggest some important point of criticism or interpretation to the pastor or theological student. The author's reverent interpretations afford a pleasing contrast to much that has recently been written on this book in the way of callow and irreverent criticism. He does not accept the Pauline authorship of the book, but regards the unknown author as "an apostolic man." There is much that is worthy of quotation in his treatment of the several great themes of the book, but we select the following more general passage as a taste for the reader:—

"Yet the New Testament was all produced—if we are forbidden to say 'given'—in one age, not fifteen centuries. Neither was this one of the great ages of history, when genius seems to be almost contagious. Even Greece had at this time no original thinkers. Its two centuries of intellectual supremacy had passed away. It was an age of literary imitations and counterfeits. Yet it was in this age that the book which has most profoundly influenced the thought of all subsequent times made its appearance. How shall we account for the fact? The explanation is not that the writers were great men. . . . . Nothing will account for the New Testament but the other fact that Jesus of Nazareth had appeared among men, and that he was so great, so universal, so human, so divine, that he contained in his own person all the truth that will ever be discovered in the book. Deny the incarnation of the Son of God, and you make the New Testament an insoluble enigma. Admit that Jesus is the Word, and that the Word is God, and the book becomes nothing more, nothing less, than the natural and befitting outcome of what he said and did and suffered. The mystery of the book is lost in the greater mystery of his person" (pp. 7–8).

"The Epistles of St. John" need no commendation to those familiar with the author's writings on the same books in the "Speaker's Commentary." Every page shows the results of a life of study. Five versions are given in parallel columns, Tischendorf's Greek and Latin, A. V., R. V., and a transla-

tion by the author himself, for the better understanding of his own meaning where exposition may be obscure. But while believing the word "charity" to have been almost providentially preserved for the rendering of ἀγάπη, he has not had, as he says, the courage of his convictions, and has not changed "God is love," to "God is charity."

"The Book of Revelation" is as carefully and studiously written as any of the other volumes of this series, but is less successful in its results. In many places the author seems to fail of discerning the thought of the passage by the very minuteness of his search for it: while in others, important conclusions are rejected and others are adopted, without evidence of more than a casual examination. In the case of the "angels of the churches" (p. 25) he says: "The favorite interpretations of the term are two: that the 'angels of the churches' are either the guardian angels to whom they were severally committed, or their bishop or chief pastors. Both interpretations may be unhesitatingly rejected. For as to the first, there is a total absence of proof that it was either a Jewish or Christian idea that each community had its guardian angel; and as to the second, if there was, as there seems to have been, in the synagogues of the Jews, an official known as the 'angel' or 'messenger,' he occupied an altogether inferior position, and possessed none of the authoritative control ascribed to the several 'angels' mentioned. Besides this, both interpretations are set aside by the single consideration that, keeping in view what has been said of the number seven in its relation to the number one, the seven angels, like the seven churches, *must be capable of being regarded as a unity*." This position is certainly untenable. Very few readers will be able to think of the seven churches as "capable of being regarded as a unity," for one of the churches had fallen from a state of good works till it was in danger of having its candlestick removed, while another was promised that its last works should be more than its first: one had left its first love, while another was holding fast the name of Christ at the very throne of Satan: one thought itself poor, but was rich, while another professed to be rich and increased with goods, and was wretched and miserable and poor and blind and naked. Thus is one view "unhesitatingly rejected" with the merest excuse for an examination of the evidence in its favor, while another is adopted on the basis of mere presumptions without evidence. He proceeds: "The true idea seems to be that the 'angels' of the churches are a symbolical representation in which the *active*, as distinguished from the passive, life of the church, finds expression. To St. John every person, every thing has its angel. . . . . The waters have an angel (chap. xvi. 5), fire has an angel (chap. xiv. 18)," etc. But the fallacy of such reasoning appears in the fact that these angels are not the waters and fire respectively, in an active as distinguished from a passive state: they are messengers appointed to execute the will of God upon these elements.

Of like character is the assumption that the seven churches "are intended to set before us a picture of the universal church." The chief reason given for this opinion is the probability that there were more than seven churches

in Asia Minor; though how the conclusion follows, is not clear. The author divides the churches into two groups. "In the first three she is the pure bride of Christ; in the last four she has yielded to the influences of the world" (p. 37). If any refutation of so improbable a conjecture were needed, it would appear sufficiently in the futility of every attempt of the most ingenious mind, to exalt Ephesus, which had fallen and left her first love, or Pergamum, which tolerated the teachers of Balaam, over Philadelphia, against which not a word of censure is spoken, but which receives unqualified commendation and unconditioned promise.

That these Epistles are designed to reveal the whole history of the church, and are to be taken as successive periods in its history, is not only improbable in itself, and unsupported by evidence, but is opposed to the testimony of the book itself. To all, the time was "at hand" (i. 3); the Lord, who was coming quickly to Pergamum, was coming quickly, and apparently as quickly, to Philadelphia. There is every reason to believe, and, at least so far as any evidence adduced in the volume before us is concerned, no reason to doubt, that the churches were contemporaneous, and that the number seven included, if not every local church, at least representative churches of Asia Minor, both as to territory and internal condition, and were designed for their special edification. That churches, or even the church as a whole, may come into the condition of any of the churches here described, and may well profit by the Spirit's messages, is decidedly probable: but the attempt to reconstruct church history on the basis of these Epistles, is a lamentable failure.

And if the effort to make the church's past history conform to the author's interpretation be a failure, much more so, we believe, and devoutly hope, will prove his effort to predict her future. That the church of Christ, "the bride, allying herself with the world, becomes a harlot" (p. 43), and that it is she who is represented by the shameless prostitute riding the beast in chapter xvii. (p. 290 seq.), seems to us not only so unutterably sad and discouraging as to dampen the zeal of the most arduous lover of the church, but opposed to the whole tenor of the book and the content of prophecy in its wider scope. That the church may often fail of its whole duty, and for a time forsake its first love, is sadly true, but there are always seven thousand somewhere that do not bow the knee to Baal nor kiss him, and the church itself shall in the main continue pure, shall end its career gloriously and be arrayed in white at its marriage with the Lord. Trusting in Him who is able to keep us from falling, we shall continue to sing:—

"I love thy church, O God!
Her walls before thee stand
Dear as the apple of thine eye,
And graven on thy hand.
Sure as thy truth shall last,
To Zion shall be given
The brightest glories earth can yield,
And brighter bliss of heaven."

Two great errors seem to us to characterize all such expositions of the Apocalypse.

First, there is a failure to consider the immediate object of the book,—the purpose it was designed to accomplish in the age in which it was written. Indeed, most such works contain no evidence that the author has even considered the question of when that age was. The Apocalypse was evidently written under the influence of mighty emotion, and designed for the comfort of the church under almost overwhelming affliction. When that time was, and what were its characteristics, ought to be ascertained: for in the light of its immediate purpose, would be likely to appear its ultimate mission to the church. This question, the author, and many others of his school, seem totally to ignore.

The second error is too minute and strained an effort to assign to each detail of the prophetic symbolism a significant meaning. Something must be allowed for costume and drapery. The Apocalypse is a vast oil painting, executed in bold, rapid strokes, under the impulse of a mighty inspiration. It must not be examined with a microscope, with a question as to the object of each stroke of the brush, but viewed at a distance and in a light which will reveal its general effect. What is the use of a painful and labored discussion of the beast in chapters xiii. and xvii.,—a consideration of such questions as to why in the one the horns, and in the other the head, is mentioned first (pp. 279–286)? Why give a microscopic examination to show what the seer intended should be seen at a glance, that the beast is the same in both chapters? Such straining out of gnats is not only profitless in itself, but it prepares for the swallowing of camels. The book demands wider angles of inspection. As well might one hope by a minute examination star by star to re-trace the imaginary lines of the ancients that marked the outline of the bear on the constellation Ursa Major as to attempt to discover the thought of the author of the Apocalypse by laborious examination of its minute details, but without viewing the whole book in search of its general purpose.

JOURNAL OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE. Vol. IX. Part I. Published by the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis. 1890. Annual subscription, $3.00; single numbers, $1.50.

Now that so many of the standard quarterlies have turned themselves into mere popular magazines, it is a good omen to see the gap in part supplied in America by the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, of which the present number is an excellent specimen. Prominent among the papers is that of the late Professor Gardiner, entitled, "A Study in the First Gospel," the design of which is to verify an ingenious theory concerning the original composition and language of the book. As is well known, the almost universal tradition is that the book was originally written in Aramaic; yet the difficulties of accepting this view are such that some subsidiary hypothesis seems essential. For example, in the narrative portion of the first Gospel the quotations from the Old Testament are not taken from the Septuagint, but are originally

translations from the Hebrew, while in the other portions they are from the Septuagint. To account for this, Professor Gardiner brings forward the hypothesis that Matthew originally wrote an account of our Lord's teaching in Aramaic, with little or no connecting narrative, "and that afterwards, finding a fuller narrative required, and the Greek language more fitted to his purpose, he determined to enlarge and re-issue the work in Greek. To this end he prepared the narrative in Greek, employing one of his disciples to translate into the same language what he had already written in Aramaic" (p. 2). A verification of this theory may be secured by an examination of the different parts with reference to a comparison of their peculiarities of style. From this it does indeed appear that the writer or translator of the discourses was more familiar with Greek construction than the writer of the narrative. The article is very interesting, and presents what the author truly regards "as a satisfactory solution of the puzzling enigmas in regard to this Gospel, both in the testimony of antiquity and in its internal structure" (p. 16).

Among the other more important articles are two by Professor J. Rendel Harris, the first being a collation of the important cursive MS. No. 33,277 of the British Museum, which was written in the tenth century, and was purchased as late as 1887. This MS., like the one recently collated by Mr. Hoskier (No. 604), was singled out by Dean Burgon as of special value, and like that contains a large number of unique readings, such as can only be paralleled in the Sinaitic or some other early uncial text. So numerous are these that we cannot well resist the conclusion that this was copied from a very early uncial MS.

A second paper of Professor Harris is an attempt to show, from botanical and other references to natural history, that the so-called "Epistle of Barnabas" was written in Egypt. Like everything else which Professor Harris undertakes, the argument is very interesting, and is most carefully wrought out.

Besides these, there are papers by Professor Toy on "Evil Spirits in the Bible;" by Professor Francis Brown on "The Measurements of Hebrew Poetry as an Aid to Literary Analysis;" by Professor H. P. Smith on Professor Workman's volume on "The Variations between the Hebrew and Greek Jeremiah;" and by Professor C. R. Brown upon "The Meaning of Isa. vii. 10-17."

UNTO THE UTTERMOST. By James M. Campbell. New York: Fords, Howard and Hulbert. 1889. (pp. 254. 5½x3⅛.) $1.25.

This is a volume of decided originality and merit; the style is perspicuous and forcible; the illustrations, interesting; and the thought in the main sound and always stimulating. The inexperienced reader, or one who does not peruse the whole volume, will at times think that the author is perilously near the logical necessity of maintaining universalism or restorationism; but careful attention to the thought will show that this is not the case. According to the author, "Every sin

brings eternal loss" (p. 155); the word *aionios*, while not expressing the idea of absolute eternity, "suggests no idea of limitation" (p. 158); and "Delusive is the dream of the greater things which the future will do. No advantage can be offered in the future which is not held out in the present. . . . . Atonement has been completed; the Holy Spirit has been poured out upon all flesh, in a flood of saving power" (p. 252).

We miss in the volume, however, the broad scriptural treatment of the themes which they severally demand. Though the Scriptures are referred to more or less, the argument is not based as thoroughly in the objective divine revelation of the Bible as would be most profitable, and in the Scripture, which is considered, the interpretation of the author frequently seems far-fetched. For example, the difficult passage in Eph. ii. 3, where all men are said to be by nature "children of wrath," is explained away as meaning no more than that we are by nature specially liable to get overcome with the passion of anger (p. 33). "The reference is not to wrath of which they are the objects, but to wrath of which they are the subjects" (p. 30). Few will be inclined to follow the author in this interpretation. More will agree with him, however, that "if the objective meaning of the term 'wrath' be insisted upon, Meyer is undoubtedly right in asserting that it is only through the development of natural disposition into actual sin that men become the objects of divine wrath. . . . . Moral tendency may depend upon things beyond the sphere of choice, but moral character is always the result of moral action" (p. 31).

CHARACTERISTICS OF VOLCANOES, with Contributions of Facts and Principles from the Hawaiian Islands, including an Historical Review of Hawaiian Volcanic Action for the Past Sixty-seven Years, a Discussion of the Relations of Volcanic Islands to Deep-Sea Topography, and a Chapter of Volcanic Island Denudation. By James D. Dana. Illustrated by Maps of the Islands; a Bathymetric Map of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; and Views of Cones, Craters, a Lava-Cascade, a Lava-Fountain, etc. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. 1890. (pp. vi. 399. 7½x4¼.)

This sumptuous volume presents to all classes of readers a mass of most interesting information systematically arranged and thoroughly digested. Professor Dana began his personal observation upon volcanoes with the ascent of Vesuvius in 1834. Through his connection with the Wilkes Expedition from 1838 to 1841, these observations were extended to Madeira and the Cape Verds, and to a larger part of the Pacific Islands, and were completed in 1887 by a second visit to the Hawaiian Islands. The larger part of the present volume is occupied with statement of facts concerning the Hawaiian Islands, where volcanic phenomena, both past and present, are open to observation upon the grandest scale. It may be truly said that upon these islands the process of world-building is still open to inspection.

Fortunately for science these islands have, for the past fifty years and more, been occupied by a most intelligent class of missionaries, who, at the suggestion and under the direction of Professor Dana, have kept records of observa-